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From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in
Post-WTO China
Abstract

In From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, I criticized
the ineffectiveness and short-sightedness of the U.S.-China intellectual property policy. As I argued, the
approach taken by the administration in the 1980s and early 1990s had created a cycle of futility in which
China and the United States repeatedly threatened each other with trade wars only to back down in the
eleventh hour with a compromise that did not provide sustainable improvements in intellectual property
protection. Since I wrote that article five years ago, China has joined the WTO and undertook a complete
overhaul of its intellectual property system. Because of China's WTO membership, the United States can no
longer impose unilateral sanctions on the country, as it threatened to do a decade ago. Instead, the United
States has to resolve the dispute through the WTO dispute settlement process. As the U.S. administration is
currently reviewing its options and preparing for a possible WTO dispute against China, it is timely and
important to reopen the debate about how to design an effective American intellectual property policy toward
China. This article begins by challenging the conventional view that the intellectual property law amendments
introduced in China in the wake of WTO accession were mostly introduced to conform Chinese intellectual
property laws to WTO standards. It argues that many of the amendments were created as responses to the
emerging socialist market economy and the rapidly-changing local conditions in the country. In addition, the
article takes on the recent proposals for the U.S. administration to file a formal complaint with the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body over inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China and explains
why the United States should not do so. The article then explores alternative protection strategies by
presenting five case studies in which intellectual property rights holders were able to protect their assets
without relying on intellectual property laws. It questions the effectiveness of the litigious approach taken by
foreign businesses while exploring differences between the Chinese and Western legal cultures. The article
concludes by examining the progress China made in the intellectual property arena by focusing on three
widely-reported incidents: the unauthorized reproduction, translation, and adaptation of Harry Potter novels,
the State Intellectual Property Office's recent decision to invalidate Pfizer's patent in Viagra, and the Chinese
authorities' heightened effort to protect trademarks used in relation to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past year, there has been a growing debate about whether the
United States should impose trade sanctions on China concerning
foreign exchange, textile exports, and inadequate intellectual
property protection. As Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and
Lindsey Graham (R-SC) declared in June 2005, “the time has come for
1
actions, not more words.” Four months earlier, they cosponsored a
bill that sought to impose tariffs of up to 27.5% on all Chinese imports
2
if China did not revalue its currency.
In July 2005, the United States House of Representatives passed a
bill that made it easier for American businesses to seek retaliatory
3
tariffs against subsidized Chinese exports. The Bush administration
also put substantial pressure on the Chinese authorities to limit its
textile exports and re-imposed import quotas to restrict the annual
4
growth of certain textile products to 7.5%. In addition, policymakers
and the American public have severely criticized the bid of China’s
state-run CNOOC Ltd. to purchase the California-based Unocal oil
5
company, citing national security concerns.
1. Charles E. Schumer & Lindsey O. Graham, Will It Take a Tariff to Free the Yuan?,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at A19.
2. S. 295, 109th Cong. (2005); see Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Warns China About
Currency, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at A1 (reporting that “[t]he Bush administration
warned China . . . that its currency policies were distorting world trade, and it
brandished the threat of retaliation against the country’s exports if Chinese leaders
did not change course in the next year”).
3. H.R. 3283, 109th Cong. (2005); see Warren Vieth, Bush Wins Approval of Trade
Pact, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2005, at A1 (reporting about the congressional bill that
sought retaliatory tariffs against subsidized Chinese imports).
4. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Puts Limits on Clothing from China, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2005, at C1 (reporting the Bush administration’s announcement that it would impose
new quotas on certain Chinese textile and apparel products).
5. See Steve Lohr, Who’s Afraid of China Inc.?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 3, at 1
(discussing the opposition of policymakers and the American public to CNOOC’s bid
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In response to this pressure, China voluntarily imposed export
6
tariffs on its textile and apparel products, and revalued its currency by
pegging the yuan to a basket of foreign currencies, as compared to the
7
U.S. dollar alone. Meanwhile, CNOOC withdrew its unpopular $18.5
8
billion bid for Unocal, leaving the company for its rival Chevron. To
mend the volatile bilateral relationship, Chinese President Hu Jintao
also agreed to meet with President Bush in the White House in early
9
September. Among the issues to be discussed were textile exports,
currency peg, intellectual property, nuclear nonproliferation, military
buildup, trade surplus, and human rights. Although the trip was
postponed due to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the two presidents
met during the sixtieth anniversary meeting of the United Nations
10
General Assembly.
To some extent, the recent developments are reminiscent of the
turbulent U.S.-China bilateral relationship of the late 1980s and early
1990s. At that time, the United States had a significant trade deficit
against China, as it does today. Because intellectual property-based
goods were considered key exports that helped reduce the deficit, the
first Bush and Clinton administrations sought to induce China to
strengthen intellectual property protection by threatening the country
with economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of most-favorednation status, and opposition to entry into the World Trade
11
Organization (“WTO”).
for Unocal); Jad Mouawad, Congress Calls for a Review of the Chinese Bid for Unocal, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2005, at C3 (reporting about Congress’s proposed four-month study
that would delay CNOOC’s takeover of Unocal by many months); Leslie Wayne &
David Barboza, Unocal Deal: A Lot More Than Money Is at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2005, at C4 (reporting about the opposition of congressional representatives, lawyers,
bankers, and lobbyists to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal).
6. China subsequently “lift[ed] self-imposed textile export tariffs in reaction to
quotas on the exports by the United States and European Union.” Chris Buckley,
China to End Its Taxes on Textile Exports in Retaliation for U.S. and European Quotas, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2005, at C3.
7. David Barboza & Joseph Kahn, Chinese to Stop Tying Currency Only to Dollar, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A1.
8. See David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Company Drops Bid to Buy U.S.
Oil Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A1 (reporting about CNOOC’s withdrawal of
its bid for Unocal).
9. See Cragg Hines, Why Hu Needs the Ranch Instead of the South Lawn, HOUS.
CHRON., Sept. 7, 2005, at B11 (reporting about the scheduled visit of President Hu
Jintao of China).
10. See David E. Sanger, Bush Puts Iraq, China and Iran on Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 2005, at A6 (reporting about the meeting between the presidents of China and the
United States during the sixtieth anniversary meeting of the United Nations General
Assembly).
11. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140-51 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From
Pirates to Partners] (describing the United States’ use of section 301 sanctions and
various trade threats to induce China to strengthen protection of intellectual property
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Against that background, I published an article in this Law Review
called From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
12
the Twenty-First Century, which criticized the ineffectiveness and shortsightedness of the American foreign intellectual property policy
toward China. As I argued, the coercive approach taken by the
administrations created a “cycle of futility” in which China and the
United States repeatedly threatened each other with trade wars, only
to back down in the eleventh hour with a compromise that did not
13
provide sustained improvements in intellectual property protection.
The article also expressed concerns about the resentment the policy
had created among the Chinese people and its collateral damage to
the United States’ longstanding interests in promoting free trade,
14
human rights, and the rule of law.
Since I wrote that article, China has revamped its intellectual
property system, amending the copyright, patent, and trademark laws
while introducing new implementing regulations, administrative
15
measures, and judicial interpretations.
In December 2001, the
16
Because of China’s WTO
country also joined the WTO.
membership, the United States can no longer impose unilateral
sanctions on the country concerning the lack of intellectual property
protection, as it threatened to do a decade ago. Instead, the United
States has to resolve the dispute through the mandatory WTO dispute
17
settlement process.
In February 2005, several trade groups urged the administration to
file a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
against China concerning inadequate intellectual property
18
protection. Others, however, expressed concern that formal WTO
rights).
12. Id.
13. See id. at 140-48 (discussing the “cycle of futility”).
14. Id. at 174.
15. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the legal reforms China undertook in the
wake of the WTO accession).
16. China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. For
discussions of the ramifications for China’s entry into the WTO, see generally GORDON
G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING
CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD,
CHINA AND THE WTO: CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); Symposium,
China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003).
17. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement], Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 64, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]
(mandating that disputes arising under the Agreement be settled by the WTO dispute
settlement process).
18. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the request by trade groups to file a
formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against inadequate
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actions would affect their businesses by straining the U.S.-China
bilateral relationship. As the administration reviews its options and
prepares for a possible WTO case against China, it is timely and
important to reopen the debate about the effectiveness of the
American foreign intellectual property policy toward China. The fact
that most of the existing legal research was published during the
decade-old U.S.-China intellectual property negotiations makes the
current debate even more urgent.
This Article draws on discussions in my earlier article and updates
my thoughts on how the United States should convert the Chinese
from pirates to partners. Although the Article focuses primarily on
intellectual property protection in China, it also offers insight into
legal developments in East Asia, other transition and less developed
economies, as well as the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of the
19
WTO system. In addition, the Article explores larger questions about
the difference between the Chinese and Western legal cultures, the
unique nature of intellectual property protection, and the different
considerations and concerns less developed and transition countries
have about the one-size-fits-all intellectual property system pushed by
the European Communities and the United States.
Part I of this Article examines the amendments China introduced to
its intellectual property system at the turn of the new millennium.
Although these amendments were introduced in the wake of China’s
WTO accession, this Part challenges the conventional view that these
“millennium amendments” were mostly introduced to conform
Chinese intellectual property laws to WTO standards. Instead, it
argues that many of the amendments were created as responses to
China’s rapidly-changing local conditions. This Part highlights the
importance of domestic factors in intellectual property lawmaking and
suggests that the development of local stakeholders may hold the key
to improving intellectual property protection in the country.
Part II articulates five reasons why the United States should not file
a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body over
inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China.
While this Part acknowledges that there will be benefits to using the
WTO process against China in certain intellectual property disputes, it

intellectual property protection in China).
19. See Pat K. Chew, The Rule of Law: China’s Skepticism and the Rule of People, 20
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 43, 47-48 (2005) (noting that “[b]y studying China, . . .
one can also cautiously extrapolate some of what is learned to other developing
countries’, other Asian countries’, and other transitioning socialist societies’
perceptions of the rule of law”).
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contends that the general lack of enforcement of intellectual property
rights does not present a strong case for the United States. In fact, if
the United States pursues such a weak case before the WTO, there will
be serious adverse implications for not only China and the United
States, but also the international community at large.
Part III explores alternative strategies to protect intellectual assets
owned by foreign businesses in China. This Part takes the position
that, while enforcement of intellectual property rights is important, it
is not the only tool through which American businesses protect their
assets. This Part presents six hypothetical case studies to illustrate how
intellectual property rights holders were able to protect their assets
even when intellectual property laws were not effectively enforced. In
exploring these case studies, this Part draws insight from not only legal
literature, but literature in business strategies and China studies.
Based on the success of the alternative strategies illustrated in these
case studies, this Part questions the effectiveness of the legalistic
approach usually taken by foreign businesses and explores the
differences between the Chinese and Western legal cultures.
Part IV undertakes the difficult task of examining the progress
China has made in the intellectual property arena. It focuses on three
widely-reported legal disputes that provide insight into recent
developments in Chinese intellectual property laws—in particular, the
unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, and distribution of “Harry
Potter” novels, the State Intellectual Property Office’s decision to
invalidate Pfizer’s patent in Viagra, and the Chinese authorities’
heightened efforts to protect trademarks used in relation to the 2008
Beijing Olympics. This Part contends that, although the piracy and
counterfeiting problems in China look familiar to what they were a
decade ago, many of these problems are actually quite different and,
therefore, warrant a new analytical perspective.
I.

THE MILLENNIUM AMENDMENTS

As China prepared to join the WTO, it undertook a complete
overhaul of its intellectual property system, amending the copyright,
20
patent, and trademark laws. It also introduced a large number of
20. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective
Nov. 1, 2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg/xgflfg/t20020416_
34754.htm [hereinafter Chinese Copyright Law]; Patent Law of the People’s Republic
of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984,
amended Aug. 25, 2000, effective July 1, 2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo
_English/flfg/zlflfg/ t20020327_33872.htm [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law];
Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
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implementing regulations and administrative measures. For example,
the Measures on the Registration of Computer Software replaced the
21
1991 Regulations on the Protection of Computer Software, and the
new Regulations on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated
Circuits offered for the first time sui generis protection of layout22
designs of integrated circuits. To help courts interpret the many new
laws and regulations, the Supreme People’s Court issued a number of
23
judicial interpretations.
As Xue Hong and Zheng Chengsi
explained, “[a]lthough these judicial explanations are not legislation,
they are binding within the Chinese judicial system . . . . The influence
of these judicial explanations on IP rights of enforcement should by
24
no means be overlooked.”
To make the Chinese intellectual property framework more
complicated, international treaties provide additional protection that
is not commonly found in the United States. As Article 142 of the
General Principles of Civil Law stated: “where the provisions of an
international treaty which the PRC has concluded or acceded to differ
from the civil laws of the PRC, the provisions of the international
treaty shall prevail, with the exception of those articles to which the
25
PRC has made a reservation.”
Although international treaties in
China are far from self-executing, “a foreign plaintiff could cite any of
the . . . treaties in a lawsuit against a Chinese entity if no domestic
legal recourses are available, or if Chinese domestic provisions conflict
26
with cited treaty provisions.” Nevertheless, as another commentator
pointed out, “an international treaty is applied only when the relevant

Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective Dec. 1,
2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ sipo_English/flfg/xgflfg/t20020416_34755.
htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Chinese Trademark Law].
21. Measures on the Registration of Computer Software, translated in http://www.
chinagate.com.cn/english/433.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
22. Regulations on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits
(promulgated by State Council, Apr. 2001) (P.R.C.), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_En
glish/ flfg/zlflfg/t20020402_33873.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
23. See, e.g., CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS
66-67 (2004) (listing the new judicial interpretations that dealt with trademark
protection).
24. HONG XUE & CHENGSI ZHENG, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST
CENTURY xxxvii (2002).
25. SUN, supra note 23, at 8 n.4 (translating article 142 of the General Principles of
Civil Law).
26. Id. at 8-9. The many treaties to which China is a signatory include the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, the International Convention for the Protection
of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (which is
commonly known as the Rome Convention), and the International Convention for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (“UPOV”), among others. For a list of the
international treaties to which China is a member, see id. at 8.
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law is inconsistent with the treaty. If a Chinese domestic law is
27
consistent with the treaty then local courts would apply Chinese law.”
Due to the complicated nature of the Chinese intellectual property
framework and the many reforms the country undertook in the wake
of the WTO accession, this Part focuses primarily on the major
28
amendments to the Chinese copyright, patent, and trademark laws.
Through the review of these amendments, this Part challenges the
conventional view that the legal reforms were introduced primarily to
conform the Chinese intellectual property system to WTO standards.
Instead, it argues that many of the new amendments were created as
responses to the country’s rapidly-changing local conditions.
Commentators often ignore the impact of local conditions (guo
qing) on the Chinese intellectual property system.
This Part,
therefore, focuses on these conditions, in particular the Chinese
leaders’ changing attitude toward the rule of law, the emergence of
private property rights and local stakeholders, the increasing concerns
about ambiguities over relationships in state-owned enterprises, and
the government’s active push for modernization. By highlighting the
local developments, this Part demonstrates the importance of
domestic factors in intellectual property lawmaking and suggests that
the development of local stakeholders may hold the key to improving
intellectual property protection in the country.
Among the three major intellectual property laws, the patent law
was the first to be revised, with amendments entering into effect on
29
July 1, 2001. There is no doubt that some of these amendments were
introduced to conform the statute to the Agreement on Trade-Related
30
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”). For
example, the amended law now prohibits the “offers for sale” of
27. Qingjiang Kong, Enforcement of WTO Agreements in China: Illusion or Reality?, in
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 132, 139
(Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM].
28. For comprehensive discussions of these amendments, see generally SUN, supra
note 23; XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24; Jiwen Chen, Better Patent Law for International
Commitment—The Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 61
(2001) [hereinafter Chen, Better Patent Law]; Xiaoqing Feng & Frank Xianfeng
Huang, International Standards and Local Elements: New Developments of Copyright Law in
China, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 917 (2002); Yahong Li, The Wolf Has Come: Are
China’s Intellectual Property Industries Prepared for the WTO?, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 77
(2002) [hereinafter Li, The Wolf Has Come]; Ruixue Ran, Well-Known Trademark
Protection in China: Before and After the TRIPS Amendments to China’s Trademark Law, 19
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231 (2002); Louis S. Sorell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected
Aspects of Patent Law in China and the United States, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 319 (2002).
The discussion in this Part benefits tremendously from these sources.
29. Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20.
30. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17.
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products that infringe upon invention patents and utility models. It
also tightens the standards for obtaining a compulsory license as
32
permissible under Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement while allowing
for judicial review of patent invalidations pursuant to Article 41(4) of
33
the Agreement.
However, local conditions and the rapid growth of domestic patent
rights holders have created the need for other revisions, such as the
34
simplification of the application procedures and the elimination of
the unnecessary duplication of the patent invalidation and revocation
35
processes. In addition, the amended patent law clarifies protection
of an employee’s invention by stating that the right to apply for a
patent in such an invention belongs to the employer unless a contrary
36
agreement exists.
To strengthen protection for both local and
foreign rights holders, the law also requires innocent infringers to
37
Where
prove the legitimate source of the patented product.
damages cannot be determined, the law further allows for the
38
calculation of damages based on appropriate royalties.
The new copyright law was the second to be revised, entering into
effect four months after the revised patent law. To comply with the
TRIPs Agreement, the amendments expanded copyright subject
matter to include architectural works, compilation works, and
39
databases.
They also added to the statute the right of
communication via information networks, public performance rights,
and rental rights with respect to motion pictures, audiovisual works,
31. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 11 (prohibiting the ‘offers for sale’
of products that infringe upon invention patents and utility models).
32. See id. arts. 48-50 (tightening the standards for obtaining a compulsory
license); see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 31 (laying out the conditions for
the WTO member states to introduce compulsory licenses).
33. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 46 (providing for judicial review of
patent invalidations); see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(4) (stipulating
that “[p]arties to a proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial
authority of final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a
Member’s law concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal aspects of
initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case”).
34. See Chen, Better Patent Law, supra note 28, at 67-70 (discussing the simplified
patent application process).
35. See Haitao Sun, Note, Post-Grant Patent Invalidation in China and in the United
States, Europe, and Japan: A Comparative Study, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 273, 286 (2004) (discussing how the revised patent law eliminated the
unnecessary duplication of the patent invalidation and revocation processes).
36. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 6 (stipulating that the right to apply
for a patent in an employee’s invention belongs to the employer unless a contrary
agreement exists).
37. See id. art. 63 (relieving users and sellers of liability if they can prove they
obtained the allegedly infringing product from a legitimate source).
38. Id. art. 60.
39. Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 3(4), 14.
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40

and computer software. In addition, the amendments modified the
fair use provision based on the three-step test laid out in Article 13 of
41
the TRIPs Agreement.
The copyright law amendments also contained many local elements.
For example, the expansion of copyright subject matter to acrobatic
42
art is particularly important to Chinese rights holders, but less so to
foreigners. As commentators noted, “[t]he purpose of the inclusion is
to highlight characteristic Chinese works and to protect well-known
43
acrobatics.” The inclusion of databases in the copyright statute also
can be partly attributed to the growth of domestic database
44
producers.
In addition, the revised law eliminates the double standards, or the
“super-national treatment,” in which foreign nationals enjoyed
stronger protection than Chinese nationals under the International
Copyright Treaties Implementing Rules for domestic and foreign
45
rights holders.
Taking into the account the growing number of
46
Internet users in the country, the statute addresses for the first time
47
online copyright issues. The amended law further requires that the
48
assignment of property rights in a copyrighted work be in writing and
places the burden on the accused infringer to prove the existence of a
49
legitimate license. It also modifies the existing copyright licensing
50
provisions and includes a reference to recently-enacted Chinese
51
Contract Law as a basis for the fulfillment of contractual obligations.
The trademark law was the last to be revised and entered into effect
only ten days before China’s WTO accession. Compared to its
copyright and patent counterparts, the old trademark law “was [the]
40. Id. art. 10.
41. See id. art. 22 (enumerating the conditions for the fair use privilege).
42. Id. art. 3(3).
43. XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24, at 8.
44. See id. at 17 (noting that “[t]o boost the development of electronic databases,
it was necessary to remove the limitation on the scope of compilation works, and
extend copyright protection to original databases”).
45. See id. at 12 (discussing the double standards); Feng & Huang, supra note 28,
at 919 (discussing the “super-national treatment” in which “foreign nationals enjoy
better treatment under international conventions than Chinese nationals”).
46. See discussion infra text accompanying note 104 (discussing the exponential
growth of Internet users in China).
47. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 10(12), 37(6), 41, 47
(addressing online copyright issues).
48. Id. art. 24.
49. See id. art. 52 (placing the burden on the accused infringer to prove the
existence of a legitimate license).
50. See id. arts. 24-28 (setting forth the formal requirements for the licensing of
copyrighted works).
51. See id. art. 53 (referring to the Chinese Contract Law as a basis for the
fulfillment of contractual obligations).
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52

most distant from the WTO rules.”
Many of the amendments,
therefore, focused on conforming the law to the TRIPs Agreement.
For example, the amendments expanded the registrable subject
53
matter to three-dimensional marks and color marks and added
protection to certification marks, collective marks, and geographical
54
indications. In addition, the revised law strengthens and clarifies
protection of well-known marks by recognizing unregistered wellknown marks and delineating factors used to determine the “well55
known” status of the mark. The new law also removes the time limit
56
for challenging marks acquired by fraud or other unfair means and
includes judicial review of all trademark office administrative
decisions, including those on opposition and cancellation, refusals of
57
registration, and trademark infringement.
Apart from substantive changes, the amended copyright, patent,
and trademark laws also strengthen enforcement of intellectual
property rights. For example, the new laws now allow for preliminary
injunctions that can be applied before or shortly after initiating the
58
lawsuit. In situations where the plaintiff’s damages or the infringer’s
profits cannot be determined, the laws provide for maximum statutory
59
damages of RMB 500,000 (about $60,000).
In addition, the laws allow enforcement authorities to confiscate
60
income from infringing products and to impose fines on violators.
52. Chengsi Zheng, Looking into the Revision of the Trade Mark and Copyright Laws
from the Perspective of China’s Accession to WTO, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 313, 313
(2002).
53. Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 8 (offering protection to threedimensional marks and color marks).
54. Id. art. 3.
55. Id. arts. 13-14. In determining the “well-known” status of a trademark, one
must take into consideration the following factors:
(1) reputation of the mark to the relevant public;
(2) time for continued use of the mark;
(3) consecutive time, extent and geographical area of advertisement of the mark;
(4) records of protection of the mark as a well-known mark; and
(5) any other factors relevant to the reputation of the mark.
Id. art. 14.
56. See id. art. 41 (exempting from the five-year limit those trademarks registered
in bad faith).
57. Id. arts. 32-34, 43, 49.
58. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 49 (providing for preliminary
injunctions); Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 61 (same); Chinese Trademark
Law, supra note 20, art. 57 (same).
59. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 48 (providing for statutory
damages); AIIPI, Punitive Damages as a Contentious Issue of Intellectual Property Rights, at
1-2, http://www.aippi.org/reports/q186/q186_china.pdf (stating that article 21 of
the Supreme Court Patent Trial Provisions provided maximum statutory damages of
RMB 500,000); Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 56 (providing for statutory
damages).
60. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 47 (permitting enforcement
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To help preserve evidence and property, the laws also authorize
administrative agencies and courts to confiscate and destroy infringing
products and materials, as well as the tools and equipment used in the
61
manufacturing process. Finally, foreign rights holders may enforce
62
their rights through both local and national authorities. All of the
63
laws provide for criminal liability; the trademark law, in particular,
requires enforcement authorities to transfer cases to a judicial body
64
for criminal investigation.
Although policymakers, business executives, and commentators are
65
generally satisfied with the major intellectual property amendments,
some aspects of the Chinese intellectual property laws remain
inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement. As Li Yahong observed:
[U]nder the Chinese Copyright Law, a computer program is still
not protected as a “literary work.” With respect to the Chinese
Trademark Law, the following aspects are problematic: (1) only
goods, not services, are mentioned in the protection of well-known
marks, (2) registration is required for well-known marks, and (3) no
protection is provided for geographical indications for wines and
spirits. . . . Further, the Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law . . .
authorities to confiscate unlawful income and to impose fine on violators); Chinese
Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 58 (same); Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art.
53 (same).
61. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 47, 51 (authorizing
administrative agencies and courts to confiscate and destroy infringing products and
materials, as well as the tools and equipment used in the manufacturing process);
Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 61 (same); Chinese Trademark Law, supra
note 20, art. 53 (same).
62. See SUN, supra note 23, at 11 (stating that “foreign companies can directly
request administrative enforcement to be conducted by local IP authorities”).
63. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 47 (providing for criminal
liability); Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 58 (same); Chinese Trademark Law,
supra note 20, art. 59 (same).
64. See Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 59 (requiring enforcement
authorities to transfer cases to a judicial body for criminal investigation). Such an
explicit provision is needed considering the limited number of cases transferred from
the administrative authorities to police and prosecutors for criminal prosecution. As
Daniel Chow noted:
[I]n 1997, of the 15,321 trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases
brought by all levels of the AIC [Administration of Industry and Commerce]
nationwide, only 57 cases, or 1 in every 269 cases, were transferred to PSBs
[Public Security Bureaus] for prosecution. In 1998, of 14,736 trademark
infringement and counterfeiting actions brought by AICs, only 35 cases, or 1
in every 421 cases, were transferred to PSBs. In 1999, of the 16,938 cases
brought by AICs, only 21, or 1 in every 807 cases, were transferred to PSBs.
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES AND PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 217 (2002).
65. See Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 88 (remarking that the revised
patent law is “the closest to being in complete compliance” with the TRIPs
Agreement); Sun, supra note 35, at 280 (observing that “[a]mong China’s IP laws, the
Patent Law is considered the closest to being in complete compliance with TRIPS; any
deviations are relatively minor”).
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requires “practicability” for a trade secret to be protected, while no
such requirement exists in TRIPS. Finally, China has not provided
protection for data concerning the marketing of pharmaceutical or
agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical entities, as
66
required by TRIPS.

Notwithstanding these inadequacies, policymakers and foreign rights
holders have since turned their attention to enforcement reforms,
rather than legal ones. Their only remaining statutory concerns
67
involve the protection of trade secrets, and the protection against
68
unfair competition.
When policymakers and commentators discuss the “millennium
amendments,” they often describe the changes as a response to
69
China’s WTO accession. Even Chinese policymakers make similar
statements, hoping that such a description would help earn goodwill
in the international community while demonstrating to the outside
world that China intends to be a respectful member of the WTO. For
example, an official in the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has
declared, “[i]n the IPR area, the amendment of IPR laws and
regulations on a large scale was initiated with a view to bringing the
IPR protection system in line with the requirements laid out by the
70
TRIPS Agreement.”
On their face, these statements seem valid. The WTO Agreements
and China’s accession agreements, for example, have called for
greater transparency, the provision of judicial review, and rule of law

66. Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 88-89.
67. See SUN, supra note 23, at 91 (observing that “China has not adopted any new
national procedure or substantive rules offering civil or administrative remedies to
proprietors of trade secrets since 2001”). As Peter Feng pointed out, trade secrets in
China originally “were by definition a matter of state secrets,” because the society was
“dominated by a centrally planned socialist command economy.” PETER FENG,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 385 (2d ed. 2003). However, as China undergoes
transition from a command economy to a socialist market economy, trade secret
protection has been increasingly inadequate.
68. See Chengsi Zheng, TRIPS and the Amendment of Unfair-Competition Laws in
China, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 231 (Henry Gao & Donald Lewis eds.,
2005) (discussing the inadequacy of the Chinese unfair competition laws and the
need for reforms to enable the laws to comply with the TRIPs Agreement).
69. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE USTR, 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 95 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 NTE REPORT],
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_N
TE_Report/asset_upload_file469_7460.pdf (stating that, “[i]n anticipation of its
accession to the WTO, China began modifying the full range of IPR laws, regulations
and implementing rules, including those relating to patents, trademarks and
copyrights, in an effort to comply with the TRIPS Agreement”).
70. Shi Miaomiao, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations and Implementation of
Its Accession Commitments, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 68, at 23,
32 [hereinafter Shi, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations].
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71

developments in China. Article 41(4) of the TRIPs Agreement also
specifies an obligation in the WTO member states to provide judicial
72
Upon close scrutiny,
review of final administrative decisions.
however, these statements are incomplete, if not misleading. While
the amendments were undeniably introduced at a time when China
prepared to enter the WTO, it is an overstatement, or a half-truth, to
claim that the amendments were introduced primarily to conform the
Chinese intellectual property system to WTO standards. Such a
statement would ignore the important changes in the socialist market
economy, the internal dynamics of the intellectual property
lawmaking process, and contributions of the local stakeholders in the
legal reforms. More problematic, by creating a misimpression that
external pressure was the key to improved intellectual property
protection in the country, the claim would misguide the development
of future U.S.-China intellectual property policies.
Indeed, the TRIPs Agreement did not require many of the
millennium amendments; rather, they were necessitated by China’s
rapidly-changing local conditions, such as the emergence of the
socialist market economy, the growing constituency of domestic rights
holders, and the need for economic stimulus to accelerate China’s
modernization efforts. To illustrate the impact of these domestic
factors on intellectual property law reforms, this Part focuses on the
provisions concerning an employee’s invention, the use of contracts,
private collective societies, online copyright infringement, and
geographical indications.
A. Socialist Market Economy
Article 6 of the Chinese Patent Law provides that the right to apply
for a patent for an employee’s invention belongs to the employer
73
unless a contrary agreement exists. The amended law eliminates an
ambiguity of the old law concerning situations where the employer’s

71. See, e.g., Rule of Law Issues in China’s Accession to the WTO, INT’L L. NEWS, Winter
2003, at 4 (reviewing comments by the ABA’s China Law Committee regarding
China’s efforts to comply with international standards).
72. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(4) (stipulating that “[p]arties to a
proceeding shall have an opportunity for review by a judicial authority of final
administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional provisions in a Member’s law
concerning the importance of a case, of at least the legal aspects of initial judicial
decisions on the merits of a case”).
73. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 6 (stipulating that, “[i]n respect of
an invention-creation made by a person using the material and technical means of an
entity to which he belongs, where the entity and the inventor or creator have entered
into a contract in which the right to apply for and own a patent is provided for, such a
provision shall apply”).
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equipment and resources were used to create the patent-seeking
74
invention. As Peter Feng noted years ago about the protection of
software, which is similar to that of patents, there was always “the
notorious classroom conundrum: who owns the copyright of software
if it was developed outside one’s normal and assigned duty, but with
75
the assistance of the material means of the employing unit.” The
revised patent statute, however, has made the answer to this question
clear: if the employee has an agreement, the law gives the employee
76
the right to apply for a patent in China.
This revision reflects the many economic changes in China in the
past decade. While state-owned enterprises dominated the Chinese
economy a decade ago, the number of private enterprises has greatly
increased, and a large number of employees of state-owned
enterprises are now rushing to enter the private sector. In the
software industry, for example,
many software engineers [in recent years] resigned from state
enterprises or research institutes, taking software products (finished
or unfinished) created during the course of employment with them,
and joined private software companies or established their own
companies. These private companies immediately produced and
marketed the software products, and became competitors of state
77
software enterprises.

What was once a “classroom conundrum,” therefore, has now become
78
The revised Article 6, therefore, was
a major business problem.
needed even without the WTO accession.
Consider the use of contracts in copyright law, as another example.
Although the implementing regulations of the old copyright statute
required that copyright contracts and licenses be in writing, “the
old . . . Copyright Law did not specify that copyright assignment and
79
licensing must be in writing.”
The copyright law amendments,
however, clarified the law by requiring a written contract for the
80
assignment of rights protected under the law and by upgrading the
74. See Chen, Better Patent Law, supra note 28, at 66-67 (discussing the ambiguity in
the definition of an employee’s inventions).
75. PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 132 (1st ed. 1997).
76. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 6 (stipulating that the right to apply
for a patent for an employee’s invention belongs to the employer unless a contrary
agreement exists).
77. XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24, at 104-05.
78. See id. at 105 (noting that “ownership disputes over the software developed by
the employees become a hot issue in China”).
79. SUN, supra note 23, at 54.
80. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 25 (stipulating that
“[a]ssignment of a right referred to in Article 10, paragraphs (5) to (17), of [the
Copyright] Law shall require conclusion of a contract in writing”).
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requirement from a lower regulation-level authority to a higher
81
statute-level authority. Article 53 of the Chinese Copyright Law also
includes, as a basis for the fulfillment of contractual obligations, a
82
reference to the Chinese Contract Law.
In addition, the Law includes provisions that cover assignment of
rights and use of contracts. Although copyrights had been widely
assigned before the most recent amendments, assignment of rights
had not been formally included in the copyright statute. The 1990
Copyright Law, for example, included “a chapter on copyright
licensing contracts, but there was no provision concerning copyright
83
assignment.” The amendments thereafter “expanded [the copyright
law] to cover the assignment of property rights in a copyrightable
84
work.”
In addition, the law permits contracting parties to freely
85
negotiate the duration of their licenses, as compared to the ten-year
renewable terms stipulated in the old copyright law.
Combined together, the above two examples show Chinese leaders’
increasing comfort with the market economy, protection of private
property, and freedom of contract. This growing comfort has become
especially apparent when one contrasts it with the dilemma Chinese
policymakers had when they were considering whether they should
86
introduce a new patent system in the mid-1980s. On the one hand,
they wanted to create a stimulus for inventions and to rehabilitate
scientists, inventors, and academics, many of whom suffered during
87
the Cultural Revolution.
On the other hand, they were greatly
concerned about the changes a new system would bring to the
country’s command economy, which was quite different from today’s
socialist market economy. As a result of this dilemma, early Chinese
81. See Feng & Huang, supra note 28, at 920 (noting that “a unique dynamic
behind the revision of the 1990 Copyright Law is the upgrading of certain
fundamental features from lower level authorities, particularly the 1991 Regulations,
to the Copyright Law itself”); see also Kong, supra note 27, at 135-36 (discussing the
hierarchy of Chinese laws and regulations at the national and provincial levels).
82. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 53 (referring to the Chinese
Contract Law as a basis for the fulfillment of contractual obligations).
83. XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24, at 22.
84. See SUN, supra note 23, at 54 (noting that the assignment of rights had not
been formally included in the 1990 Copyright Law).
85. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 24-25 (setting forth formal
requirements for the licensing of copyrighted works).
86. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 136-37 (discussing the
reluctance of Chinese leaders to introduce a new intellectual property system that
might conflict with the socialist economy).
87. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 65 (1995) (stating that China’s post-Cultural
Revolution leadership believed “the promotion of scientific and other intellectual
work to be crucial if the nation were to make up for the decade of development and
training lost to the Cultural Revolution”).
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intellectual property laws were filled with compromises that resulted
in what commentators have called “socialist legality with Chinese
88
characteristics.”
In 1992, following Deng Xiaoping’s famous “tour” in Southern
China, the National People’s Congress incorporated the concept of
89
the socialist market economy into the Chinese Constitution.
Amended in March 1993, Article 15 of the Constitution now reads:
“The state has put into practice a socialist market economy. The State
strengthens formulating economic laws, improves macro adjustment
and control and forbids according to law any units or individuals from
90
interfering with the social economic order.” In 1997, the private
sector was designated an important component of the changing
economy, and “red capitalists” were invited to join the Chinese
91
Community Party at the Sixteenth Party Congress four years later.
Today, the Constitution stipulates that “[c]itizens’ lawful private
92
property is inviolable,” and the real estate markets in major Chinese
cities have been booming.
As the Chinese socialist market economy develops, some of the
compromises in the early intellectual property laws are no longer
needed. As two Chinese legal commentators explained in the
copyright context:
[S]ignificant social and economic changes have taken place in
China since the enactment of the 1990 Copyright Law. The
fundamental economic structure of the country has been further
transformed from a central planning system (“command economy”)
into a socialist market economy. Based on predominant Chinese
legal theory, law in general, and copyright law in particular, is part
of a “superstructure” the content of which must reflect the ordering
of its underlying economic base. From such perspective, law must
be adjusted commensurate to its changing socio-economic context.
Since the 1990 Copyright Law was enacted at a stage during which
the influence of the “command” tradition was still sizeable, it
unavoidably bears the hallmark of a command economy and
therefore needs to be reconfigured to suit socialist market
93
paradigms.

88. See id. at 70 (using the 1984 Chinese Patent Law to illustrate “socialist legality
with Chinese characteristics”).
89. CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, THREE BILLION NEW CAPITALISTS: THE GREAT SHIFT OF
WEALTH AND POWER TO THE EAST 27 (2005).
90. XIAN FA art. 15 (1982) (amended 2004) (P.R.C.) (emphasis added).
91. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 89, at 27.
92. XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) (amended 2004) (P.R.C.).
93. Feng & Huang, supra note 28, at 917.
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Moreover, the notion of private profit became justifiable as the
market developed. Indeed, “[w]hen experiments began in enterprises
to replace profit quotas with taxation, many units saw exploiting
patent rights as a good way to keep more profit for themselves, taking
advantage of the new tax incentives for research in and exploitation of
94
patented technology.” At the turn of the millennium, the National
People’s Congress took advantage of the millennium amendments to
remove the outdated provisions and to align the Chinese intellectual
property system with the socialist market economy.
B. Domestic Rights Holders
Since the enactment of the 1990 Copyright Law, a large number of
domestic copyright holders have emerged. To facilitate transactions
among these rights holders, Article 8 of the revised copyright law
provides that copyright holders “may authorize an organization for
collective administration of copyright to exercise the copyright or any
95
copyright-related right.” This new provision expressly permits the
creation of private collective copyright administration bodies, which,
upon authorization, can act, litigate, or arbitrate on behalf of the
96
copyright holders they represent. The oft-cited example of these
collective bodies is the Music Copyright Society of China. As one
commentator described:
Until 2000, there was only one organization, the Music Copyright
Society of China (MCSC) established on December 17, 1992, that
was allowed to act on behalf of its collective members. The MCSC
represents Chinese singers, composers, music adaptors, heirs, music
publishers and recording companies of Chinese nationality. It
currently has more than 2500 members. Since then, a few other
97
collective bodies have also been established.

In light of the growing number of private collective societies, one
may wonder whether Article 8 is an example of the rent-seeking
98
legislation widely criticized by Western commentators. Indeed, the
rent-seeking argument becomes even stronger when one takes into
94. FENG, supra note 67, at 168.
95. Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 8.
96. See id. (stipulating that “[a]fter authorization, the organization for collective
administration of copyright may, in its own name, claim the right for the copyright
owners and copyright-related right holders, and participate, as an interested party, in
litigation or arbitration relating to the copyright or copyright-related right”).
97. SUN, supra note 23, at 63; see also XUE & ZHENG, supra note 24, at 32 (stating
that MCSC “has successfully collected royalties for using background music from 68
Chinese hotels in May 2001”).
98. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (discussing how the
U.S. copyright law has expanded as a result of industry lobbying efforts).
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account the lack of presence of foreign collective bodies in the
99
Nevertheless, regardless of whether Article 8 was the
country.
product of lobby efforts by MCSC and other private collective
societies, one cannot deny that the political leverage of local copyright
holders has increased substantially in the past decade.
C. Modernization Efforts
In December 1996, members of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”) adopted the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty to update international
intellectual property norms in light of changes to the digital
100
environment.
In strong resemblance to these two treaties, which
101
entered into force in 2002, Article 47(6) prohibits the
intentional[] circumventi[on] or destr[uction of] the technological
measures taken by a right holder for protecting the copyright or
copyright-related rights in his work, sound recording or video
recording, without the permission of the copyright owner, or the
owner of the copyright-related rights, unless otherwise provided in
102
law or in administrative regulations.

Article 47(7) also prohibits the “intentional[] delet[ion] or alter[ation
of] the electronic right management information of a work, sound
recording or video recording, without the permission of the copyright
owner or the owner of a copyright-related right, unless otherwise
103
provided in law or in administrative regulations.” These provisions
are neither mandated by the TRIPs Agreement nor have anything to
do with the WTO, even if we broadly define China’s WTO
commitments. Rather, they were included as part of China’s
preparation to accede to the WIPO Internet Treaties.
Such preparation is important for two reasons. First, the Internet
population has been growing exponentially in China. In the latest
survey conducted by the China Internet Network Information Center
(“CNNIC”), the country presently has an Internet population of more

99. Compare SUN, supra note 23, at 63 (stating that it is unclear whether foreign
copyright holders may form or join private collective societies in China), with XUE &
ZHENG, supra note 24, at 32 (noting that “the International Copyright Treaties
Implementing Rules recognize the function of foreign collective copyright
management organizations”).
100. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65; WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
101. The WIPO Copyright Treaty entered into force on March 6, 2002, and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty entered into force on May 20, 2002.
102. Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, art. 47(6).
103. Id. art. 47(7).
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104

than 110 million, behind only the United States. As the use of the
Internet and new communications technologies increases, disputes
over digital copyright infringement will surface in courts. By
including the online infringement provisions, the law provides
certainty over the scope of rights protected on the Internet. Such
certainty is important to both local and foreign Internet content
providers and will greatly facilitate electronic commerce and
broadband deployment.
Second, as demonstrated by the many bilateral and regional free
trade agreements less developed countries have signed, the European
Communities and the United States have been very aggressive in
pushing for provisions that align local laws with the WIPO Internet
105
Treaties.
Indeed, as the administration stated in the 2005 National
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, “[t]he United States
considers the WIPO treaties to reflect many key international norms
for providing copyright protection over the Internet . . . [and] China’s
accession to the WIPO treaties is an increasingly important priority for
106
If China did not include the provisions in the
the United States.”
millennium amendments, it eventually would still have had to respond
to the United States’ pressure. In that scenario, China would have to
divert the scarce resources it could otherwise use on reforms or
modernization projects that are not related to digital copyright issues.
Moreover, the early adoption of the WIPO provisions sent a strong
signal to the international community that the country was taking
107
intellectual property obligations seriously.
This allowed China to
earn goodwill despite its continuing struggle to improve intellectual
property protection. Having in place a well-developed framework may
also ensure that the terms of the debate are not framed solely by the
108
United States.

104. See CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER, 17TH STATISTICAL SURVEY
REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, 4 (2005), http://www.cnnic.net.cn/
download/2006/17threport-en.pdf (stating that China has an Internet population of
more than 110 million).
105. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property
Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004) (discussing the growing use of
bilateral and regional free trade agreements to strengthen intellectual property
abroad).
106. 2005 NTE REPORT, supra note 69, at 96.
107. See id. at 95-96 (calling attention to the progress China has recently made in
the area of intellectual property protection).
108. Cf. Jonathan Berger, Advancing Public Health by Other Means: Using Competition
Policy, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 181,
196-97 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) (explaining why less developed countries should
invest resources in creating a competition regime before they are required to do so).
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The final example concerns the protection of geographical
indications, which has been fairly controversial in the international
arena. Although the TRIPs Agreement requires protection of
109
geographical indications, it provides WTO member states with a
great deal of freedom and latitude in implementing the provisions.
Indeed, the regimes adopted by Europe and the United States are very
110
different.
While European countries offer protection of
geographical indications and appellations of origin, the United States
protects geographical indications as mere collective or certification
marks.
Most recently, the United States, along with Australia and other
countries, challenged the European Communities before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body over the lack of protection of trademarks
and geographical indications for agricultural products and
111
foodstuffs.
As the United States claimed, the European
Communities violated the TRIPs Agreement by failing to provide
protection to pre-existing trademarks similar or identical to a
geographical indication, by limiting the geographical indications the
Communities will protect, and by limiting the access of nationals of
other WTO member states to the procedures and protections
provided under the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 of 14 July
1992 on the Protection of Geographical Indications and Designations
112
of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs.
Although the
Dispute Settlement Panel found that the European Communities
failed to provide national treatment to the rights holders and products
of other member states, it considered the substantive protection of
geographical indications under the EC system consistent with the
113
TRIPs Agreement.

109. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 22-23 (requiring protection for
geographical indications).
110. For an overview of protection of geographical indications and the discussions
of the differences between the European Communities and the United States, see
generally Lee Bendekgey & Caroline H. Mead, International Protection of Appellations of
Origin and Other Geographic Indications, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 765 (1992); Albrecht
Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the TRIPs Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK
REP. 11 (1996); Paul Heald, Trademarks and Geographic Indications: Exploring the
Contours of the TRIPs Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 635 (1996).
111. Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005)
[hereinafter Geographical Indications Panel Report].
112. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the Protection of
Geographical Indications and Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 9.
113. See Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note 111.
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The revised Chinese trademark law adopted the American model of
geographical indications protection.
Article 3 of the revised
trademark law provides for the protection of geographical
114
indications, and Rule 6 of the Implementing Regulations of the
Trademark Law states that a geographical indication can be registered
115
as a certification or collective mark. Given the controversy, one may
wonder why China did not adopt the European model when it had an
opportunity to do so. The answer to this question is simple: China
was protecting geographical indications as certification marks before
116
the amendments, and the adoption of the U.S. model would allow
the country to devote its modernization efforts to other more
important areas. After all, “[f]rom the perspective of Chinese law
reformers, the adoption of international norms is to serve domestic
modernization needs and shall always be guided by Chinese social
117
In embracing the status quo, the amendments not only
realities.”
avoided the need to introduce a new form of protection that might
create adverse effects on the local community, but they also left the
battle with the European Communities over geographical indications
to the United States and other countries. It is, therefore, no surprise
that China joined Australia and the United States as a third party in
European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
118
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs.
D. Summary
In sum, the millennium amendments were enacted not merely to
conform the Chinese intellectual property system to WTO standards,
but also to meet the country’s rapidly-changing local conditions.
Specifically, these conditions include the emergence of private
property rights and local stakeholders, the increasing concerns about
ambiguities over relationships with state-owned enterprises, and the
government’s active push for economic modernization. Even the
114. Chinese Trademark Law, supra note 20, art. 3.
115. Implementing Regulations of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of
China, Rule 6, http://www.saic.gov.cn/flfg/flfg_detail.asp?flfgid=1313.
116. This is not a new rule, even though the old trademark law did not explicitly
provide protection for geographical indications. As one commentator noted,
“[b]efore [the] amendment, a geographical indication could be protected as a
certification trademark in China.” Xie Lejun, Protection of Appellations of Origin in
China, 1 CHINA PATENTS & TRADEMARKS 74, 74 (2001), quoted in Li, The Wolf Has Come,
supra note 28, at 85; see also PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 88 (2005) (observing that “[b]etween 1995 and May 2004, 110
geographical indications were registered and approved by the Trade Mark Office as
certification marks or collective marks”).
117. Feng & Huang, supra note 28, at 921.
118. Geographical Indications Panel Report, supra note 111.
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transparency and rule of law amendments were partly introduced in
response to the Chinese leaders’ changing attitude toward the rule of
law, their eagerness to reduce corruption and local protectionism, and
their determination to provide policy consistency and clarity as well as
to streamline the judicial and administrative processes.
As Peter Feng noted, “[t]oday, more and more things are being
done in the name of a rights discourse, as opposed to political
119
privileges, moral duties and class status.”
Thus, the transparency
and rule of law amendments need to be viewed against this
background, even though the WTO Agreements and China’s
accession agreements have posed new demands on the Chinese
intellectual property system. Taking note of these background and
local demands, it is a small wonder that Professor Feng summarized
the recent legislative development as follows:
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in December 2001
spurred a legislative frenzy. All major intellectual property statutes
were substantially revised and supplemented with new
administrative regulations and judicial interpretations, for the sake
of compliance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) standards. But more importantly,
the transparency and anti-corruption reforms in the practice and
procedure of the People’s Court, government units, cadre system
and state-owned enterprises, in conjunction with the central
leadership’s official endorsement of a “rule of law” strategy of social
control, all have worked to give law enforcement in general, and
intellectual property in particular, new meanings and hence new
120
challenges, quite unimaginable in the 1990s.

II. THE WTO DISPUTE
In February 2005, several trade groups, including the International
Intellectual Property Alliance, the National Association of
Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, recommended
that the Bush administration take WTO action against China
121
concerning its lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights.
119. FENG, supra note 67, at 6.
120. Id. at ix (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., Letter from Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA, to Sybia Harrison, Special
Assistant to the Section 301 Committee, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Feb.
9, 2005) [hereinafter IIPA Submission], http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2005/ CHINA%20
2005_Feb9_PRC_OCR_Submission.pdf (recommending that “USTR immediately
request consultations with China in the World Trade Organization, and that it place
China on the Priority Watch List pending an out-of-cycle review to be concluded by
July 31, at which time further appropriate multilateral and bilateral action, including
the possible establishment of a dispute settlement panel in the WTO, will be

YU.OFFTOPRINTER

924

6/11/2006 2:51:07 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:901

Such action was not available a decade ago, when China was still
outside the WTO. At that time, the United States had to rely on
threats of trade sanctions, threats of non-renewal of most favored
nation status, and opposition to entry into the WTO to induce China
to strengthen intellectual property protection. As I discussed in my
earlier article, these threats were largely ineffective and had led to
what I described as the “cycle of futility,” in which China and the
United States threatened each other with trade wars, only to back
down in the eleventh hour with a compromise that did not provide
122
sustained improvements in intellectual property protection.
The
threats also created resentment among the Chinese people while
inflicting collateral damage on the United States’ longstanding
123
interests in promoting free trade, human rights, and the rule of law.
This time, however, China has joined the WTO, and the United
States can no longer effectively threaten the country with unilateral
trade sanctions. Under the TRIPs Agreement, all intellectual property
disputes arising under the Agreement are required to be settled by the
124
The WTO process
mandatory WTO dispute settlement process.
prohibits a member state from taking retaliatory measures before it
125
has exhausted all of the actions permissible under the rules.
Although unilateral sanctions are out of the question unless the
United States withdraws from the WTO or unless the dispute falls
126
outside the scope of the WTO agreements, China’s membership
determined”); NAT’L ASS’N OF MANUFACTURERS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS’ RECOMMENDATIONS ON SPECIAL 301 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF CHINA
(2005),
http://www.nam.org/s_nam/doc1.asp?CID=164&DID=233159
(recommending that the U.S. government, upon determining China’s designation as
a Priority Foreign Country, “[b]egin preparations for filing a dispute settlement case
before the World Trade Organization (WTO), contingent upon whether real results
become apparent in terms of a pronounced decrease in counterfeiting in China”);
U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., SUBMISSION FOR USTR’S SPECIAL 301 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW ON
CHINA’S
IPR
PROTECTION
AND
ENFORCEMENT
(2005),
http://www.uschamber.com/international/regional/asia/050210ocr_submission.htm
(recommending that “the Office of the United States Trade Representative . . . should
immediately request consultations with China in the World Trade Organization”); Pat
Choate, The Pirate Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005, at A27 (contending that “[t]he
United States should bring an intellectual property case against China at the W.T.O”).
122. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 140-48 (discussing the “cycle of
futility”).
123. See id. at 174 (suggesting that the United States’ actions may have discredited
the idea that individual rights are to be respected and protected through the legal
process).
124. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 64.
125. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
126. See H.J.R. Res. 27, 109th Cong. (2005) (calling for the United States’
withdrawal from the WTO) (rejected by the House by a vote of 338-86); see also
Editorial, A Terrible Idea, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 6, 2005, at A26 (contending that
Congress would be shortsighted to support a WTO withdrawal); see generally COBURN:
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gives the United States a new process that includes consultations,
negotiations, dispute settlement, and arbitration. To initiate this
process, the United States needs to file a formal complaint with the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
In April 2005, the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(“USTR”) released the long-awaited results of its out-of-cycle review on
127
China. The report stated that “[t]he United States remains gravely
concerned . . . that China has not resolved critical deficiencies in IPR
protection and enforcement and, as a result, infringements remain at
128
epidemic levels.”
Based on these concerns, the USTR elevated
China to the Priority Watch List, marking the country’s first
appearance on the list due to inadequate compliance with the TRIPs
Agreement as well as other commitments made at the April 2004
129
meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.
The
administration also expressed its intention to invoke the transparency
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement to formally request information
concerning selected intellectual property enforcement issues,
130
including criminal and administrative penalties.
To the disappointment of major trade groups and some legislators,
the USTR decided against filing a formal complaint with the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body following its out-of-cycle review. Had the
administration done so, the complaint would have marked the second
dispute the United States filed against China with the WTO Dispute
131
Settlement Body.
Nevertheless, the USTR stated in its report its
intention to “use WTO instruments whenever appropriate to address . . .
concerns regarding the unacceptable levels of counterfeiting and
132
piracy in China.”

WTO Ignoring Intellectual Property Concerns, NAT’L J.’S TECH. DAILY, July 18, 2005
(reporting Senator Coburn’s concern that the WTO process had made it difficult for
the United States to protect intellectual property in China).
127. OFFICE OF THE USTR, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW RESULTS (2005) [hereinafter 2005
OUT-OF-CYCLE
REVIEW],
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/
Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Special_301/asset_upload_file835_7647.pdf.
128. Id. at 1.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id.
131. The first dispute concerned a tax break favoring computer chips produced or
designed in China. Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Valueadded Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/1 (July 14, 2004) [hereinafter China—
Value-added Tax on Integrated Circuits]; see also Paul Blustein, China Agrees to Resolve
Dispute Over Tax Breaks, WASH. POST, July 9, 2004, at E1 (reporting that China settled
with the United States over its first complaint with the WTO); Terril Yue Jones & Bill
Sing, China, U.S. Settle WTO Chip Dispute, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at C1 (reporting
about the first WTO dispute between China and the United States).
132. 2005 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW, supra note 127, at 8 (emphasis added).
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Disappointed by the announcement, Senator Byron Dorgan
introduced a resolution calling for the USTR to bring a formal
complaint before the WTO regarding violations of intellectual
133
property rights in China. Meanwhile, U.S. business groups repeated
134
their requests for the administration to take formal WTO action.
The USTR is currently reviewing its options and has been preparing
its WTO dispute. In a recent congressional hearing, a USTR official
stated that the WTO case against China is currently in its fact-finding
135
phase.
In October 2005, the United States invoked Article 63(3) of the
TRIPs Agreement to formally request “clarifications regarding specific
cases of IPR enforcement that China has identified for the years 2001
136
through 2004, and other relevant cases.” The request was “made in
137
conjunction with similar requests by Japan and Switzerland.”
Despite its request, the country has yet to file a complaint before the
WTO. The USTR’s “wait-and-see” approach is understandable.
Although the WTO dispute settlement process provides an effective
tool to improve intellectual property protection in China, the general
lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights does not present a
strong case for the United States. If the United States pursues such a
weak case before the WTO, there will be serious adverse implications
for not only China and the United States, but also the international
community at large. This Part explains why the United States should
133. See S. Res. 142, 109th Cong. (2005) (calling for the USTR to bring a formal
complaint before the WTO regarding violations of intellectual property rights in
China).
134. See, e.g., Letter from Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA to Gloria Blue, Executive
Secretary, Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (Sept. 9, 2005), http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPA%20China%20TSPC%
20WTO%20compliance%20Written%20Comments%20FINAL%2009092005.pdf
(reiterating its recommendation that “USTR immediately request consultations with
China in the World Trade Organization”); Richard McGregor, US Threatens to Take
Film Piracy War with China to WTO, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at 9 (reporting that the
U.S. movie industry “threatened to push for action against China in the World Trade
Organization as illegal DVD copies of the latest Star Wars movie went on sale on
Beijing’s streets just a few days after its opening”).
135. See COBURN: WTO Ignoring Intellectual Property Concerns, supra note 126
(reporting that James Mendenhall, acting general counsel of the USTR, had stated
that the WTO case “was still in the fact-finding phase” and that while there is
“widespread anecdotal evidence” that Chinese companies are engaging in piracy,
“knowing it intuitively is different from being able to prove it in dispute settlement”).
136. Letter from Peter F. Allgeier, United States Trade Representative, to H.E. Mr.
Sun Zhenyu, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to
the World Trade Organization (Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Documen
t_Library/ Reports_Publications/2005/asset_upload_file115_8232.pdf.
137. OFFICE OF THE USTR, U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS: ENTERING A NEW PHASE OF
GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT—TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW 14 (2006),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/asset_up
load_file921_8938.pdf.
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not file a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
over inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China.
A. Lack of Definition
Although the TRIPs Agreement stipulates that each WTO member
state needs to provide effective intellectual property enforcement, it
138
does not define what constitutes “effective” protection. There is no
doubt that a software piracy rate of ninety percent, as stated in a
recent study by the Business Software Alliance, provides strong
139
evidence of ineffective enforcement.
However, critics have
challenged the accuracy of these figures. For example, Gary Shapiro,
the president of the Consumer Electronics Association, described the
140
figures as “[a]bsurd on its face” and “patently obscene.”
Indeed,
because the numbers were supplied by a self-interested trade group,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel is unlikely to take them at face
141
value.
Moreover, everything is relative. If the study by the Business
Software Alliance was accurate—that is a very big if—we should not
ignore the fact that the United States has a software piracy rate of
twenty-one percent while other developed countries, like France, Italy,
and Spain, have piracy rates that range from the mid-forties to the low142
fifties.
A piracy rate of ninety percent for a country that did not
have intellectual property laws twenty-five years ago is not as
problematic as a rate of forty to fifty percent for a country that has had
a well-established intellectual property system for more than two
centuries.
In fact, as some commentators have suggested, one could interpret
the word “effective” in light of the public policy goals set forth in the
138. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(1) (requiring that each WTO
member state offer effective intellectual property enforcement, without providing a
definition of what constitutes “effective” protection).
139. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE & INT’L DATA CORP., SECOND ANNUAL BSA AND IDC
GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (2005) [hereinafter GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY],
http://www.bsa.org/globalstudy/upload/2005-Global-Study-English.pdf.
140. Software Piracy: BSA or Just BS?, THE ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 93.
141. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 87, at 129 n.13 (cautioning that loss figures
supplied by the copyright industries and the U.S. government should not be taken at
face value); COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 188 (2000) (discussing the difficulty in obtaining accurate
estimates of the costs of illegal copying); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at
175-76 (arguing that the copyright industries tend to overstate the extent of the piracy
problem in China).
142. See GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY, supra note 139, at 8 (reporting the
software piracy rates of France, Italy, and Spain at forty-five percent, fifty percent, and
forty-three percent, respectively).
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143

TRIPs Agreement or the technology transfer commitment as stated
144
in article 66 of the Agreement. As Paul Heald advocated:
[P]rotection should further “public policy objectives . . . including
developmental and technological objectives . . . [and enable the
least developed members] to create a sound and viable
technological base.” It should also “contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare.” These objectives hardly dictate a narrow set
of . . . options to developing countries. Moreover, one could
interpret “effective” purely in terms of economic incentives: A
member must provide a reward adequate to stimulate . . . successful
research and development . . . .145

Under this interpretation, the amount of protection China should
provide must be viewed in light of its domestic socio-economic
conditions, technological needs, development goals, and public policy
objectives. What is considered ineffective in the United States,
therefore, may be considered effective in China.
B. Lack of Evidence
Even if the Dispute Settlement Panel could come up with a piracy
figure that can be used to determine ineffective enforcement, the
United States might ultimately lack sufficient non-anecdotal evidence to
146
show that China has failed its obligations.
As of this writing, U.S.
143. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 7-8 (providing safeguards to protect
the public interest); see also J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict
or Cooperation with the Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 461 (2000)
(suggesting that articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPs Agreement, taken together, may provide
“a basis for seeking waivers to meet unforeseen conditions of hardship”).
144. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 66 (requiring developed countries to
provide incentives for their businesses and institutions to help create “a sound and
viable technological base” in least developed countries by promoting and encouraging
transfer of technology).
145. Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 286 (2003) [hereinafter Heald,
Mowing the Playing Field].
146. As Daniel Chow noted:
[In a complaint concerning China’s failure to satisfy its TRIPs enforcement
obligations, t]he burden of proof and persuasion will be upon the
complaining party. Meeting these burdens will require the complaining party
to gather evidence of China’s failure to meet its obligations—a task that could
take years given the complexity of the enforcement environment in China
today—and would also require the party to prove its case before the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Body. Not only will this be a long process requiring
several years, but there is no guarantee that the party raising the dispute
would succeed given that it now has all of the burdens of proof and going
forward.
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businesses have been reluctant to supply to the USTR piracy and
counterfeiting data from China. Although the USTR had contacted
147
industry groups and published a notice in the Federal Register, it
received only thirty-four submissions from the industry through the
148
Section 301 submission procedures in 2005.
As former United
States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick noted before he left
office, the administration needed more information if it was to take
149
formal WTO action against China.
In August 2005, the USTR
published another notice on the Federal Register calling for information
150
about China’s compliance with the WTO commitments.
Among all of the American businesses in China, small and midsize
companies were particularly reluctant to disclose information. Their
reactions are understandable. Guanxi (personal connections) and
151
political capital are essential to doing business in China, and these
companies fear that the information they provide would result in
political or business repercussions, such as permit delays, application
denials, or bid rejections. Moreover, competition in China has
become increasingly stiff; companies not only have to compete with
local companies, but also with the many foreign companies now

CHOW, supra note 64, at 253-54.
147. Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974:
Request for Public Comment on Out-of-Cycle Review of the People’s Republic of
China, 69 Fed. Reg. 74561-01 (Dec. 14, 2004) (providing a notice that requested
public comments in the USTR’s section 301 review of countries).
148. 2005 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW, supra note 127, at 2.
149. See More Evidence Needed for China Piracy Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at C3
(reporting that “Outgoing U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick . . . told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had more homework to
do before bringing a formal complaint at the WTO”); accord Sarah Lai Stirland,
Business Should Aid U.S. in Anti-piracy Efforts, NAT’L J.’S TECH. DAILY, July 18, 2005
(quoting Brad Huther, the director of anti-counterfeiting and piracy of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, as saying “[t]he data [provided to the USTR] has not been
supplied in sufficient scope and depth to the United States Trade Representative in
order for them to bring a case—that’s something that the business community owes
the USTR and we must do a better job at that”); see also Peter Drahos, Securing the
Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners and Their Nodally Coordinated
Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53, 67 (2004) (noting that the U.S.
trade enforcement process “is a highly information-intensive exercise”).
150. Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning China’s
Compliance with WTO Commitments, 70 Fed. Reg. 44714 (Aug. 3, 2005) (providing
another notice requesting for public comments concerning China’s compliance with
its WTO commitments).
151. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 210 (discussing the importance
of guanxi to conducting business in China); Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright
Law and the People’s Courts in the People’s Republic of China: A Review and Critique of
China’s Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 415, 451 (1996)
(contending that “it may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to continue doing
business in China to sue because doing so may wreck their ‘guanxi’—personal
contacts or favors—that are integral for doing business in the PRC”).
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rushing to the Chinese market because of “China fever.”
As a
former minister counselor at the U.S. embassy in Beijing noted, “[o]ur
153
It is,
leaders may be right, but the Europeans get the contracts.”
therefore, no surprise that these firms are concerned about taking
political action that could hurt their bottom line.
To make the administration’s position more difficult, some
companies disagree with the administration and the trade groups over
whether the United States should take formal WTO action against
154
China. To them, such action would be counterproductive, and the
resulting bilateral tension would hurt them the most, because they are
155
more vulnerable to retaliation.
Trade groups and multinational
corporations, by contrast, “could arouse enormous media attention or
[obtain additional protection from local or even national leaders
because their] investments contribute or would contribute so
significantly to the economic development of a particular locality or
156
the country as a whole.”
Meanwhile, those who favor formal WTO action are confronted
with what game theorists have called a classic “prisoner’s dilemma,” in
152. See HAROLD CHEE WITH CHRIS WEST, MYTHS ABOUT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 30
(2004) (“The Chinese market is already highly competitive. As everyone wants to be
in that market, a large majority of the global players are already here. And local
Chinese competitors are not taking this lying down.”).
153. ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY: THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB 109 (2005); see
Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 167-68 (“Today, goods produced in the
United States are also produced in Europe and Japan. Because Europe and Japan do
not impose similar demands on China, ‘the Chinese government will react to
sanctions by becoming even more hostile to the United States and by switching from
U.S. products to European and Japanese ones.’”).
154. See CHOW, supra note 64, at 245-46 (stating that “[m]any [multinational
enterprises] . . . were reluctant to involve the USTR because of concerns that such
involvement might lead to trade tensions and retaliation against their businesses by
PRC authorities”); Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China’s WTO Commitment on Independent
Judicial Review: Impact on Legal and Political Reform¸ 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 85 (2004)
(asserting that “[p]rivate enterprises are afraid of suing organs responsible for
regulating commercial activities, such as departments of taxation as well as industry
and commerce, because these departments can easily wage a war of attrition against
any enterprise by, for instance, not granting administrative approvals needed for
doing business in China”).
155. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 167-68 (discussing how the
Chinese might respond negatively by switching to European and Japanese products
and services); see also Julia Chang Bloch, Commercial Diplomacy, in LIVING WITH CHINA:
U.S./CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 185, 206 (Ezra F. Vogel ed.,
1997) (noting that “the Chinese government will react to sanctions by becoming even
more hostile to the United States and by switching from U.S. products to European
and Japanese ones”).
156. Hung, supra note 154, at 86; see also JAMES MCGREGOR, ONE BILLION
CUSTOMERS: LESSONS FROM THE FRONT LINES OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 149 (2005)
(“If your business spans the entire nation, that means to the president, premier, and
other politburo members and ministers. But don’t go there for anything less than a
world-class dispute.”).
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which players tend to cheat on others due to a lack of information
157
about choices others have made. While coordination by the USTR
and the introduction of a confidential process may improve the
quantity and quality of information available to each informant, some
companies may consider it a win-win situation to stay out of the
conflict and free ride on the efforts of their competitors and partners.
If the United States prevails, they will be able to benefit from the WTO
ruling. If the United States fails, however, they will still be able to
maintain their guanxi and political connections. Even better, by
demonstrating their loyalty throughout the process, they might be
able to develop better guanxi and political connections, thereby
ensuring further commercial success.
Some also would not see it as their business to think about the longterm implications of the United States’ policy. As one venture capital
manager responded when he was questioned about the long-term
impact of the U.S. economy caused by outsourcing of research-anddevelopments to China and India, “[l]ook, I’m a loyal citizen but what
happens to the United States is not my job. I have a fiduciary
responsibility to my investors. The guys in Washington are supposed
158
to be worrying about the United States.”
C. Difficulty with Enforcement
Even if the United States were able to amass the needed evidence,
the WTO process poses structural challenges to a general complaint
about inadequate intellectual property enforcement. Virtually all of
the existing WTO cases focus on the non-implementation of specific
provisions, rather than a lack of general enforcement. (See Fig. 1.)
The closest cases are those filed by the United States against Greece
and the European Communities, in which the United States claimed
that Greece violated Articles 41 and 61 of the TRIPs Agreement by not
157. The prisoner’s dilemma is usually described as follows:
Two criminals are arrested, but the district attorney does not have enough
evidence to convict either of them for serious charges unless one or both
confess to the crime. The district attorney separates the two and makes the
following offer to each: “If you confess and your partner does not, I will grant
you immunity, and you will walk out free. However, if your partner squeals,
and you don’t, I’m going to throw the book at you. If neither of you
confesses, then I’ll have to settle for misdemeanor charges, which will get you
each a brief prison term. If you both confess, I’ll get you both on felony
charges, but I’ll argue for shorter sentences than if you do not confess and
your partner does. Think about it and tell me what you want to do.
JAMES MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 78 (1994). See generally ANATOL
RAPOPORT & ALBERT CHAMMAH, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1965) (providing a detailed
discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma).
158. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 89, at 148.
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providing effective enforcement of intellectual property rights.
cases were eventually settled.

The

FIGURE 1:
WTO Intellectual Property Disputes (as of March, 1, 2006)
No.

Dispute (Complainant)

TRIPs
Provisions

DS28

Japan—Measures Concerning Sound
Recordings (United States)

14

DS36

Pakistan—Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (United States)

27, 65 and 70

DS37

Portugal—Patent Protection Under the
Industrial Property Act (United States)

33, 65 and 70

DS42

Japan—Measures Concerning Sound
Recordings (European Communities)

14(6) and
70(2)

DS50

India—Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (United States)

27, 65 and 70

DS79

India—Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products (European
Communities)

70(8) and
70(9)

DS82

Ireland—Measures Affecting the Grant
of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights
(United States)

9-14, 63, 65
and 70

E

DS83

Denmark—Measures Affecting the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights (United States)

50, 63 and 65

E

DS86

Sweden—Measures Affecting the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights (United States)

50, 63 and 65

159. Request for Consultations by the United States, Greece—Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS125/1 (May
7, 1998); Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities—
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs,
WT/DS124/1 (May 7, 1998).
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DS114

Canada—Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products (European
Communities)

27(1), 28 and
33

DS115

European Communities—Measures
Affecting the Grant of Copyright and
Neighbouring Rights (United States)

9-14, 63, 65
and 70

E

DS124

European Communities—Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights for
Motion Pictures and Television
Programs (United States)

41 and 61

E

DS125

Greece—Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights for Motion Pictures and
Television Programs (United States)

41 and 61

DS153

European Communities—Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products
(Canada)

27(1)

DS160

United States—Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act (European Communities)

9(1)

DS170

Canada—Term of Patent Protection
(United States)

33, 65 and 70

DS171

Argentina—Patent Protection for
Pharmaceuticals and Test Data
Protection for Agricultural Chemicals
(United States)

27, 65 and 70

DS174

EC—Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs
(United States)

3, 16, 24, 63
and 65

DS176

United States—Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998 (European
Communities)

2-4, 15-21, 41,
42 and 62

DS186

United States—Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 and Amendments Thereto
(European Communities)

2, 3, 9, 27, 41,
42, 49, 50 and
51

DS196

Argentina—Certain Measures on the
Protection of Patents and Test Data
(United States)

27, 28, 31, 34,
39, 50, 62, 65
and 70

DS199

Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent

27 and 28
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Protection (United States)
DS224

United States—US Patents Code
(Brazil)

27 and 28

DS290

EC—Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs
(Australia)

1, 2, 3, 4, 16,
20, 22, 24, 41,
42, 63 and 65

E = Disputes on Enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement

Out of all the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement, Articles 41, 46,
and 61 provide the strongest support for the United States’ complaint.
Article 41 requires WTO member states to “ensure that enforcement
procedures as specified in [Part III of the TRIPs Agreement] are
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act
of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
160
Agreement . . . .”
Article 46 states an obligation for the judicial
161
authorities to “create an effective deterrent to infringement.”
162
Although Article 61 does not mention the word “effective,” it
requires member states to provide such remedies as “imprisonment
and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with
163
the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.”
This Article was one of the two used by the administration in its WTO
dispute against Greece; it is apposite because policymakers and trade
groups increasingly focus on not just effective enforcement, but on
164
“effective, deterrent enforcement.”
Notwithstanding these provisions, challenging China on nonimplementation grounds is likely to be very difficult, as most of the
laws required under the TRIPs Agreement are already on the books.
As Part I described, China made significant changes to its intellectual
165
In the early
property regime in the wake of the WTO accession.
1990s, it also had made many substantial revisions to its intellectual
property system in response to agreements signed with the United
166
States.
Indeed, the USTR and many other U.S. officials had
160. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(1) (emphasis added).
161. Id. art. 46 (emphasis added).
162. Id. art. 61.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. See, e.g., IIPA Submission, supra note 121, at 2 (discussing China’s failure to
provide “effective, deterrent enforcement” in fulfillment of their obligations under
the TRIPs Agreement).
165. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the intellectual property reforms China
undertook in the wake of its WTO accession).
166. See generally Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11 (discussing the U.S.-China
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conceded that the problem with intellectual property protection in
China is not with the laws, but with enforcement of these laws. As the
2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers stated,
“[w]hile China has made significant progress in its efforts to make its
framework of laws, regulations and implementing rules WTOconsistent, serious problems remain, particularly with China’s
167
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”
However, should the United States go after China on nonenforcement grounds, the TRIPs Agreement might be on China’s
side. Under Article 41(5) of the Agreement, a WTO member state is
not required to devote more resources to intellectual property
168
If China were
enforcement than other areas of law enforcement.
able to show that their enforcement problems with piracy and
counterfeiting were no more excessive than their problems with, say,
169
tax collection (which are very serious), China would be likely to
prevail. After all, it is hard to imagine any country putting intellectual
property protection ahead of tax collection. Nor does the WTO
require it to do so. Moreover, as an attorney experienced with U.S.China trade has noted:
Foreign investors should be warned . . . that China’s legal reforms
have exceeded its enforcement abilities. Although China seems
committed to its reforms, it still lacks the legal infrastructure to
competently and efficiently handle intellectual property disputes.
Moreover, Beijing’s ability to enforce its intellectual property
regulations is seriously hampered by local resistance to change,
particularly when local authorities sense that such change will take
170
power out of their hands.

To some extent, the intellectual property problems in China are not
that different from those experienced in the United States and other
developed countries, which have been struggling with massive
agreements in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the resulting changes to the Chinese
intellectual property system).
167. 2005 NTE REPORT, supra note 69, at 95.
168. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 41(5).
169. See JOHN L. CHAN, CHINA STREETSMART: WHAT YOU MUST KNOW TO BE
EFFECTIVE AND PROFITABLE IN CHINA 103 (2003) (noting that “in a developing economy
like China, where tax rules are constantly changing, the loopholes are plenty and
enforcement and interpretation vary from area to area”); see also PANITCHPAKDI &
CLIFFORD, supra note 16, at 162-3 (discussing how local protectionism, or
“warlordism,” has affected the development of the auto industry); John H. Jackson,
The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,
supra note 27, at 19, 27 [hereinafter Jackson, Impact of China’s Accession] (“China’s
implementation of WTO obligations is partly an adjustment problem. It is also partly
a problem of the central government’s power vis-à-vis local governments.”).
170. Kim Newby, Doing Business in China: How the State of 1.3 Million Can Tap the
Nation of 1.3 Billion, 19 MAINE BAR J. 238, 241 (2004).

YU.OFFTOPRINTER

936

6/11/2006 2:51:07 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:901

unauthorized copying problems since the emergence of Napster and
171
other file-sharing technologies. In the past two years, the recording
and movie industries have filed many rounds of lawsuits throughout
the world against individuals distributing copyrighted works illegally
172
via peer-to-peer networks.
The file-sharing problems are so
important that courts around the world are now inundated with cases
173
addressing secondary copyright liability.
At some point, we need to recognize that intellectual property, due
to its abstract nature, is generally treated differently from physical
property. It does not matter whether it is in China or in the United
174
States. Even in major U.S. cities, it is not uncommon to notice street
vendors selling pirated CDs and DVDs in the presence of police
officers. Even though the officers are very unlikely to buy the fake
products, the fact that they have no problems—either moral or legal—
with the street vending activities has greatly weakened the U.S.’s moral
175
claim.
Moreover, many intellectual property rights holders have
complained about the difficulty of convincing federal prosecutors to
176
take piracy and counterfeiting cases seriously.
Some district
attorneys’ offices, they maintain, just refuse to take those cases. From
China’s standpoint, the lack of support from the U.S. authorities for
171. For discussions of the massive unauthorized copying problem created by peerto-peer file-sharing technology, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907 (2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U.
COLO. L. REV. 653 (2005) [hereinafter Yu, P2P and the Future].
172. See, e.g., Yu, P2P and the Future, supra note 171, at 658-76 (discussing the
enforcement tactics used by the recording industry in 2003).
173. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764,
2770 (2005) (holding that the distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies
could be liable for copyright infringement committed by individuals using their
products if they had “induced” their users to undertake infringing activities); BMG
Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2005] F.C.A. 193 (Can.) (addressing the issue of whether
setting up the facilities to allow copying amounts to authorizing infringement);
Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 65 I.P.R. 289
(Austl.) (holding the defendant liable for authorizing users to infringe on music
copyrights and directing it to modify the software application to reduce
infringement).
174. See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 131-40 (2003) (challenging the common misconceptions
that copyright piracy is a cultural problem or the product of technological
backwardness).
175. Arguably, state police officers could claim that it is not within their jurisdiction
to combat the federal crimes of commercial piracy and counterfeiting. However, the
scenes remain troubling and greatly weaken the moral strength of the United States’
arguments against China.
176. See, e.g., Remarks of Timothy P. Trainer, Esq., President, International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, Inc., at “Free Trade and Counterfeit Havens: A CrossIndustry Dialogue” Symposium at Michigan State University College of Law (Oct. 12,
2004).
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prosecuting intellectual property crimes is particularly interesting.
After all, the Chinese authorities have been heavily criticized for their
reluctance to take action against the alleged infringers.
Compared to enforcement of domestic laws, enforcement of the
TRIPs Agreement is even more difficult, as the issue has been further
compounded by the political dynamics of the WTO negotiations. As
Ruth Okediji aptly observed, the WTO member states can be seen as
playing “a two-stage game” with respect to the negotiation and
177
enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement. Although commentators and
policymakers in less developed countries have questioned the fairness
of the Agreement, developed countries won the first-stage negotiation
game by forming coalitions among themselves and by convincing their
less developed counterparts to join them in an agreement that created
178
minimum standards for intellectual property protection.
The
strategies used to complete the first-stage game, however, have left
developed countries with a much harder enforcement game to play—
both among themselves and vis-à-vis less developed countries. As
Professor Okediji noted:
Having accomplished the primary goal of binding developing
countries to high standards of intellectual property protection,
developed countries must now deal with the costs of “winning” the
first stage game. These include constraints on sovereign discretion
in the area of policy development, and battles over extant policy
179
differences between the member states.

As less developed countries become increasingly dissatisfied with
the international intellectual property system and as they acquire
more sophisticated knowledge about the international intellectual
property regime, it is unlikely that developed countries will be able to
win the enforcement game as easily as they won the negotiation game.
Moreover, enforcement, by nature, is a more difficult game. That
game is further complicated by the fact that some countries might
177. Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 823 (2003). Unlike Professor Okediji, this
Author considers the game played by the WTO member states as a three-stage game,
with stages in negotiation, implementation, and enforcement. Nevertheless, these
differences will not affect the implications of Professor Okediji’s important insight
into the multi-stage game the TRIPs members have to play when they move from
negotiation to enforcement.
178. There are many explanations why developed countries have agreed to join the
TRIPs Agreement. See generally Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 105, at 325-26
(discussing the various reasons why countries joined the TRIPs Agreement); Peter K.
Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-79 (2005)
(outlining the four different narratives commonly used to account for the
establishment of the TRIPs Agreement).
179. Okediji, supra note 177, at 823.
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have negotiated treaties knowing well in advance that those treaties
would not be fully enforced due to domestic implementation
180
Indeed, as Andrew Mertha and Robert Pahre
constraints.
maintained, “a state with an implementation constraint [like China
and other less developed countries] may make greater concessions
181
knowing that they will not be implemented.”
D. Adverse WTO Rulings
Although the United States initially dominated the WTO dispute
settlement process and has scored major victories against less
182
developed countries, the WTO process does not guarantee victory
for the United States—or, for that matter, any other developed
countries. Indeed, when Congress deliberated the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, U.S. lawmakers expressed concern about the tension
that adverse WTO rulings would pose to the country’s long-held
183
A few days before
constitutional principles and legal tradition.
Congress voted on the statute, Senate Robert Dole introduced a bill to
establish a statutory commission to review adopted WTO panel reports
184
185
adverse to the United States. (The bill was eventually abandoned. )
Even today, many policymakers take the position that the United
States should withdraw from the WTO. Every five years, the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act of 1994 requires the USTR to submit to
Congress a report of “the effects of the WTO Agreement on the
interests of the United States, the costs and benefits to the United
States of its participation in the WTO, and the value of the continued
186
participation of the United States in the WTO.” After submission of
the report, legislators can introduce a bill calling for the United

180. See generally Andrew Mertha & Robert Pahre, Patently Misleading: Partial
Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual
Property Rights, 59 INT’L ORG. 695 (2005) (discussing the negotiation of treaties that
parties know in advance will not be fully implemented). It is no coincidence that the
authors illustrated this partial implementation process with the bilateral intellectual
property agreements signed between China and the United States. Id.
181. Id. at 697.
182. See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 17, 17 (2005) [hereinafter Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System] (noting
that “[t]he first half of [the first ten years’ operation of the WTO dispute settlement
process]—from 1995 through 1999—was characterized by extensive use of the system
by the United States initially, and later by the EU”).
183. S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see John H. Jackson, The Great 1994
Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round
Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 157, 186-87 (1997) (discussing the proposed WTO
Dispute Settlement Review Commission).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 187.
186. Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 19 U.S.C. § 3535 (2000).
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States’ withdrawal from the WTO. Following the USTR’s most recent
report, Representative Bernard Sanders (I-VT) introduced such a
187
bill, which the House subsequently rejected by a vote of 338-86.
The dissatisfaction of the WTO among policymakers is
understandable. The WTO dispute settlement process does not
benefit the United States all the time. Since the inception of the
WTO, the United States has lost a number of major disputes. In
December 1999, for example, the European Communities successfully
challenged Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 in United States—
188
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974.
In this dispute, the
European Communities claimed that the strict time limits imposed by
the U.S. statute did not provide sufficient time for a WTO member
state to implement recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body
189
based on rules and procedures of the international trading body.
Although the Dispute Settlement Panel ultimately upheld the
challenged sections, it confirmed that a WTO member state could not
pursue retaliatory actions before it had exhausted all of the remedies
190
permissible under the WTO rules.
In effect, the Panel limited the
ability of the United States to impose unilateral trade sanctions
without going through the WTO dispute settlement process.
A year later, the United States lost its dispute with the European
Communities over Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which
enables some restaurants and small establishments to play copyrighted
191
music without compensating copyright holders. In this dispute, the
European Communities argued that the homestyle and business
exemptions of the U.S. Copyright Act were in violation of the TRIPs
192
Agreement. The United States defended that the exemptions were
valid under Article 13 of the Agreement, which allows member states
to “confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
193
right holder.” The Dispute Settlement Panel held for the European

187. See H.J. Res. 27, 109th Cong. (2005).
188. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 125.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5) Panel Report]. For
discussions of the dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and
Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733
(2001); Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic
Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2004).
193. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 13.
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Communities, maintaining that the business exemption was
inconsistent with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne
194
Following
Convention as incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement.
the panel decision, the European Communities and the United States
195
pursued arbitration to determine the penalty award, which the
196
United States did not pay until more than a year later.
Most recently, in United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, the tiny Caribbean islands of
Antigua and Barbuda mounted a David-and-Goliath challenge against
the United States over its federal and state prohibitions of Internet
197
and telephone gambling.
The complainants argued that the
restrictions were inconsistent with the market access provisions of the
198
General Agreement on Trade in Services, which allow for the supply
of gambling and betting services on a cross-border basis, as well as the
199
U.S. Schedule of Specific Commitments. The United States counterargued that WTO member states were entitled to maintain restrictions
on Internet gambling, which fall within the scope of exceptions
200
“necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order.”
The Dispute Settlement Panel found for the complainants,
maintaining that the U.S. gambling regulations were in violation of
the WTO Agreements. On appeal, the Appellate Body partially
reversed the panel decision, upholding some of the U.S. federal laws
201
as permissible exceptions.
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body
affirmed the panel decision that some of the U.S. laws were
inconsistent with the market access commitments made by the United
202
States during the Uruguay Round.

194. See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 191.
195. See Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU ¶ 5.1, United States—
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001)
(determining the award at $1,219,900 per year).
196. “As part of the Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, signed into law on
16 April 2003, the US Congress approved the $3.3 million appropriation for
European music right holders; the sum was subsequently paid to the representative
body of European right holders (GESAC).” Fair Play?, COPYRIGHT WORLD, July/Aug.
2004. Thanks to Professor Won-Mog Choi for pointing out the payment.
197. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Online Gambling Panel
Report].
198. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement, supra note 17, Annex 1B, art. XIV(a), 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994).
199. See Online Gambling Panel Report, supra note 197.
200. See id.
201. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
202. See id.
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There is no doubt that the United States and the European
Communities have dominated the dispute settlement process in the
first few years of the WTO’s existence, especially when the disputes
involved intellectual property and the TRIPs Agreement. (See fig. 2.)
Indeed, many of the United States’ losses came from its archrival, the
European Communities. However, in recent years, less developed
203
countries have had more frequent use of the WTO process.
If the
WTO rules are on their side, even tiny Caribbean islands can prevail
204
One can only imagine
over a trading giant like the United States.
what it will be like when an emerging trading power like China
decides to face-off with the United States.
FIGURE 2:
Distribution of Parties in WTO Intellectual Property Disputes
(as of March 1, 2006)
Countries

Cases as Complainants

Cases as
Respondents

United States

15

4

European
Communities

6

5

Australia

1

0

Canada

1

2

Brazil

1

1

Argentina

0

2

India

0

2

Japan

0

2

203. See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—US Patents Code,
WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001) (challenging U.S. patent laws for violations of articles 27
and 28 of the TRIPs Agreement); see also Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra
note 182, at 24 (noting that “the US and the EC no longer were as dominant as
complainants in the system” and that “developing country use of the system increased
dramatically” in the second half of the first decade of operation of the WTO dispute
settlement process).
204. But see William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51,
90 (1987) [hereinafter Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT] (questioning whether less
developed countries will “have the diplomatic or economic muscle to ensure that the
decision is implemented” even if they win their case, based on the United States’ past
refusal to implement successful GATT findings against the United States by smaller
countries).
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Denmark

0

1

Greece

0

1

Ireland

0

1

Pakistan

0

1

Portugal

0

1

Sweden

0

1

As in most WTO cases, it is unlikely that either China or the United
States will win the entire case. Indeed, because of the customary
length and detail in the WTO panel reports, both the winning and
losing parties are likely to score some important points. As William
Davey observed, “the US lost the Film case and the EC lost the Section
301 case and neither appealed, perhaps because in each case the
205
losing party won some useful points.” Thus, if the United States files
a complaint against China in the WTO process, it has to be ready for
China to score some major points even if it wins.
Obviously, this argument cuts both ways, as the converse is also true.
Just as China would score some useful points should it lose a WTO
case, the United States would do the same and, therefore, would be
shielded from a complete disaster if it lost on a bad case.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the United States and other
developed countries, such a filing would be unwise and dangerous,
because the points it scores might not compensate for the symbolic
effect of losing the first WTO case against China. Such a loss would
also have a devastating impact that could spill over into other areas of
international trade as well as disputes involving other developed
countries.
E. Need for Guidance
The WTO dispute settlement process, if used properly, will help the
United States’ long-term interests in promoting free trade by
providing China with the needed guidance as it makes transition to
full compliance with WTO rules. As Long Yongtu, the chief
negotiator for China’s entry into the WTO, worried, “[l]acking
expertise and professionals qualified on international rules may make
206
China[] . . . ‘a blind man riding a blind horse’ within the WTO.”
205. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 182, at 19-20.
206. Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 104 (quoting Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan,
Chinese Economists Fear Favored West May Threaten Sovereignty, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
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Well-conceived challenges before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
are, therefore, needed to provide guidance during this critical
transitional period.
As I have discussed elsewhere, foreign pushes are sometimes needed
207
to fuel China’s intellectual property reforms.
Indeed,
commentators, like noted China analyst Kenneth Lieberthal, have
suggested that “the reformers in the government plan to use the WTO
entry requirements to force the domestic reforms that they believe will
make Chinese firms competitive internationally in the coming
208
decades.”
As a result, an adverse decision by a dispute settlement
panel “may help respondent’s government counteract domestic
pressures if that government can honestly argue that condemnation
by [the WTO] is likely and retaliation by trading partners is
209
possible.”
In addition, an adverse WTO decision can help break up the local
monopolies and entrenched piracy interests that are lobbying against
210
legal reforms and greater competition within the country.
Thus,
WTO challenges need to be strategically used to maximize the
Nov. 13, 2001); see PANITCHPAKDI & CLIFFORD, supra note 16, at 153 (quoting Wang Fei,
a judge in the High People’s Court in Shanghai, as noting that they were “very
confused by WTO rules”).
207. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 368 (2003)
(noting that “foreign pushes were undoubtedly helpful in establishing the Chinese
intellectual property system in the early 1990s”); Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, supra
note 178, at 377 (noting that foreign pushes are sometimes needed because
“countries . . . might not be able to implement policy changes that are in their best
interests, at least of the country as a whole”); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent
Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 178 (1994) (noting that
“[o]utsiders can play a constructive role by insisting that the issues be addressed
within a larger and principled framework” and thus prevent internal political forces
from blocking the adoption of an optimal, long-run strategy); Robert P. Merges, Battle
of the Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 239, 243-44 (1990)
[hereinafter Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms] (observing that “representatives of the
‘pirate’ industries may have enough political clout to block the proposed changes”
even though the changes might be in the best interests of a country as a whole).
208. Kenneth Lieberthal & Geoffrey Lieberthal, The Great Transition, in HARV. BUS.
REV., DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 1, 7 (2004); see also Richard Janda & Men Jing, China’s
Great Leap of Faith: Telecommunications and Financial Services Commitments, in CHINA AND
THE LONG MARCH TO GLOBAL TRADE: THE ACCESSION OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 66, 67 (Sylvia Ostry et al. eds., 2003) (noting that “[t]he Chinese
leadership obviously chose to use WTO entry not only to solidify existing reforms, but
also as an engine for further and more dramatic reforms in the key financial services
and telecommunications sectors”) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH]; WTO
Deal Is Major Victory for China’s Zhu, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1999, at A21 (“WTO is the
lever that the reformers need to open the system. You can’t reform from above. You
can’t reform from below. So you reform from outside.” (quoting Rick Baum, political
scientist, University of California at San Diego)).
209. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 204, at 74.
210. See PANITCHPAKDI & CLIFFORD, supra note 16, at 163-64 (discussing how
domestic legal reforms accompanying China’s accession to WTO may provide hopes
for local partners in reducing local favoritism).
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benefits created by China’s WTO accession. If the right complaint is
brought, the United States might even be able to enlist the support of
local companies, which are equally concerned about the
anticompetitive behavior of the monopolies and entrenched players.
Although the WTO has a broad coverage, some complaints are less
well-suited than others for the WTO dispute settlement process. For
example, the United States failed in its attempt to use the WTO
211
process to open the Japanese market for American films.
If the
United States is not careful in bringing these challenges, it might
create a new “cycle of futility” similar to the one created in the early
212
1990s. In this new cycle, the United States might threaten to take, or
might actually take, formal WTO action on a weak WTO case on
inadequate intellectual property enforcement, only to find
unsustained improvements in intellectual property protection in
China.
This is particularly problematic, because a formal WTO complaint
will strain the bilateral relationship between China and the United
213
States, regardless of who wins at the end. So far, the United States
has filed only one complaint against China with the WTO Dispute
214
Settlement Body, which has been quickly settled.
Likewise, China
has been a co-complainant in only one dispute with the United States,
215
which the latter lost despite its appeal to the Appellate Body.
211. See Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (finding that the United States had not
demonstrated that the Japanese measures nullified or impaired the benefits accruing
to the US within the meaning of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade); see
also Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 182, at 28 (noting that “the
experience in the Film case demonstrates that the WTO rules are not well suited to
disciplining indirect and informal barriers to market access”); Jackson, The Impact of
China’s Accession, supra note 169, at 24 (observing that the effectiveness of the WTO
dispute settlement system has created “a tendency to throw things at the dispute
settlement system”).
212. See Peter K. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years: Intellectual Property, PostWTO China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 148-51
(2005) (discussing the new cycle of futility).
213. See ROBERT HUDEC, ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES 25-26
(1978) (discussing how the legalistic approach would promote conflict and
contentiousness in an organization that sought to promote negotiated solutions);
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 204, at 70 (arguing that a legalistic
approach may be counterproductive “because it poisons the atmosphere in which
[diplomatic] contacts take place . . . [and because] economic relations between the
contending parties may deteriorate generally as positions in the dispute harden and
bad feelings spill over into other areas”); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to
Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 585 (2002)
(noting that “as with all adversary processes, the dispute settlement procedure creates
hostility between the disputing parties”).
214. China—Value-added Tax on Integrated Circuits, supra note 131.
215. Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
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Because the countries had been adversaries in only two cases,
“initiation of a complaint would be something of a slap in the face.
216
Nevertheless, as
The ignominy of a loss would also loom larger.”
more complaints are filed and as both parties have their share of wins
and losses, the impact of a WTO dispute on bilateral relations will be
greatly reduced, and the consequences of filing a risky case will be less
severe.
F.

SUMMARY

China spent fifteen years negotiating exhaustively for its entry to the
WTO. While policymakers and commentators initially expressed
reservations about China’s joining the international trading body,
most of them, by now, have agreed that China’s WTO accession will
benefit the international trading system in the long run. Indeed,
some commentators have suggested that China will play a major role
in the organization, given the fact that it joined the organization “[a]t
a time when trade protectionism and unilateralism threaten to
reemerge, and the demand for a more equitable distribution of the
217
benefits of globalization is loud.” Thus, it is important that the U.S.
administration be patient and provide guidance as China learns to
become a respectable member of the international trading body.
Although this Article argues against a complaint against the general
lack of intellectual property enforcement, it does not argue against
the use of the WTO dispute settlement process on all intellectual
property matters. Indeed, it takes the position that WTO challenges
will be particularly helpful in areas in which Chinese laws do not
218
comply with the TRIPs Agreement, as well as those in which the
challenges are supported by prior WTO panel decisions. By contrast,
WTO challenges will be the most risky in areas in which the laws meet
219
the TRIPs requirements, but are not enforced effectively.
If the
United States insists on pursuing the latter, it needs to understand the
Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003). Other co-complainants were the European
Communities, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, and Brazil.
216. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 204, at 71.
217. Deborah Z. Cass et al., China and the Reshaping of the World Trade Organization,
in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 15.
218. For discussion of aspects of Chinese intellectual property laws that are
inconsistent with the TRIPs Agreement, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
219. See Angela Gregory, Chinese Trademark Law and the TRIPs Agreement—Confucius
Meets the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 321, 342
(arguing that the WTO dispute settlement process may be more effective “in
situations of deficiencies in substantive law rather than in cases in which the
substantive law meets TRIPs requirements but enforcement is lacking”).
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limitations and the potential consequences of its strategy. A weak case
before the WTO will not only be unhelpful in liberating trade, but
could potentially backfire on the entire international community.
Pursuing such a case is worse than not bringing the case at all.
III. THINKING OUTSIDE THE IP BOX
If the United States could not file a complaint with the WTO, one
might wonder what other alternatives the country has in dealing with
China’s rampant piracy and counterfeiting problems. Elsewhere, I
discussed four different areas in which policymakers and business
executives should focus their remedial efforts: (1) educate the local
people; (2) create local stakeholders; (3) strengthen laws and
220
enforcement mechanisms; and (4) develop legitimate alternatives.
Even with these remedial efforts, foreign businesses are likely to suffer
from rampant piracy and counterfeiting, at least in the short term.
Thus, this Part explores the alternative protective measures
intellectual property rights holders can take to protect their assets.
The two common approaches used to protect intellectual property
in China are administrative enforcement and litigation. Although the
former is cheaper, quicker, more flexible, and less antagonistic, the
latter protects the rights holders from corruption and local
221
protectionism while allowing for damage compensation and pre222
litigation remedies. With the introduction of specialized courts with
judges possessing intellectual property expertise since the 1990s,

220. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 207, at 428-37 (discussing four areas in
which policymakers and business executives should focus remedial efforts to combat
piracy and counterfeiting).
221. See, e.g., Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property
Rights in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 28 (Mary L.
Riley ed., 1997) (maintaining that “[i]n China, administrative enforcement is
occasionally seen as more cost effective than either civil or criminal proceedings
against counterfeiters”); id. at 32 (asserting that Chinese judges are less likely than
administrative agencies to bend to local pressure); Yiqiang Li, Evaluation of the SinoAmerican Intellectual Property Agreements: A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local
Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391, 414-15 (1996) (maintaining that “[t]he
courts are . . . more powerful than administrative agencies”); Kolton, supra note 151,
at 451 (noting that “it may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to continue doing
business in China to sue because doing so may wreck their ‘guanxi’—personal
contacts or favors—that are integral for doing business in the PRC”); see also Susan
Finder, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through the Courts, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 255 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999)
(discussing issues potential litigants in Chinese courts must be aware of when
considering whether to seek enforcement of their intellectual property rights through
the Chinese courts).
222. GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 116, at 290 (noting that “damage
compensation and pre-litigation remedies are now only available from the courts,
which will increase their importance tremendously over the long run”).
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courts in major cities have been greatly improved. As a result, rights
holders in these cities have increasingly resorted to the use of courts.
In 2002, for example, the total numbers of patent and trademark cases
adjudicated were 2080 (an increase of 30.24% over 2001) and 707 (an
223
increase of 46.68%), respectively.
Apart from these “dual
enforcement” mechanisms, rights holders have also sought criminal
224
225
enforcement, enforcement through customs control, and, more
recently, litigation in the United States or other major markets outside
226
of China. Notwithstanding these approaches, businesses continue to
struggle with inadequate intellectual property protection in China.
While this Part acknowledges the importance of legal reforms and
development of the rule of law, it highlights the fact that the legal
route is not the only way to protect intellectual assets. Instead,
intellectual property protection is one of the many tools to achieve the
ultimate goal of successfully doing business in China.
Notwithstanding their importance, the other tools are seldom
227
discussed by commentators.
228
To fill this void, this Part presents six hypothetical case studies in
which intellectual property rights holders were able to protect their
assets even when intellectual property laws were not effectively
enforced. This Part draws insight from not only legal literature, but
literature in business strategies and China studies. An understanding
of the non-legal literature is particularly important, because the
protection of intellectual assets is as much a business strategy as a legal
issue. By presenting these case studies, this Part seeks to provide
insight into both the causes of piracy and counterfeiting in China and
223. SUN, supra note 23, at 12.
224. See id. at 224-25 (discussing criminal enforcement).
225. See id. at 211-19 (discussing the use of border control measures provided by
the Chinese Customs Law).
226. See Chiang Ling Li, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China, in CHINA’S
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 68, at 241, 257 [hereinafter Li, Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights] (citing an example of how a multinational electrical
component company “was able to pursue patent infringement and product quality
actions against the copied products outside of the PRC” because “most of the
products of [the counterfeit] factories were exported outside of the PRC”); Emma
Schwartz, D.C. Firms View China with Caution, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 1
(discussing the growing use of U.S. courts by Chinese firms).
227. See, e.g., LOKE KHOON TAN, PIRATES IN THE MIDDLE KINGDOM: THE ART OF
TRADEMARK WAR 132-33 (2004) (discussing informal enforcement options for
trademark holders); John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates: A
Communications-Based Approach to IPR Protection in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 221, at 409 (discussing alternative, non-legal
strategies for protection intellectual property in China); Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note
221, at 7 (same).
228. Although these case studies have been expanded and improvised, they are
based on or inspired by real case studies.
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the many barriers faced by local authorities in their enforcement of
intellectual property laws.
Following the case studies, this Part questions whether the legalistic
approach usually taken by foreign businesses is wise and productive in
light of the country’s historical aversion to courts and its significant
229
emphasis on mediation. As researchers from McKinsey & Company
have found, “[m]any multinational companies in China are losing the
battle to protect their intellectual property, largely because they rely
too heavily on legal tactics and fail to factor IP properly into their
230
strategic and operational decisions.”
This Part concludes by
exploring the differences between the Chinese and Western legal
cultures and how these differences may have created different
expectations between China and the United States over the role of the
WTO dispute settlement process.
A. Competition
231

The first case study concerns a publisher of popular comic books.
Immediately after the books were published, unauthorized copies
appeared in the market—some even before the publication of the
originals. Although most consumers were able to distinguish between
the genuine versions and the pirated copies, some of them failed to do
so. Even for those who were able to notice the difference, some chose
to purchase the pirated copies because they were much cheaper than
the original products.
To deal with piracy, the publisher could sue the pirates in courts or
seek administrative enforcement. Instead, it chose to compete directly
against the pirates. To do so, it wrapped the comic books in hard-toreproduce plastic, upgraded the quality of the graphics and paper,
and included inexpensive educational prizes with each issue.
Although its action no doubt increased production costs, the
additional preparation made the comic books more expensive and
difficult to copy. As the pirates turned to other, easier targets,
subscriptions and profits increased.

229. For discussions of the emphasis on mediation in China, see generally Jerome
A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1966);
Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China,
55 CAL. L. REV. 1284 (1967); Stanley B. Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China After Deng
Xiaoping: “Mao and Mediation” Revisited, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229 (1997).
230. Meagan C. Dietz et al., Protecting Intellectual Property in China, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 6,
6 (2005).
231. This case study was inspired by and improvised from Donaldson & Weiner,
supra note 227, at 432.
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This case study is instructive for a number of reasons. It highlights
the fact that pirates and counterfeiters are rational businesspeople
who seek profits and opportunities. As one commentator has pointed
out, the total cost of piracy “includes the cost of producing and
distributing the fakes and the cost of paying penalties, weighed against
the embarrassment of being caught, the probability of being
convicted, and the severity or inconvenience of any non-monetary
232
penalties that are likely to be imposed.”
By increasing the cost of
producing the fakes, the publisher successfully reduced the pirates’
profit margin while making its products a less attractive piracy target.
Foreign rights holders sometimes forget that they do not need to
solve all of China’s piracy and counterfeiting problems. Unlike
governments, they need not worry about the overall interests of
businesses and nationals in the country. Instead, they merely need to
focus on making themselves less attractive piracy targets. Surprisingly,
despite the widespread reports of piracy and counterfeiting in China,
many businesses expand into China without adequate planning and
sophisticated protection strategies. As researchers from McKinsey &
Company noted:
When we studied the Chinese operations of ten multinationals
competing in IP-sensitive industries (including consumer
electronics, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors,
and software), we found that many executives think of protecting IP
solely in legal terms—and sometimes only after property has been stolen.
The most successful companies, however, take strategic and
operational action to protect their IP before that happens, thus
lowering their litigation costs and improving the odds that their IP
233
will remain safe.

Moreover, many foreign businesses ignore the differences in
Chinese intellectual property laws, and some have the mistaken belief
that what works in their home countries will work in China. For
example, although registration is essential to trademark protection in
China, many U.S. businesses fail to register their marks, hoping
234
misguidedly that they can claim prior use without a registration.
Some also overlook the significance of registering the Chinese
translations or transliterations of their marks. Pfizer, for example, did
232. Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 221, at 17.
233. Dietz et al., supra note 230, at 6 (emphasis added).
234. See Li, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 226, at 257 (noting
that “in many cases, multinational companies do not have their intellectual property
rights registered or otherwise protected in the PRC”); see also CHAN, supra note 169, at
105 (noting the need to understand the difference between the Chinese and the U.S.
trademark systems).
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not register its Chinese name WEIGE, even though it registered the
235
Even worse, as a Beijing-based
English name VIAGRA in China.
attorney noted, “[c]ompanies—particularly those from the U.S.—are
used to writing a cease and desist letter, which in China destroys your
case. If you write a cease and desist letter you will never be able to get
236
sufficient evidence through an investigation.”
In fact, failure to take proactive measures may even result in
underprotection of their products. A case in point is the recently
settled three-year dispute between General Motors and Chery
237
Automobile Company, in which General Motors claimed that the
Shanghai-based carmaker copied its Chevy Spark in designing the
Chery QQ. Because General Motors did not have patents in China for
238
its car designs, it sued Chery for trade secrets infringement. Had the
American automaker filed Chinese patents in the first place, as it did
239
in its home market, it would have a much stronger claim and might
not even need the “assistance” of the Chinese government to secure
240
an out-of-court settlement.
Thus, proactive protective measures, like those taken by the comic
book publisher in the present case study, are very important. By
making products more expensive and difficult to copy, it sent a strong
message to the pirates that they would make more money by choosing
a more vulnerable target. Indeed, if its competitors had been less
235. Id. For example, “[i]n . . . Pfizer, Inc. v. Shenzhen Wanyong Information Network,
the court held that the plaintiff’s registered trademark, ‘VIAGRA,’ was not well known
among Chinese people, though the plaintiff’s medicine was well known for its
informal Chinese name ‘weige’ (which means ‘a strong brother’ in Chinese).” Hong
Xue, Domain Name Dispute Resolution in China: A Comprehensive Review, 18 TEMP. INT’L
& COMP. L.J. 1, 14-15 (2004).
236. Secrets of Success in China, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Oct. 1, 2004, at 40 (quoting
James Haynes, a partner of Beijing-based IP firm Tee & Howe).
237. See John Schmid, Two Cars and One View: U.S. Taken for a Ride, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 2004, at 1A (reporting about the intellectual property dispute
between General Motors and Chery Automobile Company over the copying of
General Motors’ Chevy Spark).
238. See Secrets of Success in China, supra note 236, at 40.
239. See id. (quoting Wen Xikai, the deputy director general of the Law & Treaty
Department of the State Intellectual Property Office, as suggesting that the trade
secrets case is more difficult, because “evidence is very important” for that type of
case).
240. Intellectual Property Battle Between GM and Chery Reaches Settlement, CHINA IP
EXPRESS, Dec. 1, 2005, at http://www.iprights.com/publications/chinaipexpress/
ciex_268.asp (reporting that “GM and Chery extended their appreciation to Chinese
government for helping to resolve the dispute”). Although Chery agreed not to use
the CHERY trademark in the United States, which is likely to be confusingly similar to
General Motors’ CHEVY trademark, Malcolm Bricklin, Chery’s American partner,
claimed that “Chery [was] not required to pay any compensation to GM under the
settlement agreement . . . [and that] the agreement clears the way for a smoother
introduction of the newly designed, Chinese-made, vehicles into the United States,
starting in 2007.” Id.
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protective of their products, the publisher’s actions might have driven
the pirates to its competitors, increasing their losses while reducing
their ability to compete. In doing so, the publisher would have
achieved what the Chinese describe as “killing two birds with one
stone”—it fought both the pirates and the competitors by improving
its products.
Some skeptics might question the wisdom of this competition
strategy, citing the additional upgrading costs and the unethical
nature of the pirates’ behavior. However, the strategy makes good
business sense. The improvement would reduce the losses caused by
piracy, and such reduction, if planned carefully, would more than
compensate for the higher production costs.
In addition, by
improving the products, the publisher would have rewarded its loyal
customers for paying a higher price for the originals. It also would
help convince customers that genuine products are worth the higher
price they pay. In economic terms, the improvement would highlight
the fact that pirated products are imperfect substitutes. Such signaling
is important, because the Chinese eventually would demand products
of higher quality as their living standards improve.
Although the facts on which this case study was based were taken
from China, software companies around the world have widely used a
similar competition strategy, offering such post-sale benefits as
warranty service, replacement guarantees, free upgrades, and contests
or giveaways.
For example, Microsoft recently limited the
downloading of updates to customers who have purchased genuine
241
Microsoft products. Many companies and industry groups also have
actively highlighted the danger of using fake computer products,
which often bring with them unwanted computer viruses and spyware.
In doing so, these software companies force users to decide not only
between genuine and pirated products, but also between products
with additional benefits and those without.
B. Shaming
The second case study deals with a baby food manufacturer that had
242
been struggling with counterfeit products from local factories.
While the company went to the local authorities to seek administrative
enforcement, it also took a proactive approach. When the authorities
241. See Michelle Kessler, Copy-protection Gear Sneaks into Products, USA TODAY, Aug.
16, 2005, at 1B (reporting that Microsoft “now requires users to prove that they have
an official version of its Windows operating system before downloading updates”).
242. This case study was inspired by and improvised from Donaldson & Weiner,
supra note 227, at 426.
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raided the factories, the right holder brought reporters and a camera
crew from the local media. In doing so, it not only exposed the
counterfeiters and created evidence for the authorities, but also
showed to the local community the shoddy quality of the fake
products and the unsanitary facilities of the counterfeit factories.
After a series of well-publicized raids, the counterfeiting problem was
significantly reduced.
This case study is insightful for three reasons. First, unbeknownst to
many Western business executives, public shaming is an effective
243
strategy in China.
From the standpoint of Chinese psychology,
public shaming causes the infringer to lose “face,” or mianzi in
Chinese. As one commentator explained: “Face is about one’s selfrespect and prestige and, crucially, about one’s standing in the group.
It is an essentially public phenomenon, though it has powerful (albeit
secondary) emotional consequences. The emotions are about dignity
and dignity’s enemy, shame. This polarity runs deep in the lives of
244
Chinese people. . . .”
As far as legitimate businesses, as compared to nameless
counterfeiters, are concerned, the embarrassment caused by the
public apology will create a significant deterrent. It is, therefore, no
surprise that Chinese companies have insisted on public apologies
from the infringers. As an attorney noted:
When negotiating or litigating with a Chinese party, foreign
companies often encounter a strong demand for making a public
apology in addition to monetary compensation. Often it is quite
difficult to persuade Chinese parties to withdraw a demand for a
public apology, even at the expense of conceding more in
245
damages.

In light of this Chinese tradition, Chinese copyright law, unlike its
246
Western counterparts, includes specifically the remedy of apology.
Both Articles 46 and 47 of the statute state that anyone who commits
an act of copyright infringement “shall bear civil liability for such
247
remedies as . . . making an apology.” As Peter Feng explained:

243. See MCGREGOR, supra note 156, at 10 (noting that “China is a shame-based
society, very different from the guilt-based West”).
244. CHEE, supra note 152, at 48.
245. SUN, supra note 23, at 61.
246. This remedy is not available in trademark or patent law. Indeed, as Thomas
Pattloch noted, “[r]ecent remarks by relevant officials within the Chinese People’s
Courts indicate that future Interpretations by the [Supreme People’s Court] might
exclude such a right for patent infringement proceedings.” GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra
note 116, at 316.
247. Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 46, 47.
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Traditionally, an apology to the injured party was seen as
appropriate after a confession of guilt or wrongdoing, although it
was more a moral duty than a legal requirement. Today, apologies
are often ordered by the court in its judgments. They are published
in newspapers and other media with a wide enough circulation to
eliminate the “adverse effects” of the infringement. The content, as
well as format and page, is court approved. If a wrongdoer or
infringer fails to apologize as ordered, the court may draft and
publish an apology instead and charge the expense to the
248
wrongdoer.

Alternatively, and more often these days, the court “will publish its
249
verdict in the newspaper and charge the cost to the wrongdoer.” To
some extent, the request for an apology has lost its purpose of seeking
250
a “voluntary admission of error and regret.”
Today, an apology is
more like a shaming penalty or the alternative remedy of “eliminating
251
the effects of the [infringing] act,” or both.
It is, therefore, no
surprise that one commentator noted that the remedies of apology
252
and elimination of adverse effects are often rendered together.
After all, “[a]pologies are one way to compensate for the adverse
253
effects caused by the infringement.”
Second, although the local authorities might not be concerned
about counterfeiting, they might be very concerned about public
health.
While foreign businesses have widely criticized the
Communist system for contributing to the country’s lack of respect for
intellectual property rights, they often ignore the heavy emphasis the
254
system has placed on the people’s well-being.
Because of this
emphasis, the authorities may consider a violation of quality control or
consumer protection laws a more serious offense than a violation of
intellectual property laws. As a commentator has noted, “China has
especially several laws and regulations containing statutory warranties
of the quality of goods manufactured or sold in such cases. If the
product copy is of inferior quality, selling it under a trade mark is an
255
offense, as is advertising it or selling it directly to a consumer.”
Thus, if
248. FENG, supra note 67, at 42-43.
249. Id. at 43.
250. Id.
251. See Chinese Copyright Law, supra note 20, arts. 46, 47 (providing for the
remedy of “eliminating the effects of the [infringing] act”).
252. See SUN, supra note 23, at 60.
253. Id.
254. See TED C. FISHMAN, CHINA INC.: HOW THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER
CHALLENGES AMERICA AND THE WORLD 170 (2005) (recalling that “[i]n an April 2004
scandal, 130 people were arrested for making phony infant formula using starch and
water and contributing to the deaths of twelve children”).
255. Mary L. Riley, Strategies for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in China, in
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the ultimate goal is to close down the counterfeit factories, it may be
ill-advised for foreign rights holders to focus only on intellectual
property protection, as such protection might not always be the most
effective.
Non-intellectual property-based alternatives are particularly
important when rights holders have to address piracy or
counterfeiting problems outside of the major Chinese cities. In those
places, government officials are often charged with many competing
duties, including combating crimes, promoting public health and
social welfare, and handling unemployment and other economic
problems. Their reluctance to close down counterfeit factories,
therefore, may be due to the fact that they are also charged with
256
handling unemployment. By closing down the counterfeit factories,
they would have converted the counterfeiting problem into an
unemployment problem. Even worse, from their standpoint, the
unemployment problem is more serious, because it affects the local
community while the counterfeiting problem concerns only foreign
rights holders.
The baby food company in the present case study smartly turned
this problem on its head. Instead of creating a new and more serious
problem for the local authorities, it reminded the officials that their
trouble would not go away even if they chose to ignore the counterfeit
problem. After all, they still had to deal with the public health
problem. More importantly, the public health problem would be
more serious than the counterfeiting problem, because it concerned
primarily the local community. As a result, the company created

PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 221, at 65, 70; see
CHOW, supra note 64, at 206 (noting that “enforcement actions against counterfeiting
can be brought with the Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC) under the
Trademark Law and its Implementing Rules or the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, or
with the Technical Supervision Bureau (TSB) under the Consumer Protection Law or
the Product Quality Law”); TAN, supra note 227, at 56 (stating that, “[a]s certain forms
of trademark infringement may also be actionable under the [Product Quality Law],
trademark owners may choose to take action through the local [Technical
Supervision Bureaus]”); Li, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 226, at
257 (citing an example of how a multinational electrical component company was
“able to take actions against the offending factories based on product quality
grounds” even though it “did not file patents in China to protect its inventions”).
256. See Simon P. Cheetham, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Luxury Goods,
in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 221, at 385 (stating
that the local economies are concerned about “the employment, foreign exchange,
and increased industrial development provided by counterfeiting factories”); Yu, From
Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 210 (suggesting that the Chinese authorities would
be concerned about “the unemployment problem that may result from the closure of
pirate factories”).
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incentives for the local authorities to close down the counterfeit
factories.
Third, by bringing in the local media, the company was able to
attract large-scale public attention, which in turn raised the concerns
257
of local parents over the health and well-being of their children.
The publicized raids, therefore, created domestic pressure on the
local authorities by drawing the local community to the side of the
foreign right holder. By erasing the local-foreign divide, the raids also
reduced the xenophobic sentiments that the local authorities might
harbor toward foreign businesses. While some officials might still be
concerned about the unemployment problem the factory closure
would create, they were less likely to leave the factories open
considering the wide local support the company had generated.
C. Education
The third case study involves a joint venture created by a Western
258
athletic shoe company and a local manufacturer and distributor. In
China, joint ventures are the typical business structures used by
foreign companies to gain a foothold in the market. In some
regulated industries, like the media industry, joint ventures were the
259
only way to enter the country before China’s WTO accession. These
joint ventures are important; they help increase market access, bridge
cultural differences, overcome local protectionism, and utilize guanxi
260
established by local partners. There is one major problem, however:
many local partners do not understand how intellectual property
protection operates and why they need such protection. Such a lack
of understanding not only creates confusion and disagreement, but
also has led to the underprotection of the foreign partner’s valuable
261
assets.
257. Nevertheless, the media strategy could backfire on the rights holders by
“send[ing] the public into a state of panic” and turning away potential customers. Li,
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 226, at 252 (cautioning that “[i]n
cases of baby formulae, pharmaceuticals, and foods and beverages, information about
counterfeiting may send the public into a state of panic”). To avoid panic, the rights
holders need to “focus on providing a positive message to the public about the
genuine products.” Id.
258. This case study was inspired by and improvised from Donaldson & Weiner,
supra note 227, at 420.
259. See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to
Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 31 (2001)
[hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives] (discussing the restrictions on wholly
foreign-owned enterprises in the media sector).
260. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 11, at 209-10 (listing the benefits of
establishing joint ventures in China).
261. See Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 101 (discussing how “a Xiamen
company registered the ‘yinlu’ trademark and allowed its U.S. joint venture partner to
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In this case study, the Western partner asked the Chinese
manufacturer for a portion of the joint venture profits to cover its
design charges. The Chinese partner refused, believing that its
Western partner was greedy and wanted to get more than its fair share
of revenues. The negotiation dragged on for days without resolving
the dispute. After a few days and some karaoke, the Western partner
used a different approach. This time, it explained to the Chinese
partner the importance of design charges and taught the local partner
how to charge for design work itself. The Chinese partner was
surprised; it did not know that it could charge separately for design
work. After realizing that it could do so, it quickly agreed to the
Western partner’s request. It even mobilized to lobby the local
regulators and the national legislature for the right to design fees.
This example is instructive for many reasons. A Chinese partner
might refuse to protect products, not because it does not want to
protect intellectual property, but because it does not understand why
it needs to protect such assets, does not know that it could protect its
own intellectual property rights, and has the misunderstanding that
intellectual property is an unfair Western tool to eke out profits from
hardworking Chinese people. By educating the Chinese partner, the
Western shoemaker provided more information, alleviated its
concern, and created goodwill. It also laid the much-needed
groundwork for future partnerships that call for an allocation of
intellectual property fees.
While education is always important, it is critically important in
China, in which the cultural customs are different and intellectual
property remains a new, and sometimes alien, concept. Consider the
following additional facts about the shoemaker in the present case
262
study.
Concerned about the limited disposable income local
consumers have to buy the latest shoe models, the local manufacturer
successfully convinced its Western partner to promote the company’s
lower-priced “classic” model, which was sold for only a third of the
price of other more advanced models. Although this discount strategy
had quadrupled sales and substantially enlarged the Chinese market
in the first few years, the Western partner had its reservations. Fearing
that the strategy would harm its image as a high-end technologicallyadvanced shoemaker, the company asked the local manufacturer to
alter its strategy. Frustrated and confused, the manufacturer ignored
use the mark freely”).
262. The story with the additional facts was inspired by and improvised from the
New Balance story described in Chew, supra note 19, at 56-59. For a journalistic
account of the story, see Gabriel Kahn, Factory Fight, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at Al.
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the company’s request. Very soon, the discounted “classic” shoes
appeared in Japan and Taiwan, as well as in Australia and Europe.
The Western partner was enraged; it terminated the manufacturing
and distribution agreement and sued the Chinese manufacturer for
infringement of its intellectual property rights.
The added facts are actually taken from a true story concerning the
shoemaker New Balance. In her analysis of the story, Pat Chew
discussed how cultural factors may help explain the ineffectiveness of
distribution and joint venture agreements in offering adequate
intellectual property protection for Western companies. As she
explains:
The contract may prohibit employees of the Chinese joint-venture
partner from disclosing the American partner’s proprietary
information to “third parties.” The Chinese, however, may define a
“third party” differently than American business practices. In
China’s collectivist, socialist, relationship-oriented society, the
notion of outsider status may be quite narrow. For instance, cultural
traditions would likely indicate that family members, “extendedfamily” members, close friends, party members, and state-affiliated
companies and their representatives are not outsiders, and hence,
263
would not be considered as “third parties.”

While Professor Chew’s observation is insightful and important,
education could play a pro-active role in minimizing the potential
misunderstanding between the two partners. For example, the shoe
company could have either educated the local partner about what the
term “third parties” meant even if it had failed to clearly define the
264
term in the contract.
Even better, it could have introduced the
licensing concept to the local manufacturer, explaining why licensees
in Australia, Europe, Japan, and Taiwan should be treated as members
of its “extended family.” In doing so, the shoe company might have
reduced the chance of creating confusion when it later asked the
263. Chew, supra note 19, at 58-59.
264. Moreover, as one commentator noted:
When dealing with a partner who has control over a manufacturing or
distribution process, it is critical that the main agreements directly address the
extent to which subcontractors, agents, or other third parties are allowed
access to a foreign party’s intellectual property. Further, the agreements
should stipulate that written arrangements must be in place before third
parties are allowed to have such access. Signing substantive non-disclosure
agreements with all parties holding access to key information further
strengthens a foreign party’s position in the event of unauthorized disclosure.
Newby, supra note 170, at 242. Nevertheless, foreign businesses, and their lawyers,
need to avoid long boilerplate contracts.” Id. at 240; see id. (noting that “[c]ontract
lawyers must be prepared to negotiate an acceptable compromise between a five-page
model agreement issued by the Chinese authorities and a 60-page American-style
agreement covering every imaginable indemnity, representation, and warranty”).
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manufacturer to abandon its discount strategy. Indeed, it might even
have been able to convince the local partner to switch to a mutuallybeneficial strategy that boosts sales in China without inflicting harm
on the shoe company’s other markets.
Despite the importance of education and the wide criticism of the
ignorance of intellectual property rights in China, Western
governments and businesses remain reluctant to invest in education.
Their
reluctance—and
short-sightedness—is
understandable.
Education is a long-term strategy, and it does not bear fruit for many
years. While American presidents are limited to two terms of four
years, most CEOs of American companies do not last that long. As a
result, neither the government nor the businesses have incentives to
invest in long-term educational efforts.
Indeed, education is not the only under-focused area; intellectual
property enforcement itself remains underserved.
Despite the
existence of rampant piracy and counterfeiting in China, many
foreign businesses in China have allocated only limited budgets for
intellectual property enforcement.
As one attorney noted in
frustration, “in the U.S., companies spend millions of dollars in patent
litigation. But, they are not willing to allocate adequate budgets to
265
China IP enforcement, instead hoping miracles will occur.”
If
companies are unwilling to devote the resources needed for such a
basic aspect of intellectual property management as enforcement, it is
no surprise that they will be unwilling to devote resources to
education.
Although the case study focuses mainly on education, it also
provides insight into the stakeholder issue. As I advocated elsewhere,
foreign governments and intellectual property rights holders need to
266
help China develop local stakeholders. A case in point is the China
Software Alliance (“CSA”), the domestic software lobby formed in
March 1995. As one commentator described the contributions of this
lobby:
265. SUN, supra note 23, at 16.
266. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 207, at 431-33 (discussing the need to
develop local stakeholders as part of a four-part strategy to combat piracy and
counterfeiting). One might question whether it would be wise for U.S. companies to
help develop stakeholders in China, because these stakeholders will eventually
become their competitors. While I am sympathetic to this concern, there are three
possible responses. First, U.S. companies do not need to create stakeholders in areas
that are key to their success. Instead, they can focus on areas that will complement
their business or create synergy for them. Second, the benefits far outweigh the costs.
Just as countries do not want to keep their trading partners weak and poor, companies
should encourage the development of local stakeholders. Finally, there are only very
limited alternatives, if any at all, and the development of stakeholders may perhaps be
the best available alternative.
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CSA successfully lobbied the NPC to emphasize the importance of
having a separate software protection regulation, and also
convinced the legislature “to add clauses that prohibit purchasers
from trying to decipher software that makers had encrypted to
prevent piracy.” To bolster enforcement, the CSA cooperated with
the Business Software Alliance of the United States (BSA) to operate
a national hotline for reporting piracy and wrote newspaper articles
267
to promote public awareness of the enforcement of IP laws.

By educating the local partner about the possibility of charging
design fees in the first hypothetical, the shoe company did what the
baby food company in the previous case study had done—it created a
local stakeholder. As a result of its effort, the Western partner now
has a local ally to depend on for lobbying its government. While
foreign pressure is sometimes needed, domestic pressure is always
effective. Indeed, by increasing domestic pressure on the local and
national governments, the Western partner will be able to avoid any
xenophobic sentiments created by its aggressive tactics.
Some policymakers and business executives have suggested that
lawsuits and crackdowns are useful educational tools. In the context
of file-sharing, for example, Cary Sherman, the president of the
Recording Industry Association of America, took the position that
268
“lawsuits are a very potent form of education.”
This unpopular
approach, nevertheless, is risky and has been proven ineffective in
China. There are too many reasons for crackdowns on piracy and
counterfeiting activities by the Chinese authorities, and many Chinese
view publicized raids with great skepticism. As Ted Fishman wrote:
The purposes behind the publicized raids are always obscure, and
the Chinese who read about them are skeptical about taking the
raids at face value. Are they the result of turf wars among the
government fiefdoms that are themselves knee-deep in
counterfeiting? Did the raided factories push the Party’s tolerance
of violent and eroticized Western entertainment too far? Did they
pirate a movie backed by the Chinese government? Or was that
day’s demonstration of will just a show for a foreign trade group
coming to China to—yet again—express its grave concerns over
269
intellectual-property theft?

267. Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 100-01.
268. Benny Evangelista, Online Music Finally Starts to Rock ‘n’ Roll, SAN FRAN. CHRON.,
Dec. 29, 2003, at E1 (quoting Cary Sherman, president of the RIAA); see also MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2794 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting that the RIAA’s lawsuits “have served as a teaching tool, making
clear that much file sharing, if done without permission, is unlawful”).
269. FISHMAN, supra note 254, at 236.
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Thus, although both education and enforcement actions will raise
awareness of intellectual property rights among the Chinese,
education is a more effective approach.
D. Co-optation
The fourth case study centers on a Western manufacturer whose
production process required the purchase and installation of very
expensive and complicated equipment. When the company realized
that its product had been pirated in China, it hired a team of private
investigators, who subsequently discovered the source of the piracy.
Instead of going to court or seeking administrative enforcement, the
270
company offered to purchase the pirate factory. Because it was very
expensive to build a similar factory from scratch, the pirates decided
not to establish a new factory and accepted the company’s offer
instead. Gradually, the former pirates found the benefits of such a
licensing arrangement; they not only earned income, but needed not
fear factory closure, jail time, or financial damages. The story had a
happy ending.
This case study invites a number of moral questions—in particular,
whether and why one should reward the criminal acts of other people?
However, moral questions aside, co-optation can be a very effective
strategy, as it will take away the essential means of illegal reproduction.
One should not forget that there are many causes of piracy.
Sometimes, it is just greed; other times, however, it is poverty and
desperation. As an administrative official reportedly recounted to his
attorney friend, one poor street vendor committed suicide after his
271
pirated goods had been taken away from him.
In the present case
study, the manufacturer not only avoided this difficult problem by
giving the factory workers an alternative means to earn an honest
living, but it created the potential for converting a pirate to a future
partner.

270. See, e.g., CHEE, supra note 152, at 109 (using Cadence Design Systems as an
example of Western firms that “managed to get the Chinese companies who [sic]
pirated its products to become licence holding companies—who [sic] now have an
interest in stopping the IP from spreading any further”); Clifford J. Shultz II & Bill
Saporito, Protecting Intellectual Property:
Strategies and Recommendations to Deter
Counterfeiting and Brand Piracy in Global Markets, 31 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 18, 22-23
(1996) (arguing that companies consider co-opting pirates when more heavy-handed
approaches would be costly); Eric M. Griffin, Note, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!—A
Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection in the People’s Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 169, 188 (1998) (stating that co-optation through buy-outs or joint ventures
may help alleviate the piracy problem).
271. See Secrets of Success in China, supra note 236 (remarks of Wen Xikai, Deputy
Director General of the Law & Treaty Department, State Intellectual Property Office).
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Moreover, the co-optation strategy would allow the Western
manufacturer to create goodwill in the local community. As discussed
earlier, government officials outside of major Chinese cities often have
to deal with not only intellectual property problems, but also other
seemingly more pressing problems, like unemployment and social
welfare. Because of their dual, or multiple, capacity, they are often
more receptive to a co-optation proposal than to one that requires
factory closures. While the latter would create a more serious
problem for the local community, the former would reduce two
problems—piracy and social welfare.
Unfortunately, despite its benefits, the co-optation strategy does not
work for every situation. Foreign businesses, therefore, need to
carefully determine when and whether to utilize this strategy. When it
is easy and inexpensive to re-establish the factory, co-optation would
be similar to paying ransom to a kidnapper without asking him or her
to release the hostage. In such a scenario, the pirates will continue
selling their factories, only to set up another one in a different, often
nearby place. The manufacturer will have to buy the same factories
over and over again, while protection of its products will not improve.
Thus, if a company decides to use co-optation, it needs to conduct
due diligence regarding the owner of the pirate factory, in particular
whether it has the ability, or even plans, to set up another pirate
272
factory.
To avoid misunderstanding and to preserve its future
working relationship with the factory, it is ideal for the Western
partner to explain the due diligence practice and its justification
273
before pursuing the practice.
As an attorney experienced in U.S.China transactions explained:
Due diligence is a concept distastefully alien to the Chinese.
Chinese companies are not comfortable with outsiders inspecting
books, records, and management practices. The Chinese view a
detailed request for information as reflecting a lack of trust. Even
Chinese companies with a history of foreign business interactions
may be reluctant to share sensitive information with a foreign party.
Sending a standard multi-page due diligence checklist to a Chinese

272. CHOW, supra note 64, at 244 (observing that “[s]everal recent cases in China
have highlighted the risks involved in dealing with unscrupulous third party
contractors who have clandestine business relationships with counterfeiters at the
same time that they are under contract to the [multinational enterprise]”); see also
CHEE, supra note 152, at 109 (underscoring the importance of due diligence
investigations in transactions in China).
273. See Newby, supra note 170, at 240 (suggesting that American companies
explain both the scope of the review and the depth of the details required by the
review).
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target company is a common mistake made by American investors
274
and one that can be a deal killer.

E. Reinvestment
The fifth case study focuses on a Western mobile phone company
which understands the importance of reinvesting in the local
275
community.
Every year, it invests a portion of its profits into the
local community to promote cultural and educational benefits.
Drawing on this case study, this Section proposes a new strategy in
which foreign businesses ask for penalty awards in the form of cultural
or educational benefits in the local community, or as contributions to
a special patent fund that will be used by local inventors when they file
276
patents both in China and abroad.
One of the standard criticisms made by trade groups and rights
holders is that penalties in China are too low to serve any deterrent
effect. As the International Intellectual Property Alliance wrote in its
recent report, “[i]ndustry is very concerned that the apparently
grudging minor changes will not result in significantly more criminal
cases with deterrent penalties and thus piracy levels will not be
277
markedly affected.”
Indeed, foreign rights holders are known to
joke about how they have “won the case but lost the money” in
278
China. Even worse for the rights holders, judgments in the country
are not automatically enforced. Thus, the winning party often “has to
spend extra time, effort and money to enforce the favourable
judgment,” and their success will be greatly reduced when the

274. Id.
275. See Doris Estelle Long, China’s IP Reforms Show Little Success, IP WORLDWIDE,
Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 5-6 [hereinafter Long, China’s IP Reforms] (discussing Motorola’s
Project Hope, which “has contributed funds to assist in the construction of local
primary schools throughout China”); see also CHAN, supra note 169, at 3 (noting that
some foreign companies have “invested in university programmes, training projects
and other large-scale infrastructure “to show they are a ‘good friend’ of China”); R.
Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards, Introduction to INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 1, 27 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy
J. Richards eds., 1988) [hereinafter GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?] (arguing
for the investment of a portion of the benefits the United States would gain from the
elimination of piracy).
276. See, e.g., Secrets of Success in China, supra note 236, at 43 (quoting Wen Xikai, the
deputy director general of the Law & Treaty Department of the State Intellectual
Property Office, as reporting that “[e]ach province or municipality has established a
patent fund and if an enterprise has a good invention and wants to file abroad they
can apply to the fund”).
277. IIPA Submission, supra note 121, at 2.
278. Ruay Lian Ho, Compliance and Challenges Faced by the Chinese Patent System Under
TRIPS, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 504, 522 (2003).
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financial circumstances of their adversaries change or when funds
279
used to pay for the judgment have been absconded.
The low penalty is understandable for at least three reasons, even if
we ignore the statutory stipulation that damages in China can be
calculated for a maximum period of only two years from the date of
filing of the complaint, as compared to a maximum of six years in the
280
United States. First, the cost of living in China is much lower than
that in the Western world. Thus, a calculation of the product value
based on the price at which infringing product is sold in a market
other than China, or at which the manufacturer priced it for the
Chinese market, is far from reliable. Such a figure tends to distort
decisions Chinese consumers make over the product.
Moreover, it is unlikely that there will be a uniform product price in
China, given the drastically different living standards that exist in
different parts of the country. Indeed, commentators have widely
281
challenged the myth of a single market in China.
Because of the
country’s largeness, the cost of living in the East is far higher than that
in the West, and the cost of living in the North may vary from that in
the South. To some extent, one needs to recognize China as a
282
“country of countries,” rather than a homogenous one.
Second, many judges are concerned that foreign rights holders will
either take the penalty awards back to their home country, or to major
cities in which their headquarters are located. Giving foreign rights
holders large penalty awards, therefore, would drain the local
community of its limited resources. Indeed, as a judge reasoned,
foreign rights holders seem to be “more concerned with stopping
future infringement than with receiving excessive compensation for
283
past infringement.”
It is, therefore, not unusual for judges to
calculate compensation rewards based on the lower, rather than
higher, estimates.
Third, heavy compensation seems morally wrong when the
infringement involves a state-owned or collectively-owned enterprise.
As Peter Feng explained:

279. SUN, supra note 23, at 14.
280. See id. at 61 (discussing the difference between how damages are calculated in
China and in the United States).
281. See, e.g., CHEE, supra note 152, at 3-9 (challenging the widely-held myth of a
single market among businesspeople in China).
282. Cf. SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 134 (pointing out that “China’s enormous
labor reserve, with pay scales radically lower in the hinterland than on the coast and
in urban areas . . . , creates the equivalent of a country within a country”).
283. FENG, supra note 67, at 48.
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[I]n the case of state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises, the
cost of compensation is ultimately borne by the state or collective,
which traditionally has the responsibility to take care of the
employees’ livelihood. As one judge commented concerning the
compensation policy in a case of patent infringement before him,
the innocent workers did no wrong; they expended labor and skill
in producing the infringing products on which they earn their
meager livelihood. The court should not shut it eyes to reality by
284
depriving the workers of their only income.

When Western businesses invest money they earned from the
penalty awards back into the local community, the judges’ second and
third concerns are largely removed. Even better, from the perspective
of foreign businesses, the reinvestment strategy would help them win
the acceptance and goodwill of the local leaders and residents. Like
the co-optation strategy, reinvesting in the local community also would
help alleviate xenophobic sentiments among the Chinese people and
their widespread skepticism toward Western institutions. In addition,
such a strategy might also allow them to create local stakeholders by
demonstrating to the local officials the benefits of adequate
intellectual property protection and by including the local community
in the benefits of the success of foreign businesses with major
285
intellectual property assets.
The possibility of the local community
losing these benefits might even motivate local authorities to pursue
infringers that refuse to pay the penalty awards.
In recent years, local officials have learned this benefit indirectly.
Because of the rampant piracy and counterfeiting problems, local and
national governments as well as the private sector have allocated
substantial resources for cracking down intellectual property
infringement activities. As Daniel Chow has noted:
The authority to combat counterfeiting results in larger budgets and
more staffing, power, and prestige. Raids are also potential revenue
generating activities because the authorities confiscate cash, goods,
machinery, and equipment, including cars, and then sell the
confiscated goods at public auctions . . . . Government authorities
also routinely ask companies to reimburse the cost of lodging where
travel is required, the cost of hiring trucks to load and move
confiscated goods, and the cost of storing the goods if a private

284. Id.
285. See Long, China’s IP Reforms, supra note 275, at 6 (using Motorola’s Hope
Project to illustrate how the reinvestment of funds to help pay for local primary
schools in China allowed local officials to benefit from protection of Motorola’s
intellectual property rights).
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warehouse needs to be rented. Some government authorities will
286
also ask companies to pay case handling fees.

Thus, the more actively the authorities crack down on piracy and
counterfeiting activities, the bigger the budgetary income they will
receive for the benefit of the community.
Finally, the reinvestment strategy would help generate muchneeded funds for education and awareness efforts. As discussed
above, the corporate budgets for intellectual property enforcement
for many Western companies in China are limited, and business
executives who are in charge of these budgets are often reluctant to
spend them on long-term educational efforts. Reinvestment of these
penalty awards, however, will serve to indirectly increase the
enforcement budgets and allow the company to fund what they
otherwise cannot afford or are unwilling to pay for. Moreover,
because judges are likely to reduce the penalty awards if they are not
reinvested back into the local community, foreign companies actually
would be better served by allowing the awards to be paid in the form
of educational or cultural benefits or as contributions to a special
patent fund.
F.

Isolation

The final case study concerns a manufacturer of state-of-the-art
electronics products. Although the firm was eager to take advantage
of the lower manufacturing and distribution costs and the potentially
enormous future market in China, it was reluctant to relocate there,
because of the fear that its patented technology would be stolen due
to limited protection of intellectual property and inadequate
enforcement of contract law in China. To protect its key technology,
the manufacturer separated the high-technology components of its
products from their low-technology counterparts, producing the
former in the United States while manufacturing the latter and
assembling the finished products in China. In doing so, the firm was
not only able to resolve the dilemma, but also benefited from the
growing Chinese market.
This case study is instructive for several reasons. First, it illustrates,
again, the importance for foreign businesses in China of taking proactive measures to protect their intellectual assets. Despite increased
globalization, physical distance and technological barriers remain
effective defenses against piracy. In the present case study, for
286. Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 31 (2000).
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example, the electronics manufacturer, by isolating its key
technologies, successfully protected against intellectual property
infringement without pulling out of the Chinese market. If natural
barriers are unavailable, companies can consider creating artificial
barriers by carefully formulating a nondisclosure strategy to protect
their trade secrets and critical know-how. In Edwin Mansfield’s
influential study on the relationship between intellectual property and
foreign direct investment, a respondent was reported to have
refrained from “implement[ing] manufacturing operations . . . that
use [its] highest level of technology due to uncertainty over adequacy
287
of trade secret protection.”
Another respondent was reported to
have minimized risks “by not disclosing critical catalyst or process
288
know-how information to the licensee.”
Second, the present case study highlights the different factors a firm
needs to consider when making decisions about why they want to
relocate to China. As Paul Heald and Keith Maskus have noted, it is
important to distinguish a business decision to relocate manufacturing
and research facilities to a country from one that seeks to establish a
289
market for its finished product.
While intellectual property is the
main concern for the latter, it is of marginal importance to the
former. Indeed, except for trade secret and contractual protection,
there is empirically no strong correlation between other forms of
intellectual property and a firm’s decision to relocate manufacturing
290
and research facilities. Instead, a decision to relocate manufacturing
facilities is likely to be determined by such “location advantages” as
“market size and growth, local demand patterns, transport costs and
distance from markets, low wage costs in relation to labor productivity,
abundant natural resources, and trade protection that could
287. EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 27 (Int’l Fin. Corp. Discussion Paper No. 19,
1994).
288. Id. at 30.
289. See Heald, Mowing the Playing Field, supra note 145, at 258-60 (discussing the
different concerns about intellectual property protection between the marketing
division and the research and manufacturing division of a foreign company); see also
Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct
Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 119-28 (1998)
(discussing the various factors influencing foreign direct investment flows).
290. As Professor Heald noted:
Moving a research and development facility to a country without patent,
trademark, or copyright law does not increase a firm’s risk of damaging
disclosures or increase its cost of doing business. In the absence of
involuntary disclosure fears, MegaCorp’s research and manufacturing
divisions should be relatively indifferent to the level of patent, trademark, and
copyright protection found in a developing country.
Heald, Mowing the Playing Field, supra note 145, at 259.
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291

encourage ‘tariff-jumping’ investments.”
Likewise, a decision to
relocate research and development facilities is likely to be affected by
“the level of education and training of the local workforce, the
condition of its financial sector, the health of its legal system, and the
292
transparency of governmental procedures.”
Third, the case study illustrates how the type of business structure a
firm adopts may affect its ability to protect intellectual property. For
example, wholly foreign-owned enterprises, or WFOEs, are in a better
293
position to protect intellectual property than joint ventures.
Although foreign companies favored the formation of joint ventures
in the past decade, they now have increasingly embraced WFOEs as
the model business structure to enter the Chinese market, which has
become increasingly open, thanks partly to the WTO accession.
WFOEs not only enable foreign rights holders to maintain control
over their businesses, but allow them to protect their key technologies
by either isolating them or preventing comprises by mistakes made by
local partners who are unconscious, or have limited awareness, of
294
intellectual property protection.
Moreover, technology transfer remains a major requirement for the
establishment of joint ventures in China, especially when partnerships
295
with state-owned enterprises are involved. Those who are willing to
296
transfer technology are also greatly rewarded. As some experts have
291. Maskus, supra note 289, at 123.
292. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field, supra note 145, at 259.
293. See CHAN, supra note 169, at 117 (recommending the establishment of WFOEs
under “circumstances that involve companies with sensitive technologies and
proprietary manufacturing processes to protect”); CHOW, supra note 64, at 179 (noting
that “[a]dopting the WFOE form for a manufacturing facility, research and
development center, and an investment holding company will help to reduce the risks
of authorized access to proprietary rights by vesting greater control and security in the
foreign investor”); MCGREGOR, supra note 156, at 92 (“Avoid joint ventures with
government entities unless you have no choice. Then understand that this
partnership is about China obtaining your technology, know-how, and capital while
maintaining Chinese control.”).
294. See discussion Part III.C (discussing how local partners sometimes may be
unconscious, or have limited awareness, of intellectual property protection).
295. See OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INDUS. & ECON. SEC., BUREAU OF EXP. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, US COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA i (1999) (assessing “the extent to which US commercial technology
is being . . . ‘coerced’ from US companies engaged in normal business practices and
joint ventures in China in exchange for access to China’s market”); see also Michael S.
Lelyveld, US Companies Are “Not Being Smart’ in China, J. COMMERCE, Mar. 1, 1999, at 1A
(discussing the findings of the report).
296. As one commentator noted:
Those who were ready to transfer more cutting-edge technologies and to
hand in the underlying capabilities were amply rewarded: They were granted
permission to locate in the most desirable areas; given preferential
governance and equity terms; provided with prolonged tax holidays and duty
exemptions; and, perhaps most importantly, given preferential access or the
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noted, China “require[s] trade ‘offsets’ in the form of technology
transfers from foreign joint ventures . . . [and] has been frank about
its need to acquire technology because of the prohibitive cost of trying
297
to modernize from scratch.”
In addition, technology transfer
through the establishment of joint ventures “was considered necessary
for China to increase local added value, maintain local employment
and speed up the process of industrialisation; and more important,
through technological learning, to build up indigenous technological
298
capabilities.”
Chinese leaders have long held the belief that transfer of
technology is more important than the cost and quality of service. For
instance, when China was exploring opportunities to set up a joint
production venture in the telecommunications field, it chose to team
up with a Belgian firm, partly because of the firm’s willingness to
299
transfer advanced switching technology.
This focus on technology
transfer is understandable, considering the large-scale modernization
efforts China is currently undertaking as well as the country’s long
history of modernization reforms, which can be traced back to the
300
Self-Strengthening Movement of the mid-nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, in the wake of the WTO accession, “China has agreed to
eliminate technology transfer requirements and offsets as a condition
301
for investment or importation immediately upon entry,” and the
Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises and its implementing
regulations were subsequently enacted to eliminate compulsory
302
technology transfer.
promise of access to the much-coveted domestic market.
SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 67.
297. Lelyveld, supra note 295.
298. XIAOBAI SHEN, THE CHINESE ROAD TO HIGH TECHNOLOGY: A STUDY OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SWITCHING TECHNOLOGY IN THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION 63
(1999).
299. See id. at 64 (noting that “[t]he most important factor was that BTM [Belgiumbased Bell Technology Manufacturing Company] agreed to transfer technologies for
component production, including the production technology of its custom LSI (large
scale integrated circuit) chip” and that, at the time of the agreement, “no other
supplier was prepared or able to offer the transfer of such advanced technology”); see
also id. at 63-103 (discussing the establishment of Shanghai Bell as a Belgian-Chinese
joint venture and the resulting transfer of System-12 technology).
300. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 22-24 (2001)
(discussing the self-strengthening movement and China’s modernization efforts).
301. PETER NOLAN, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: NATIONAL CHAMPIONS,
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE BIG BUSINESS REVOLUTION 196 (2001).
302. As Shi Miaomiao, the deputy director general of the WTO Department in the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, stated:
In the investment area, China has revised the Law of People’s Republic of
China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture; and the Law on Wholly
Foreign Owned Enterprises and their respective implementing regulations,
including the elimination of the requirements on trade and foreign exchange
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While the isolation strategy has many benefits, its effectiveness has
been greatly undermined in recent years. As the literacy and
education levels of the Chinese increase, a growing number are now
entering colleges and universities. Indeed, recent studies have shown
that China is facing an educational crisis due to the limited number of
higher education institutions for the large number of qualified
303
college-aged students.
Moreover, a growing number of Chinese,
who have worked abroad and have acquired foreign training and
304
Because of the
experience, are now returning to China to work.
increasing relocation of research and development centers, China also
305
benefits from an influx of expatriate workers.
As a result,
technological capacity in China has greatly improved, and most
products and technologies, except for very advanced ones, can now be
reverse-engineered in China. Thus, even though it is still useful to
isolate critical technology from China, the effectiveness of the strategy
has been greatly reduced in regards to all but the very latest
technologies.
G. Summary
The above case studies demonstrate how some foreign businesses
were able to protect their intellectual assets even when intellectual
property laws were ineffectively enforced. While these studies offer
insight into possible alternative strategies to protect intellectual
property in China, they also call into question the effectiveness and
expediency of the legalistic approach usually taken by Western
companies. To some extent, the discussion is reminiscent of the
differences between the Chinese and Western legal cultures and of the
balancing, local content, export performance and compulsory technology
transfer.
Shi, China’s Participation in the Doha Negotiations, supra note 68, at 31-32.
303. See CHEE, supra note 152, at 110-11 (noting the enormous talent pool in
China); Bruce Einhorn, No Peasant Left Behind, BUS. WK., Aug. 22, 2005, at 102 (noting
the “daunting” educational challenge in China).
304. See Bruce Einhorn & John Carey, A New Lab Partner for the U.S.?, BUS. WK., Aug.
22, 2005, at 116 (noting that “Beijing is . . . working hard to lure American-educated
Chinese scientists back to the mainland”); see also SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 5
(noting that “Chinese students are now the largest contingent of foreign students in
the United States” and that “returnees are bringing with them not only academic
knowledge, but also . . . application know-how and business-related experience”). See
id. at 75-77 for a brief discussion of the return of the “Turtles,” or returnees. See
DAVID ZWEIG, INTERNATIONALIZING CHINA: DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND GLOBAL LINKAGES
161-210 (2002), for a discussion of educational exchanges between China and the
outside world.
305. See SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 66 (noting that “China was able to obtain
technology on a scale unprecedented for a developing nation, culminating in the
establishment of research and development (R&D) centers, the epitome of
technology transfer”).
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millennia-old debate between the Confucianists and the Legalists in
306
China.
In this debate, the Confucianists questioned whether laws were
307
needed or expedient.
As Confucius, the most influential Chinese
philosopher of all time, explained in the Analects: “Govern the people
by regulations, keep order among them by chastisements, and they
will flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral
force, keep order among them by ritual and they will keep their self308
This concept of
respect and come to you of their own accord.”
governance by moral norms can be traced back to the pre-Confucius
period of Western Zhou (1122-771 B.C.), during which rituals or rites
309
(li) were heavily emphasized. These rites, broadly defined, covered
a wide range of political, social, and familial relationships in society
and informed people of their normative roles, responsibilities, and
310
obligations to others. In a Confucian society, people learn to adjust
their views and demands to accommodate other people’s needs and
desires, to avoid confrontation and conflict, and to preserve
311
harmony. Litigation, therefore, is unnecessary.
The Legalists, by contrast, believed it was impossible to teach people
to be good. Laws and punishment (fa), therefore, were needed to
maintain public order by instructing people what and what not to
306. For discussions of the debate between the Confucianists and the Legalists, see
generally Chew, supra note 19, at 48-51; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note
259, at 32-38.
307. See ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 9 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that the Confucianists “criticized the
hedonistic pleasure-pain psychology relied on by the Legalists, which, [they] argued,
would lead people to think only in terms of their self-interest and make them litigious,
trying to manipulate the laws to suit their own interests”).
308. CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS bk. II, ¶ 3 (Arthur Waley trans.,
Vintage 1989) (500 B.C.).
309. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 32-33 & n.207
(tracing the origins of the Chinese aversion to litigation).
310. See Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in
China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1109-10
(1996) (discussing the concept of li and social roles).
311. See id. at 1109; see also Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL (Milton Katz ed., 1957) (noting that
“[t]he proper disposition with regard to one’s interests is the predisposition to yield
rather than the predisposition to insist”), quoted in JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION 62, 65
(1968); Alice Tay, The Struggle for Law in China, 21 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 561, 562
(1987) (noting that “Chinese tradition personalizes all claims, seeing them in the
context of social human relationships”); Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in
Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 168
(Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000) (noting that “[t]oday, litigation in the public
courts is still viewed with disfavor in China, for it represents a breakdown in
relationships that should be avoided. Ideally, broken relationships should be
restored, but litigation makes restoration difficult”).
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312

do. Although Legalism was embraced in a very short period of time
in the Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.), it never dominated the Chinese
313
In fact, fa was often associated with the
society until very recently.
harsh, despotic, and unpopular Qin rule that united the country and
314
centralized its bureaucracy.
As the Chinese would reason, “when
government leans heavily on fa to reinforce its authority, it does so
315
because it has no effective ability to rule by li.”
Thus, to many
316
Chinese, laws should be used only as the last resort.
Notwithstanding the unpopularity of fa and the overall reluctance
of the Chinese to use a legal system, laws had not been abolished in
imperial China. Rather, li and fa coexisted, and the Chinese emperors
317
have used both concepts to govern the country.
Indeed,
comprehensive legal codes were enacted in the Qin and Han
dynasties, and the Tang Code, created after the Han dynasty, became
the basis of the later codes of the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing
318
dynasties.

312. See Butterton, supra note 310, at 1110 (explaining that “fa is a penal concept; it
is associated with punishment, serving to maintain public order through the threat of
force and physical violence”).
313. See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 307, at 93 (“[T]he concept and doctrines of legality,
unlike the precepts of Confucianism, had never occupied a central role in traditional
imperial China. There has not existed a legal culture with elements like officials’
fidelity to law or citizens’ consciousness of their legal rights . . . .”); FENG, supra note
67, at 11 (maintaining that “[t]here is . . . an entrenched Confucian-strategist
tradition which regards formal law as an inefficient and cumbersome instrument for
governance”). Even today, there are significant differences between the rule of law
model Western countries projected on to China and the rule of law model embraced
by Chinese leaders. See generally Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom,
One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471,
486-510 (2002) (discussing the different rule of law models).
314. See Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 34 (noting that fa was
the dominant Chinese ideology in the Qin dynasty); Butterton, supra note 310, at
1108 (same). See generally GRAY L. DORSEY, JURISCULTURE: CHINA 125-30 (1993)
(discussing Legalism in the State of Qin).
315. Butterton, supra note 310, at 1110.
316. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 87, at 10 (noting that “[p]ublic, positive law was
meant to buttress, rather than supersede, the more desirable means of guiding society
and was to be resorted to only when these other means failed to elicit appropriate
behavior”); CHEN, supra note 307, at 11 (maintaining that fa “is to be employed as a
last resort to maintain social order when li has failed to do so”); Jeffrey W. Berkman,
Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to Protection and the Need for the Rule
of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 32 n.144 (1996) (explaining that Confucianism
“saw law as an instrument of last resort necessary to punish those who could not follow
the normative ideal of social harmony arising from the many social relationships
within society”); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 34 (noting that
“[t]o the Chinese, fa should always be employed as the last resort”).
317. See CHEN, supra note 307, at 11 (noting that “[t]here was thus a coexistence of
both li and fa in traditional China” and that “[a]ll the dynastic empires subsequent to
the Qin dynasty continued to develop codes of law and legal institutions”).
318. See id. at 12. The Tang Code remains the oldest surviving code in the country.
Id.
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While the debate between the Confucianists and the Legalists is
interesting from a philosophical standpoint, it is also relevant to our
discussion. This debate not only provides insight into questions like
whether China will have the rule of law in the near future or whether
the tens of thousands of Chinese laws and regulations will be
319
eventually enforced, but also broader questions concerning the
nature of the WTO dispute settlement process and China’s perception
of that process.
One might recall the “general disagreement [before the
establishment of the WTO] among GATT members over whether the
principal role of GATT dispute settlement panels should be to render
judicial-like decisions or to promote negotiated settlements through
320
conciliation,” which commentators attributed to the differences
between Japan and the United States over their domestic dispute
settlement traditions. As William Davey suggested, “the United States
is a more litigious society than Japan, which places a high premium on
321
consensus.”
The GATT debate was later extended to the WTO context, raising
questions about whether the legalistic, rule-oriented approach of the
dispute settlement process would be more effective and preferable to
322
an alternative approach focusing on negotiation and conciliation.
Although commentators have widely credited the Uruguay Round for
embracing the rule-based approach in establishing the mandatory
323
dispute settlement process, recent behavior of developed country
319. See Chew, supra note 19, at 62 (suggesting that the debate between
Confucianism and Legalism will raise questions about the prospects of rule of law in
China).
320. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, supra note 204, at 57. As Professor Davey
described the two conflicting viewpoints:
[T]he legalistic view is that the General Agreement is a code of conduct and
embodies a balance of concessions. If a contracting party violates the code
and tips the balance, it is appropriate to label that party as a violator and to
put pressure on it to conform its conduct to the code, if necessary by
threatening some form of retaliation. On the other hand, the antilegalistic
position is that the General Agreement is not a code of conduct per se, but
more of a commitment by the contracting parties to deal in good faith with
each other in trade matters so as to work out a mutually acceptable solution to
any disagreement. The United States is generally perceived to support the
legalistic position, while the EC and Japan are considered supporters of the
antilegalistic view.
Id. at 66.
321. Id. at 67.
322. See generally id. at 65-81 (discussing the philosophical debate about whether a
legalistic, rule-oriented approach of the dispute settlement would be more effective
and preferable to one that focuses on negotiation and conciliation).
323. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements
of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L.
275, 277 (1997) (describing the process as having a “complex system of enforcement,
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members in the WTO process, in particular the United States, have
called into question whether the dispute settlement process is a rulebased system with mechanisms for negotiation and consensus building
324
or a negotiation/consensus-based process backed by default rules.
After all, article IV of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization has emphasized “the special character of
the WTO, which is both a legally binding intergovernmental treaty of
rights and obligations among its Members and a forum for
325
negotiations.”
A case in point is the incompliance of section 110(5) of the United
States Copyright Act with the Berne Convention as incorporated into
the TRIPs Agreement. Even after the Dispute Settlement Panel had
found the United States in violation of the TRIPs Agreement in United
States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, the United States refused
326
to revise its copyright law.
If this trend continues—and, worse, if
countries like China follow the United States’ lead—one has to
wonder how effective the rule-based dispute settlement approach will
be in maintaining worldwide protection of intellectual property rights,
whether the legalistic approach makes sense in the international
system that lacks an effective supranational enforcement
327
mechanism, and whether the dispute settlement process will offer
the same level of protection to less developed countries as it does to
328
their developed counterparts.
If the WTO dispute settlement
complete with fairly short deadlines and provision for retaliation, in case a member
state does not comply with a decision”).
324. Although commentators have focused on the dispute settlement aspects of the
WTO process, the process also includes mechanisms for negotiation and conciliations.
Under the procedure, a WTO member state can initiate consultations with another
member state that allegedly has breached obligations under the treaty.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 4,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112, 116. If consultations fail, the parties may pursue good
offices, conciliation, or mediation within the WTO. Id. art. 5.
325. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17.
326. See Status Report by the United States, United States—Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/24/Add.9 (Aug. 19, 2005) (stating that the United States
“has been consulting with the US Congress and will continue to confer with the
European Communities in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this
matter”). This dispute is particularly important, because it concerned two economic
superpowers—the European Communities and the United States. As China’s
economic power increases, it is logical to conceive that the United States’ response in
United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act might serve as a model for China’s
behavior in the WTO system.
327. See Okediji, supra note 177, at 822 (noting that “the choice to utilize diplomacy
instead of the dispute settlement process in addressing the public health crises
arguably was a superior strategic move”).
328. As one commentator noted, the United States’ approach may encourage other
WTO member states “to replace effective enforcement of intellectual property rights
with a cynical ‘exemptions plus compensation’ approach to TRIPS.” Richard Owens,
TRIPS and the Fairness in Music Arbitration: The Repercussions, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
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process is not as rule-based as its proponents have claimed, one may
have to wonder what the United States can achieve through the
process and, from China’s perspective, what it really means when the
United States files a formal WTO complaint against the country.
Moreover, China’s perception of the dispute settlement process may
329
ultimately affect developments in the international trading system.
As one commentator has noted:
the study of Chinese accession has rendered problematic many of
the assumptions that have traditionally governed our (Western)
understanding of the WTO and has therefore entailed the need for
more appropriate alternative perspectives and scenarios of what may
occur once China accedes (given its size and distinct legal and
cultural traditions).330

Although commentators have feared that China’s accession would
lead to an “litigation explosion” and the “increasing litigiousness of
the WTO dispute mechanism,”331 China’s behavior in the WTO in the
past few years seem to have suggested otherwise. From the standpoint
of dispute settlement approaches, China was closer to Japan than to
the United States; “[h]istorically, [it] has never been shy to express its
332
preference for amicable means of dispute settlement in diplomacy.”
Thus, China might be skeptical of the WTO dispute settlement
process, or even reluctant to use it.
49, 53 (2003). Such an approach, according to the commentator, might undercut the
minimum standards for intellectual property protection under the TRIPs Agreement
while creating instability in the international trading system. Id.
329. See Cass et al., supra note 217, at 5 (observing that “China’s entry to the WTO
has the potential to have a significant impact upon the world trading system precisely
because it occurs at a time when many of the old verities of geo-politics and law, and
law and diplomacy, are being questioned”). For discussions of China’s participation
in the WTO dispute settlement process, see generally Henry S. Gao, Aggressive
Legalisism: The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN
THE WTO, supra note 68, at 315; Liyong Jiang, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
and China’s Participation, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 68, at 303.
330. Alan S. Alexandroff & Rafael Gomez, General Introduction to CHINA AND THE
LONG MARCH supra, note 208, at 1, 2.
331. See Deborah Z. Cass, China and the ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade
Law, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 40, 45 (noting the
concern that “China’s entry might weaken the dispute settlement system” by creating
“non-compliance with Appellate Body rulings . . . [and an] overload of the dispute
settlement system”). But see Sylvia Ostry, WTO Membership for China: To Be and Not to
Be—Is That the Answer?, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 27, at 31,
38 (contending that “the issue of the increasing litigiousness of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism is a broader issue that the Chinese accession will amplify but
does not create”).
332. Kong, supra note 27, at 151; see also Pitman B. Potter, The Evolution of Law in
Contemporary China: Challenges for WTO Implementation, in CHINA AND THE LONG MARCH,
supra note 208, at 136, 140 (noting that “[a] comparison of WTO norms on dispute
resolution with Chinese norms reveals apparent convergence in form but significant
divergence in substantive performance”).
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IV. PROSPECTS OF CHINA’S IMPROVEMENTS
Since the mid-1990s, China has introduced many intellectual
property laws and regulations. The country now has so many laws that
it is very hard for the authorities to properly enforce all of them even
if they have the political will to do so. As William Alford noted
insightfully, the problem with China is not a lack of laws, but the
333
existence of too many.
Laws, nevertheless, are important, because
intellectual property laws will only be as effective as they are enforced.
Thus far, enforcement, has been a major stumbling block to effective
protection of intellectual property rights in China.
This Part undertakes the difficult task of examining the progress
China has made in the intellectual property arena. Although
researchers and trade groups have provided empirical evidence of the
extent of piracy and counterfeiting in China, such evidence does not
track the progress China has made in the intellectual property arena.
To measure progress, one has to examine not just the extent of the
Chinese piracy and counterfeiting problems, but the extent of those
problems when all the political, social, economic, cultural, and
technological conditions are kept constant.
Because China is
changing very rapidly and there is no easy way to account for all the
different variables, it is virtually impossible to measure the progress
China has made in the intellectual property arena.
Thus, instead of attempting the futile task of developing a metric to
measure China’s progress, this Part explores three widely-reported
legal disputes that provide insight into recent developments in
Chinese copyright, patent, and trademark laws. In particular, it
focuses on the unauthorized reproduction, adaptation, and
distribution of “Harry Potter” novels, the State Intellectual Property
Office’s decision to invalidate Pfizer’s patent in Viagra, and the
Chinese government’s heightened efforts to protect trademarks used
in relation to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Based on the belief that the
protection of intellectual assets is as much a business strategy as a legal
issue, this Part examines both the legal and non-legal aspects of the
three disputes. While there are still many existing problems for
intellectual property rights holders in China, this Part contends that
many of these problems are quite different from what they were a
decade ago and, therefore, warrant a new analytical perspective.

333. See William P. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter: American
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 21 (1994)
(noting that he was “tempted to write an article entitled ‘Why China Has Too Much
Law—And Too Little Legality’”).
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A. Harry Potter
Harry Potter is one of the most popular fictional figures of all time.
Since its debut, the “Harry Potter” series has sold more than 270
334
million copies in sixty-two languages, and all of the four “Harry
Potter” films have swept box offices throughout the world. When
Scholastic, Inc. released Harry Potter and the Half-blood Prince—the latest
installment of the “Harry Potter” series—in July 2005, it ordered an
initial print run of 10.8 million copies, followed by a second print run
335
that brought the book’s total production to 13.5 million.
On the
first day alone, the book sold an estimated 6.9 million copies in the
United States, dwarfing the one-day sales record of five million set two
years ago by the previous installment, Harry Potter and the Order of the
336
Phoenix.
Although the publisher had been very careful in protecting the
book, going so far as to take legal action to enjoin a Canadian grocery
store that had inadvertently sold the book before its scheduled
337
release, pirated copies became widely available on the Internet in
338
less than twelve hours after the book hit stores.
Within two days,
early chapters of the book had been translated into French, Spanish,
339
German, and Russian without author J.K. Rowling’s authorization.
By the end of the month, an unauthorized Chinese translated version
340
of the book—with typos and omissions—went on sale in Beijing.
According to Rowling’s attorney, more than a hundred cease-anddesist letters and take-down notices had been sent to Web sites in
Brazil, Canada, China, Poland, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, as well as to eBay on which pirated copies of
341
the book were auctioned.

334. See Martin Hickman, Price War Declared Over Harry Potter, INDEP. (London), July
16, 2005, at 10 (reporting that “[t]he first five Harry Potter books have sold more than
265 million copies in 200 countries and have been translated into 62 languages”);
Edward Wyatt, Potter Book Sets Record in First Day, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at B3
(reporting that the latest installment of the “Harry Potter” series had sold an
estimated 6.9 million copies in the United States on the first day).
335. See Wyatt, supra note 334.
336. Id.
337. See Michael Geist, Harry Potter and the Amazing Injunction, TORONTO STAR, July
18, 2005, at C3 (reporting that the author and publisher not only sought to enjoin the
grocery store from selling the books and the book purchasers from disclosing
information about the copyrighted story).
338. Jerome Weeks, Piracy Perused, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 29, 2005, at 25A.
339. Murdo Macleod, Rowling’s Millions Get Lost in Translation, SCOTLAND ON
SUNDAY, July 31, 2005, at 11.
340. Alexa Oleson, Presto! Potter Book Pirated in China, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1, 2005, at 4.
341. Richard J. Dalton Jr., Publishers: It’s Not Nice to Share, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 9,
2005, at A2.
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Unauthorized copying of “Harry Potter” novels was not new. In fact,
there are many interesting developments concerning the previous
342
installment. Like Harry Potter and the Half-blood Prince, unauthorized
translations of Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix had appeared on
343
the Internet before the authorized version was available.
As a
Chinese fan involved in the translation maintained, “[w]e wanted to
create this ourselves. We wanted to encourage an exchange of views
between fans. This is not a money-making operation. If anyone feels
their rights are being infringed all they have to do is tell us and we will
344
remove it.”
In fall 2000, a raid by the Chinese authorities discovered fake Harry
Potter books being produced by a publisher in the southwestern
345
Chinese city of Chengdu. Interestingly, the pirate was tracked down
when Chinese private investigators found an unauthorized copy of the
pirated book published with the publisher’s name. As an attorney
involved in the case noted, “[t]he funny thing was, the book we
bought in Guangzhou turned out to have been a fake of a fake. It had
been printed by another printing house that used [the publisher’s]
346
name.”
Once the pirated books were discovered, the publisher
quickly settled the dispute, agreeing to pay a $2,500 fine within six
347
months and to publish an apology in China’s Legal Times.
While the “Harry Potter” stories illustrated the extent of copyright
piracy in China, they provide important insights into recent copyright
developments in the country. First, as the Chengdu story has shown,
copyright problems in China have become more complicated than
they were a decade ago. Unlike the past, when the infringing
products are often verbatim copies of the originals, the parties
involved in the dispute these days include legitimate companies, as
well as underground operations and mom-and-pop pirates. For

342. For example, before the newest installment was even released, books
purporting to be the fifth, sixth, and even the finale of the Harry Potter series appeared
in China. Among the many “imaginary” titles were Harry Potter and the Leopard-WalkUp-to-Dragon, Harry Potter and the Golden Turtle, and Poor Dad, Rich Dad and Harry Potter.
Aileen Jacobson, Harry Potter and the Wizards of Ersatz, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 14, 2002,
at B2; see John Pomfret, Chinese Pirates Rob ‘Harry’ of Magic, and Fees, WASH. POST, Nov.
1, 2002, at A1.
343. See Alice Yan, Harry Potter and the Case of Copyright Infringement, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 14, 2003, at 4 (reporting that “[a] Chinese-language version of
the first 10 chapters of Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix has appeared on
domestic websites three months before the book’s official release on the mainland”).
344. Id.
345. Jacobson, supra note 342; Pomfret, supra note 342.
346. Pomfret, supra note 342 (quoting Joseph Simone, attorney with the Hong
Kong office of the law firm Baker & McKenzie).
347. Jacobson, supra note 342; Pomfret, supra note 342.
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example, the infringing publisher in Chengdu, Bashu Publishing
348
There is no doubt that their
House, was a legitimate enterprise.
books had violated both copyright and trademark laws. However,
their unauthorized products were not typical rip-offs, but rather
unauthorized sequels. While the overall quality of these products may
not be comparable to that of Rowling’s originals, it is undeniable that
the publisher and its editors had expended a substantial amount of
time, skill, and effort to prepare the unauthorized products.
As the Chinese continue to learn about the law and test the limits of
copyright protection, this type of infringement will increase—to the
point that the infringement eventually will raise difficult questions
concerning the level of substantial similarity between the originals and
the allegedly-infringing products and the limits of fair use. Because
courts will be in a better position to adjudicate these complex
copyright questions, litigation, in the near future, is likely to become a
349
more important protective tool than administrative enforcement.
Unauthorized sequels like those in the Chengdu story are not
limited to China; they are found in other countries. A recent example
350
concerns the allegedly-infringing “Tanya Grotter” book series. The
protagonist of that series is a young orphan living in a magical world
351
named Tanya Grotter. In November 2002, Rowling’s publisher sent
a cease-and-desist letter to the Russian publisher, alleging copyright
352
infringement.
The defendant claimed that the books, which were
inspired by the Potter books, were rooted in Russian culture and
348. See Jacobson, supra note 342 (reporting the view of the attorney involved in the
case that it was easier to track down the Chengdu publisher because it was “a
legitimate organization”); see also David R. Baker, Cisco Suit Could Test Chinese
Intentions, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28, 2003, at B1 (reporting about the intellectual property
dispute between Cisco Systems and the Shenzhen-based Huawei Technologies, a
legitimate telecommunications equipment manufacturer); Peter S. Goodman, Pirated
Goods Swamp China, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2004, at E1 (reporting about the intellectual
property dispute between General Motors and Shanghai-based Chery Automobile
Company, a legitimate car manufacturer).
349. As one commentator noted, “administrative actions are more common in
trademark cases where most cases are clear-cut and infringement is easy to prove. In
more complex patent and copyright matters, it is more difficult to prove either the
existence of a right (copyright) or the infringement (patent).” GANEA & PATTLOCH,
supra note 116, at 290.
350. For discussions of potential copyright infringement involving the “Tanya
Grotter” book series, see generally Alex Rodriguez, Potter ‘Parody’ Conjures up Trouble,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 2002, at C5; Peter K. Yu, The Downside of Being Harry, IP L. & BUS.,
May 2003, at 26.
351. Louise Jury, Russia’s Tanya Grotter Copies Potter’s Magic, INDEP. (London), Nov.
8, 2002, at 13. Like Potter, Grotter wears glasses. Unlike Potter, however, Grotter is a
girl who attends the Abracadabra School for Young Witches. Instead of a broomstick,
she rides a double bass. Although she does not have a scar, she has an unusual mole
on her nose.
352. Rodriguez, supra note 350.

YU.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

6/11/2006 2:51:07 PM

FROM PIRATES TO PARTNERS (EPISODE II)

979

folklore and should be considered parodies of the Potter books.
Notwithstanding the parody defense, Rowling’s publisher successfully
obtained an injunction in the Netherlands blocking the Dutch
353
translation of the allegedly-infringing books.
Unauthorized prequels, sequels, and spin-offs also can be found in
the developed world. A Google search, for example, reveals a large
number of Harry Potter fanzines, fan fictions, and fan sites in Canada,
the United States, and the United Kingdom, featuring stories that use
without authorization “Harry Potter” characters and images from
“Harry Potter” books and movies. These sites are particularly difficult
354
for the rights holders to deal with, because they usually are not
created by traditional pirates who seek to free ride on the creative
efforts of others, but rather by obsessive fans who are also avid
promoters of the “Harry Potter” mystique. In December 2000, Warner
Brothers learned this the hard way when it threatened to sue a fifteenyear-old English schoolgirl for putting up a Web site that used the
355
domain name www.harrypotterguide.co.uk.
The studio eventually
backed down after she and others organized a boycott of “Harry
Potter” merchandise in protest through another Web site,
356
potterwar.org.uk.
Second, local stakeholders are emerging in China, and, as a result,
piracy affects both local and foreign rights holders alike. A case in
point is the online release of the unauthorized Chinese versions of the
“Harry Potter” novels. The unauthorized versions not only affected
Rowling and her publisher, but also hurt Renmin Wenxue publishing
company, the local state-owned publishing house that holds the rights
to publish the Chinese translation of the “Harry Potter” books.
Although the local publisher had planned to release its authorized
translation of Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix in October 2003,

353. Robyn Dixon, Harry Potter Battles Attack of the Clones, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003,
at 41; see Dan Lerner, Rowling Blocks Book Publication, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 4,
2003, at 6 (reporting that Rowling “won a court battle in an attempt to block the
Dutch publication of a Russian novel about a girl wizard called ‘Tanya Grotter’ after
arguing it copied one of her bestsellers”).
354. For discussions of fan sites and fan fictions, see generally Rebecca Tushnet,
Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651,
664-83 (1997); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace,
35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1139-49, 1181-89 (2001).
355. See Kieren McCarthy, Warner Bros Backs Down on Harry Potter Web Site, THE
REGISTER, Dec. 15, 2000, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/12/15/ warner_bros_ba
cks_down/ (discussing the “Potter War” between Warner Brothers and “Harry Potter”
fans).
356. See id.
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it eventually had to move its production schedule forward to protect
357
itself against piracy, both online and offline.
This local impact is often lost on foreign rights holders. While
foreign movie producers are understandably frustrated when pirated
358
copies of their movies appear shortly after the film release, piracy
has deeply affected the box-office success of many domestic Chinese
movies, including those by acclaimed Chinese director Zhang Yimou
359
and those featuring famous Hong Kong actors. By compelling local
products to compete against cheap, pirated copies of more
sophisticated foreign software, piracy also has made the establishment
360
and development of the local software industry very difficult.
Even
Professor Zheng Chengsi, the leading Chinese academic on
intellectual property law, suffered from piracy when unauthorized
digital copies of his intellectual property law books were sold on the
361
Internet.
Moreover, piracy affects local consumers as much as it affects the
rights holders. For example, fake books might have endings that are
different from the originals, the entertainment one gets from a
362
bootlegged DVD might be unsatisfactory, and pirated software might
363
come with harmful computer viruses. Indeed, when British authors

357. See Satoshi Saeki, Harry Potter Latest Victim of China’s Lucrative Piracy Mart, DAILY
YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 9, 2003, at 18 (reporting that the local publisher had to move
its production schedule forward to protect itself against piracy).
358. See Star Wars Piracy Rife, TORONTO SUN, May 23, 2005, at 24 (reporting that
“[u]nauthorized copies of the latest Star Wars movie went on sale on the streets of
Beijing . . . just days after the blockbuster film premiered in China”).
359. See, e.g., Catherine Armitage, Unlikely Hero, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 29,
2003, at B10 (attributing the box-office success of Zhang Yimou’s Hero partly “to the
elaborate and expensive effort that went into protecting it from being pirated before
its release”); Joseph Kahn, The Pinch of Piracy Wakes China Up on Copyright Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at C1 (discussing the impact of unauthorized DVDs on the action
adventure movie The Touch); Mark Magnier, A Tiger Still Crouching, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2004, at E4 (reporting about how box office receipts of Zhang Yimou’s The House
of Flying Daggers had decreased dramatically after pirated copies appeared on the
street).
360. See Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 92 (discussing how the piracy of
foreign software harms the local software firms as much as the foreign software
companies).
361. Mure Dickie, Book About Copyright Is Pirated in China, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan.
15-16, 2005, at 5 (recounting a case in China that found Beijing-based Scholar Digital
guilty of offering bootlegged digital versions of a series of books on copyright piracy
authored by Professor Zheng Chengsi).
362. See Nathan Lee, Through a Lens, Darkly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, § 2, at 1
(discussing the poor quality of bootlegged DVDs).
363. But see FISHMAN, supra note 254, at 244 (maintaining that “[o]ften the
[software] packages sold in China’s bootleg stalls perform better than legitimate
versions, because the sellers have gone to the trouble of updating their wares with all
the original manufacturers’ updates, a somewhat tedious process that buyers who pay
full price have to go through on their own”).
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petitioned the U.S. government in the nineteenth century to extend
copyright protection to their works, they cautioned explicitly that the
lack of effective protection of foreign copyrights would confuse the
American public “as to whether the books presented to them as the
works of British authors, [we]re the actual and complete productions
364
of the writers whose names they b[ore].”
Consider, for example, the Chinese bootlegged version of President
Bill Clinton’s autobiography, My Life. This version not only reduced
the book’s size by half, but also omitted key passages from the
365
autobiography. Even worse, it added new, nonexistent twists to the
former president’s life. According to this pirated version, President
Clinton said upon meeting Senator Hilary Clinton when she was a
student, “She was as beautiful as a princess. I told her my name is Big
366
Watermelon.”
In addition, he was found repeatedly quoting
Chairman Mao Zedong, dropping such famous sayings as “You want to
367
know the taste of the pear, then you have to eat it yourself.”
Notwithstanding the rampant piracy problem in China, intellectual
property protection has been improving in the country. As the
Chinese economy grows and the middle class becomes larger, the
Chinese will have more disposable income and purchasing power.
When people are poor, they are more willing to settle for fake PRADA
handbags or low-quality VCDs (video compact discs). When they
become richer, however, they may start looking for higher-priced
genuine products and luxury goods. Indeed, some commentators
have suggested that China’s WTO accession might improve local living
standards to the point that Chinese consumers will be more interested
368
in buying genuine products. As stated in a recent study by Ernst &
Young:
The Chinese luxury market . . . is expected to grow 20%, annually
until 2008 and then 10% annually until 2015, when sales are
expected to exceed US$11.5 billion. By 2010, China is expected to
have a quarter-billion consumers who can afford luxury products,
nearly 17 times the present number. By 2015, Chinese consumers

364. S. REP. NO. 134, 24th Cong., 2d Sess., ¶ 9 (1837), reprinted in R.R. BOWKER,
COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW: BEING A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND LAW OF
COPYRIGHT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BOOKS 341, 343 (1912).
365. See Oliver August, Clinton’s Mentor Was Mao, Chinese Readers Are Told, TIMES
(London), July 21, 2004 (reporting about how President Clinton’s autobiography has
been truncated and modified).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See, e.g., CHOW, supra note 64, at 254 (suggesting that China’s WTO accession
might improve living standards and encourage Chinese consumers to buy genuine
and legitimate products).
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could be as influential as the Japanese and account for 29% of all
369
global luxury goods purchases.

Third, the Chinese market is large, unique, and complex. The
conventional wisdom about how one does business in a foreign
country, therefore, may not be applicable to the country.
Commentators have emphasized the correlation between intellectual
370
property protection and foreign direct investment. However, studies
have shown that many companies that are doing business in China are
371
not particularly concerned about intellectual property issues.
Rather, they are there to take advantage of the lower labor and
372
production costs, or to build up their market share and position
before the Chinese economy takes off.
As Microsoft’s founder Bill Gates famously noted on PBS in an
exchange with Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Although about three million computers get sold every year in
China, people don’t pay for the software. Someday they will,
though. And as long as they’re going to steal it, we want them to
steal ours. They’ll get sort of addicted, and then we’ll somehow
373
figure out how to collect sometime in the next decade.

To a great extent, Mr. Gates rightly sees piracy losses as promotional
expenses needed to capture an emerging market. Had it not been for
the widespread piracy of Microsoft’s products, these products would
374
not have become the industry standard in China.
Interestingly,
369. ERNST & YOUNG, CHINA:
THE NEW LAP OF LUXURY 1 (2005),
http://www.ey.com/ global/download.nsf/China_E/050914_Report_E/$file/ChinaThe%20New%20Lap%20 of%20Luxury_Eng%20(Final).pdf.
370. See Josh Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COM., Mar.
7, 1996, at 2C (reporting on a World Bank survey of major U.S. companies that
demonstrated the correlation between intellectual property protection and foreign
investment).
371. See Paul Tackaberry, Intellectual Property Risks in China: Their Effect on Foreign
Investment and Technology Transfer, J. ASIAN BUS., Fall 1998, at 34, 45, quoted in Li, The
Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 79 n.9 (suggesting that the size and promise of the
Chinese market provides the main attraction for foreign direct investment); see also
Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property
Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163, 164 (1998) (stating
that “the available empirical evidence does not conclusively establish the relationship
between IPRs and FDI decisions”).
372. See Maskus, supra note 289, at 123 (identifying “market size and growth, local
demand patterns, transport costs and distance from markets, low wage costs in
relation to labor productivity, abundant natural resources, and trade protection that
could encourage ‘tariff-jumping’ investments” as examples of “location advantages”);
see also Heald, Mowing the Playing Field, supra note 145, at 258-60 (discussing the
different concerns about intellectual property protection between the marketing
division and the research and manufacturing division of a foreign company).
373. Brent Schlender et al., The Bill & Warren Show, FORTUNE, July 20, 1998, at 48.
374. As Lawrence Lessig has observed:
When the Chinese “steal” Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on
Microsoft. Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it
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though, Chinese leaders have recently pushed for the expanded use of
open source software by government agencies as a substitute to
375
To ward off competition, Microsoft
expensive Microsoft products.
had agreed, in response, to provide the Chinese authorities with
access to its proprietary code while donating computers and software
376
to state agencies and local schools.
One may wonder whether Mr.
Gates overstated the appeal of his promotional strategy or whether he
is still trying to “figure out how to collect sometime in the next
decade.”
Fourth, for those companies that have successfully adapted to the
local market environment, rampant piracy and counterfeiting
problems, though annoying, did not affect their ability to make
profits. For example, the Chinese licensee of the “Harry Potter” books
sold more than a million copies despite the widespread piracy
377
problem, both online and offline. On the first day alone, the book
sold more than 10,000 copies, setting a Chinese national record for
378
daily sales.
Similarly, many major Western companies—like CocaCola, Kodak, Motorola, and Procter & Gamble—have been enjoying
substantial profits for years even though they were confronted with
379
serious piracy and counterfeiting problems.
To be successful, business executives need to remember that “China
380
is . . . not a ‘get rich quick’ market or one for the faint hearted.”
While business executives and pundits often talk about the proverbial

gains users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
nation grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather
than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit Microsoft,
Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating Microsoft Windows,
the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating system, then these Chinese
users would not eventually be buying Microsoft. Without piracy, then,
Microsoft would lose.
LAWRENCE, LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 65 (2004).
375. See Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 106 (reporting that “[i]n August
2002, the open source operating system called Yangfan (or ‘raise the sail’) Linux was
released by a government-sponsored software development group in China, which is
expected to replace Windows and Unix on all Chinese government PCs and servers”).
376. See FISHMAN, supra note 254, at 247 (noting Microsoft’s agreement to provide
the Chinese authorities with access to its proprietary code and its donations of
computers and software to state agencies and local schools); Henry Chu et al.,
Developing Nations See Linux as a Savior from Microsoft’s Grip, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at
A4 (reporting about Microsoft’s opening up of its proprietary code to governments);
Steve Lohr, Microsoft to Give Governments Access to Code, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at C10
(same).
377. See Harry Potter Wins Press Award in China with a Million Copies Sold Last Year,
XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Sept. 2, 2004, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
378. Id.
379. SUN, supra note 23, at 4.
380. CHEE, supra note 152, at 29.
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market of 1.3 billion people, that market does not exist.
Indeed,
most of the successful foreign companies in China understand the
actual market conditions of the country and are well-prepared for the
many challenges of the emerging market, including widespread piracy
and counterfeiting.
For these companies, an improvement in
intellectual property protection merely “increas[es the] already
acceptable profit ratios,” rather than being the necessary precursor to
382
profitability in the first place.
Finally, as the widespread online piracy of the “Harry Potter” books
has illustrated, the problem that rights holders encounter on the
Internet are not that different from the massive copyright piracy they
face in China. To be fair, the former is different from the latter; while
the former focuses on commercial copying, the latter consists of
primarily private or noncommercial copying. Nevertheless, U.S.
courts have not embraced this public-private, commercial383
noncommercial distinction. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., for
example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California stated clearly that the use of the Napster file-sharing service
could not be considered private use or “personal use in the traditional
sense,” partly because users reaped economic benefits by “get[ting]
384
Although
for free something they would ordinarily have to buy.”
commentators have widely criticized the court’s interpretation of the
385
word “commercial,” the court’s reasoning seems to suggest that
there are remarkable similarities between the Chinese piracy problem
386
and the unauthorized copying problem on the Internet.
B. Viagra
In July 2003, the State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”)
invalidated Pfizer’s patent in sildenafil citrate, a key ingredient of
387
Viagra.
Although SIPO’s ruling has yet to be published and it is
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

See id. at 3-9 (discussing the myth of a market of 1.3 billion people).
SUN, supra note 23, at 5.
114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Id. at 912.
See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER, III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 118 (2004) (noting that the appellate court’s rejection of
the characterization of sampling as “noncommercial” in nature was troublesome,
because under the court’s interpretation “virtually every unauthorized use of a
copyrighted work would be ‘commercial’ in character”).
386. See generally Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 207 (comparing the massive
copyright piracy in China to that of the Internet).
387. Paul Mooney, China Challenging Drug Patents, SCIENTIST, Aug. 20, 2004,
http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20040820/02; accord Pfizer v. China, RED HERRING, Aug.
26, 2004, http://www.redherring.com/article.aspx?a=10812. See generally Geoffrey K.
Cooper, Patent Invalidation in Post-WTO China: Pfizer’s Sildenafil Use, JURISNOTES.COM,
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unclear how the patent was struck down, media reports suggested that
Pfizer might have failed to disclose sufficient information about the
388
drug and how it was able to cure impotence. As a Beijing attorney
surmised, “Pfizer may have been caught in a catch-22: they may have
provided just enough information to the patent office to meet local
requirements, while holding back some key details to protect the
389
process from counterfeiters in China.”
After the decision, commentators quickly criticized China for its
390
Some
lack of commitment to protect intellectual property rights.
also suggested that SIPO’s ruling might violate China’s obligations
under the TRIPs Agreement, which requires all member countries to
protect patents regardless of “the place of invention, the field of
technology, and whether products are imported or locally
391
produced.” As the former director of policy planning at the USTR
noted:
Faced with rising global pressure to crack down on patent
infringement, Beijing may be in the process of redefining patent
criteria effectively to safeguard Chinese drug-makers from
accusations of illegal infringements. The removal of patents on
Viagra or Avandia would offer Chinese companies free rein to
manufacture homegrown copycat drugs without fear of prosecution.
If these cases continue in their current direction, China may in the
process violate its obligations to the WTO.
For the global research pharmaceutical industry, the ruling
carries the significant threat of a Chinese government tacitly
supporting the production of counterfeit drugs by domestic Chinese
companies. For China’s trading partners worldwide, the ruling
demonstrates China’s somewhat cautious embrace of the WTO’s
392
rules-based system, which it joined in 2002.
http://www.jurisnotes.com/IP/articles/patentinvalidation.htm (last visited Nov. 17,
2005) (discussing the legal issues involved in the reexamination proceeding).
388. See Andrew Yeh, Chinese Set Date for Viagra Patent Appeal, FIN. TIMES (Asia), Mar.
30, 2005, at 18 (reporting that “Chinese officials argued the US group did not provide
sufficient description of the drug and was unable to prove Viagra was able to cure
impotence”).
389. Mooney, supra note 387.
390. See, e.g., Dudley Schleier, Pfizer Clarifies China’s Reversal of Viagra Patent, STRAITS
TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 6, 2004, at 24 (maintaining that “China’s decision to overturn the
Viagra patent . . . does indeed break new and unsettling legal ground . . . [and] sends
a very disturbing message to all who are concerned about China’s commitment to
intellectual property right”).
391. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 17, art. 27(1).
392. Naotaka Matsukata, China’s Counterfeit Commitment to Patents, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2004, at 17; see also China’s Viagra Heist, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2004, at A16 (criticizing
SIPO’s ruling for “ignor[ing] market principles, its own World Trade Organization
commitments and the long-term interests of its people by overturning the drug’s
patent”).
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What these critics failed to realize, or at least acknowledge, was that
SIPO’s decision was exactly what intellectual property rights holders
should expect in a country making transition to full compliance with
the WTO agreements. Indeed, it was the first time Chinese companies
took the legal route to challenge a patent owned by a major foreign
company. A decade ago, local companies simply ignored the law and
manufactured counterfeit products; many still do today. This time,
however, local companies went to the patent office first, asking for the
cancellation of Pfizer’s patent for its failure to satisfy the novelty
393
requirement. That is a great improvement and is largely due to the
394
legal reforms introduced in the wake of the WTO accession.
Five weeks after SIPO’s ruling, seventeen Chinese pharmaceutical
companies joined together to explore how they could use their
combined manufacturing and marketing capabilities to domestically
395
produce a version of Viagra.
While Pfizer was certainly unhappy
with this alliance, it was not particularly worried about the Chinese
market. Although the market has grown quickly and is forecasted to
396
be the world’s fifth largest pharmaceutical market by 2010, China
provides only a small market for Viagra, because the drug is deemed a
397
controlled substance and can only be legally sold in a few hospitals.
Moreover, widespread counterfeiting had significantly damaged the
market; Pfizer estimated that ninety percent of the drug sold in China
398
was fake.
Unlike the Chinese market, the international market is very
important to Pfizer. In 2003 alone, the company earned $1.88 billion
399
from the international market.
Because SIPO’s ruling has the
potential to encourage Chinese pharmaceutical companies to produce
393. Although SIPO has not released its decision, an official indicated that the
patent had been revoked—not because of the novelty requirement—but because of
Pfizer’s failure to adequately describe the “technological” uses of sildenafil citrate.
394. As one attorney noted, “[a]s long as people are interested in dealing with
commercial disputes through court, it is a sign that a country is developing a proper
legal system rather than ignoring it.” Pfizer v. China, supra note 387 (quoting Doug
Clark, an intellectual property rights attorney at Lovells who has practiced law in
China for about a decade).
395. Id.
396. See SUN, supra note 23, at 143 (citing the July 2002 report from the Boston
Consulting Group reporting that “China’s pharmaceutical market has grown at an
average annual rate of 14%for the past decades”).
397. See Phelim Kyne et al., China Voids Pfizer’s Viagra Patent, WALL ST. J., July 8,
2004, at A3 (“Viagra sales in China remain small, hampered by the Ministry of
Health’s classification of the drug as a controlled substance. That classification bans
advertising and limits the drug’s distribution by prescription to only a small number
of hospitals.”).
398. See Mooney, supra note 387.
399. See Kyne et al., supra note 397 (reporting that Viagra’s worldwide sales “last
year rose 8% to $1.88 billion”).
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generic versions of the drug that can be exported to foreign markets,
Pfizer was understandably concerned about the decision. Indeed, if
these Chinese generics are exported to other markets, like those in
the United States and other developed countries, they will compete
directly against Pfizer’s pills, driving down prices and cutting into the
company’s profits.
At the industry level, SIPO’s ruling presented a different problem.
To the concern of the foreign pharmaceutical industry, the Viagra
ruling had the potential of setting a precedent that could spark a new
trend of systematic revocation of foreign pharmaceutical patents by
Chinese stakeholders. Indeed, because of the Viagra decision,
GlaxoSmithKline PLC decided to abandon its patent for rosiglitazone,
a major ingredient of its popular diabetes drug Avandia; the Avandia
patent had been similarly challenged by local pharmaceutical
400
manufacturers.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the Viagra decision was an
isolated incident. After all, inventors challenge patents all the time
and all over the world, and most countries accommodate these
challenges by providing a reexamination or opposition procedure in
their patent law. For example, U.S. patent law provides for a
401
comprehensive reexamination procedure, which states that “[a]ny
person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the [U.S.
Patent and Trademark] Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of
402
any prior art cited under the provisions of [the patent statute].” The
statute also invites third parties to “cite to the Office in writing prior
art consisting of patents or printed publications which that person
believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a
403
particular patent.”
The Chinese patent statute is not that different from the U.S. patent
statute. Article 45 of the Chinese Patent Law, which was used by the
local pharmaceutical companies in their challenge of Pfizer’s patent,
provides: “[w]here . . . any entity or individual considers that the
grant of the . . . patent right is not in conformity with the relevant
provisions of this Law, it or he [or she] may request the Patent
400. Richard McGregor, Glaxo Fight to Defend Diabetes Patent in China Is Abandoned,
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at 21. As reported in that case, the local companies argued
that GSK’s patent, which was registered before 1993, “was only granted for the
compound in one particular formulation.” Because the Chinese patent law did not
permit basic compound patents until 1993, they were entitled to make the same
compound using other formulations. Id.
401. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2000) (laying out the law for prior art citations and
the procedure for ex parte reexamination of patents).
402. Id. § 302.
403. Id. § 301.
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Reexamination Board to declare the patent right invalid.”
The
Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law also offer detailed
information about the procedure to be used by the Patent
405
Reexamination Board.
Shortly after SIPO’s ruling, some Pfizer executives and
commentators accused SIPO of giving preferential treatment to local
406
companies, citing the fact that the patent challenge was brought by
leading local pharmaceutical manufacturers, such as Tonghua
407
Hongtaomao Pharmaceutical and Lianxiang Pharmaceutical. While
the decision no doubt benefits local companies, it also benefits other
foreign pharmaceutical companies—in particular generic drug
companies—which, until now, have been unable to manufacture their
versions of Viagra in China. If they decide to compete directly with
the Chinese companies, there is no guarantee that local companies
will prevail. For example, generic drug companies in India have very
advanced technological capabilities and are increasingly challenging
408
patents in developed country markets.
Nevertheless, the position taken by those mounting the accusation
is understandable, when one considers the lack of transparency in
SIPO’s ruling and the fact that the reversed decision was made two
409
years after a seven-year review of the patent application.
The
404. Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 45. For a detailed description of the
patent invalidation process under the Chinese patent law, see generally SUN, supra
note 23, at 27-28; Sun, supra note 35, at 285-96.
405. See Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of
China (promulgated by the State Council, June 15, 2001) (P.R.C.),
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg/zlflfg/t20020327_33871.htm (laying out
the procedure to be used by the Patent Reexamination Board).
406. See China’s Viagra Heist, supra note 392 (“[T]he decision in favor of a group of
Chinese pharmaceutical companies who had petitioned the SIPO demonstrates a
troubling pattern. Although it is under international pressure to respect intellectual
property rights, China is acceding to the demands of its own companies for patentnullification.”); see also Matsukata, supra note 392 (noting that “[t]he removal of
patents on Viagra or Avandia would offer Chinese companies free rein to
manufacture homegrown copycat drugs without fear of prosecution”).
407. See, e.g., Kyne et al., supra note 397 (reporting that the challenge on the Viagra
patent was brought by leading local pharmaceutical manufacturers).
408. See Sue Reisinger, A Generic Takes on a Drug Giant, NAT. L.J., Jan. 10, 2005, at 8
(discussing the aggressive effort by the New Delhi-based generic drug manufacturer
Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited to challenge Pfizer’s patent in its cholesterol drug
Lipitor); Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and
Market Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 108, at 97, 117 (“Two notable
examples of the shift in the strategy of generic companies reported in the press are
the cases of . . . Ranbaxy challenging the patent of Lipitor—Pfizer’s best selling
cholesterol drug—and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories . . . challenging the basic patent of
Zyprexa—Eli Lilly’s best-selling schizophrenia drug.”).
409. See Connie Carnabuci & Peter Yuen, Improve Your Chances of Success, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP., June 2005, at 35 (maintaining that the Patent Re-examination Board’s
“revers[al of] the decision made by the SIPO in 2001 after a seven-year review of the
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situation was worsened by the perplexing rationale given by SIPO for
the invalidation. While the Viagra patent was struck down on novelty
grounds in the United Kingdom and before the European Patent
Office, SIPO faulted Pfizer for its failure to disclose sufficient
410
information in its patent description.
As a Pfizer executive said in
his company’s defense, “[testing] data was neither required nor even
requested at the time the Viagra patent was granted in 2001 but it was
retroactively used as a basis for overturning the government’s initial
411
approval.”
Fortunately for Pfizer (and other foreign pharmaceutical
companies), SIPO does not have the final say over the validity of the
Viagra patent, thanks to the many intellectual property law reforms
introduced since the early 1990s. Article 46 of the Chinese Patent Law
provides the holders of invention patents, design patents, and utility
models with the right to seek judicial review of administrative
412
proceedings. In March 2005, Pfizer’s appeal was heard in the First
Intermediate People’s Court in Beijing. Although it is hard to predict
whether the court will uphold SIPO’s ruling on stated or other
grounds, the case is likely to receive very careful treatment now that
the ruling has received considerable international attention.
Hopefully, the court will decide the case with solid evidence and
sound legal reasoning, rather than through an accommodation of
413
either domestic or foreign interests.
Regardless of the outcome, any evaluation of the Viagra decision
needs to take into account the peculiar characteristics of Viagra’s
discovery and the many legal troubles confronting the drug. After all,
Viagra may be a special case, and what SIPO did in the present ruling
may not reflect how it will handle the patents in other drugs. When
patent application made the decision seem irrational,” particularly because during the
seven-year period there was no indication that Pfizer was not in compliance with
Chinese regulations regarding patent descriptions).
410. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 26(3) (stipulating that “[t]he
description shall set forth the invention or utility model in a manner sufficiently clear
and complete so as to enable a person skilled in the relevant field of technology to
carry it out; where necessary, drawings are required”).
411. Schleier, supra note 390.
412. See Chinese Patent Law, supra note 20, art. 46 (stipulating that “[w]here the
patentee or the person who made the request for invalidation is not satisfied with the
decision of the Patent Reexamination Board declaring the patent right invalid or
upholding the patent right, such party may, within three months from receipt of the
notification of the decision, institute legal proceedings in the people’s court”).
413. Cf. Cooper, supra note 387 (arguing that “[i]t is important to China’s
international legal reputation for the invalidation of the sildenafil use patent to be
supported by solid evidence and sound legal reasoning, and not to appear to be a
cynical accommodation by China’s government of the interests of domestic
manufacturers”).
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Pfizer applied for the patent in the early 1990s, Viagra was conceived
414
as a potential drug for heart problems. Pfizer soon discovered that
the drug had a better use for treating male erectile dysfunction and
filed a second patent. Although the United States and many countries
allowed Pfizer to patent this new and unintended use, some countries
did not. In addition to the United Kingdom and the European Patent
Office, the patent was also invalidated in countries in South
415
America.
The invalidations are understandable, as it is unrealistic to assume
that patent offices and courts in other countries will uphold a patent
merely because it is valid in the United States. Due to philosophical
differences and diverging local conditions, decision-makers sometimes
come to different conclusions even when they apply identical laws to
identical facts. Moreover, there has been a growing debate about the
416
low quality of patents granted in the United States.
The fact that
Pfizer has a valid patent in the United States now does not mean that
the patent will not be invalidated in the future. Indeed, following
Pfizer’s lawsuit against its competitors over erectile dysfunction drugs,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is currently reviewing the
417
patent for Viagra.
In the years to come, the Chinese pharmaceutical industry will grow
rapidly. Coupled with the increasing respect for the rule of law, this
418
growth will lead to an explosion of patent challenges and litigations.
414. See id. (providing the scientific background of sildenafil citrate and revealing
the molecular class’s original claimed medicinal uses).
415. See, e.g., Tony Chen, Western Ways, Good and Bad, FIN. TIMES (Asia), July 21,
2004, at 10 (providing a brief history of the development of Viagra and discussing the
revocation of the Viagra patent by a U.K. court and the European Patent Office);
Andy Ho, The Hoopla over Viagra Patenting in China, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 14,
2004, at 16 (reporting about the invalidation of the Viagra patent in the United
Kingdom, Colombia, and Venezuela as well as by the European Patent Office); Kyne
et al., supra note 397 (reporting that “in 2001, the patent was disallowed in Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela over a different issue”).
416. For discussions of problems within the patent system, see generally FED. TRADE
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAW AND POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004);
STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004). As John
Thomas explained, “[b]udgetary limitations, an exploding filing rate, and the
increasing range of patentable subject matter are among the reasons that U.S. patent
quality appears to be on the decline.” John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the
Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 727, 728 (2002).
417. See Pfizer v. China, supra note 387; see also Kyne et al., supra note 397
(discussing Pfizer’s disputes with Eli Lilly/ICOS and Bayer over their erectile
dysfunction drugs Cialis and Levitra).
418. See Chen, Western Ways, Good and Bad, supra note 415 (“Intellectual property
disputes have also mushroomed. Chinese companies are incorporating litigation into
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This explosion would be worsened by the fact that “[t]he increased
numbers of commercial disputes brought on by the market reforms
have created a certain degree of institutional competition for a share
419
of the dispute resolution ‘market.’”
Although commentators and foreign business executives have
expressed concern that excessive litigation will raise drug prices and,
therefore, will hurt both foreign rights holders and local consumers,
there is no easy alternative. It is unrealistic to expect local companies
to abide by the laws solely for the benefit of their foreign competitors.
As the Chinese learn to respect the rule of law, they might have to test
the system to learn its boundaries and how it operates. This increased
litigation will no doubt leave commentators wondering whether the
number of lawsuits is increasing rapidly because “China is becoming a
place where business disputes are resolved by rule of law or [rather
420
because] it is simply adopting a ‘bad’ habit of the west.”
C. Olympics
In July 2001, Beijing won the bid to host the Olympic Games in
421
2008. Like the successful bids by Tokyo in 1964 and Seoul in 1988,
this bid strongly suggests China’s emerging world power status and
422
may help position the country in the global economy. Because the
Games will generate significant international attention, Chinese
leaders are likely to use this widely-anticipated event to transform the
country’s world image.
Some commentators, therefore, have
suggested that the Beijing Olympics will provide a perfect opportunity
423
for China to strengthen intellectual property rights.
As one
their business strategy. Over 9,000 lawsuits were filed in China in 2003.”).
419. Potter, supra note 332, at 142.
420. Chen, Western Ways, Good and Bad, supra note 415.
421. Jere Longman, Beijing Wins Bid for 2008 Olympic Games, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2001, at A1.
422. As one commentator noted:
Olympic Games in East Asia—Tokyo in 1964, Seoul in 1988—are not just
about throwing a few javelins around, but are primarily about positioning the
nation in the global community. For Japan, 1964 represented its “return” as
an upstanding member of the world community after its defeat and
humiliation in the Second World War—the following year it joined the
OECD. As for South Korea, the 1988 Olympics (also followed by the country
joining the OECD) provided a strong boost to political reform, among other
things allowing the country to enter the international arena as a constructive
and credible player, turning its back on the “hermit kingdom” it had been for
most of its history.
Jean-Pierre Lehmann, China and the East Asian Political-economic Model, in DOES CHINA
MATTER? A REASSESSMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF GERALD SEGAL 87, 104 (Barry Buzan &
Rosemary Foot eds., 2004).
423. See, e.g., Stacey H. Wang, Note, Great Olympics, New China: Intellectual Property
Enforcement Steps Up to the Mark, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 293 (2005)
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commentator noted, “[w]inning the 2008 Olympics bid has not only
given China a chance to demonstrate its cultural prowess, but it has
also made intellectual property enforcement relevant to the Party
424
agenda.”
Since the successful bid, the Chinese government has introduced
various measures to protect the Olympic-related marks, which include
“the Olympic symbol, motto, flag, emblems, anthem, flame, and
425
torch.”
In November 2001, the Beijing municipal government
issued a decree on the Protection of Olympic Intellectual Property
Provisions by the Beijing Municipality, which protects the intellectual
426
property rights associated with the Olympics.
A month later, the
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Organizing Committee set up a legal
427
affairs department to protect all of those rights.
As a senior
department official explained, “[t]he establishment of the legal
department is the first ever in the history of Chinese sports. . . .
During the bidding stage we have committed ourselves to the
protection of the Olympic intellectual property rights. It is our
428
In addition, China also enacted the
indispensable responsibility.”
Regulations on the Protection of Olympic Insignia and the Measures
429
for the Recordal and Administration of Olympic Insignia, while the
authorities have been actively cracking down on infringements and
430
the sale of fake Olympic merchandises.
[hereinafter Wang, Great Olympics, New China] (contending that “the 2008 Olympics is
in a unique position to set the framework for legal adherence to the rights of foreign
intellectual property owners”); Steve Friess, The Trouble with Olympic Trinkets, USA
TODAY, Dec. 12, 2001, at 6B (quoting Michael Payne, marketing director of the
International Olympic Committee, in his assertion that “[t]here are high expectations
and hopes that the Olympics will be an important catalyst for China’s trademark
protection, just as it was in Korea”). But see Rosie DiManno, Games Won’t Change Way
Chinese Do Business, TORONTO STAR, July 16, 2001, at C9 (suggesting that “letting the
Chinese in the front door . . . would predictably result in knock-offs going out the
back door” and that this was “simply a characteristic of Chinese business, with its
clever distribution fraud and its grey market, its corruption and espionage”).
424. Wang, Great Olympics, New China, supra note 423, at 310.
425. Id. at 300.
426. Beijing Sets up Department to Protect Olympics Logo, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 27,
2001, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting on the establishment of the first
local law on Olympics intellectual property rights and the first legal department in the
history of Chinese sports).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Wang, Great Olympics, New China, supra note 423, at 302.
430. See Catherine Armitage, Editorial, Run Rings Around Thieves, WEEKEND
AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 16, 2003, at T6 (reporting that “60,000 bureaus and 440,000
personnel across China would be working round the clock between now and 2008 to
protect the Olympic trademarks”); Nailene Chou Wiest, Beijing Cracks Down on Fakes,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 16, 2005, at A7 (reporting that “[a]s it prepares to host
the 2008 Olympics, Beijing is trying to burnish its image as an international city by
cracking down on counterfeit brand-name goods and the ubiquitous hawkers of
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While the International Olympic Committee might have included
stipulations in the Host City Contract that called for these heightened
efforts of protection, the growing awareness and understanding of
trademark law among the Chinese leaders and local businesses is not
to be overlooked. When Legend, China’s leading manufacturer of
personal computers, expanded overseas a few years ago, it learned
painfully that its name had already been registered and used in many
431
other countries. As a result, the company had to change its name to
432
LENOVO.
Such a name has since become famous around the world
following the extensive Western media coverage of Lenovo’s purchase
of IBM’s personal computers division.
Today, a number of local companies have already achieved
prominence in the international market, with their trademarks being
433
recognized as well-known outside of China.
Examples of these
famous local brands include GALANZ (for microwave ovens), HAIER
(for household appliances), HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES (for
telecommunications equipment), KONKA (for televisions), LENOVO
(for personal computers), and TCL (for televisions). Even the monks
of the Shaolin Temple reportedly have sought to register the name of
434
their temple as a trademark.
From the standpoint of China’s internal development,
strengthening the country’s trademark protection makes a lot of
sense. As commentators have noted, there are two primary reasons
why countries were reluctant to offer stronger trademark protection.
First, the country wants to encourage its export businesses to free ride
on the investment of foreign trademark holders by earning profits as if
they were selling genuine goods that bear the infringing trademarks.
This competitive strategy is misguided, because it “will result in a
parasitical business that will always be dependent on the willingness of

pirated CDs”). But see Irene Wang, Fake Olympic Shirts Make Quick Debut, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at A4 (reporting that “[a] week after the logo for the
2008 Beijing Olympics was unveiled, pirated T-shirts and other souvenirs bearing the
emblem have appeared on sale at several markets in the capital”).
431. See Mark Hall, Welcome, China, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 13, 2004, at 18.
432. See id.; Bruce Einhorn & Dexter Roberts, A New Twist in Legend’s Tale, BUS. WK.,
June 23, 2003, at 50.
433. See generally DONALD N. SULL WITH YONG WANG, MADE IN CHINA: WHAT WESTERN
MANAGERS CAN LEARN FROM TRAILBLAZING CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS 8-13 (2005)
(providing interesting profiles of successful Chinese local brands in the areas of
information technology, telecommunications equipment and services, food and
beverage, and electronic appliances).
434. See Call My Lawyer, Grasshopper, TORONTO SUN, Sept. 26, 2002, at 88 (reporting
that the Shaolin Temple “has been trying to register ‘Shaolin’ and ‘Shaolin Temple’
as trademarks with Chinese authorities . . . [and has] . . . set up a firm, Henan Shaolin
Temple Industrial Development Ltd., to safeguard the temple's name”).
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the targeted countries to tolerate the infringing imports . . . [and that]
will never have an established market position that can lay a
foundation for the development of an internationally competitive
435
business.”
In fact, it does not require much investment to create a
famous trademark, and even less developed countries have succeeded
in doing so; CORONA (for Mexican beer) and TSINGTAO (for Chinese
436
beer) are good examples.
Second, the country does not want its consumers to pay a higher
premium just because a foreign trademark has established a
reputation with consumers in the country. From the perspective of
economic development, this argument makes a lot of sense. By not
protecting famous trademarks, it will save foreign exchange and
makes consumer products more affordable for its people.
Unfortunately, the strategy will ultimately backfire on local consumers,
who will be unable to use trademarks to identify the source of origin
of goods and services due to widespread counterfeiting. As a result,
local consumers not only will have to spend more time searching for
the products, but will have no guarantee that they will get the
437
products they want. Consumer confidence, therefore, will suffer. In
fact, with no or only limited trademark protection, producers will have
438
Thus,
little incentive to control the quality of their products.
consumers often will get at inflated prices poor-quality goods, some of
439
which may expose them to health and safety risks.
435. Kitch, supra note 207, at 168.
436. See Janet H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?, supra note
275, at 89, 104 (discussing the Corona example as a success story for the creation of
trademarks in a less developed country to drive innovation and economic
development).
437. See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that
“[t]he fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by
providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular
goods”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (stating that “[b]y protecting against
deceptive uses of trade symbols in commerce, the law enables sellers to create their
own reliable shorthand to identify their goods and reduces search costs for
consumers”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987) (stating that “the benefits of trademarks in
lowering consumer search costs presuppose legal protection of trademarks”).
438. See Kitch, supra note 207, at 168 (maintaining that “the mark the firms desire
to copy will inevitably lose its reputation in the less developed country as multiple
sources produce goods infringing it while none of them has an incentive to protect its
value as a signal of quality desired by consumers”).
439. It is important to note that consumers do not necessarily get inferior products
due to the lack of trademark protection. For example, many counterfeit products in
China are made using the same raw materials and design patterns. The products are
counterfeits because the manufacturers did not have authorization from the rights
holders at the time of production, rather than because they used inferior raw
materials or production processes. Indeed, some of the counterfeiters were former
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There are several additional benefits that are unique to China and
are seldom mentioned by commentators.
First, compared to
copyrights and patents, trademark protection will create fewer
obstacles to China’s modernization efforts. Trademarks “were a state
planning tool before they became a marketing device and private
440
property,” and trademark registrations continued even during the
441
Cultural Revolution, although they have been decentralized and
442
politicized, and manufacturers had used such “politically correct”
pseudonyms and non-identifying labels as “Red Flag,” “East Wind,”
443
and “Worker-Peasant-Soldier.”
By contrast, copyright protection
affects the country’s ability to maintain cultural and media control
444
and may have a negative impact on its extensive propaganda efforts,
while patent protection slows down the country’s efforts by draining
foreign exchange reserves in the form of royalty and license fee
payments. It is, therefore, no surprise that the 1982 Trademark Law
was the first to be enacted after China’s reopening in the late 1970s,
while the 1990 Copyright Law was the last to be enacted, only after
445
significant pressure by the United States.
contractors and had prior authorization to use the related design patterns.
440. FENG, supra note 67, at 344.
441. See id. at 293 (noting that trademarks “survived China’s socialist
transformation of the 1950s, and registration continued even during the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976), except that, from today’s point of view, it was decentralized
and ‘irregular’”).
442. TAN, supra note 227, at 10 (noting that “[t]rademarks were effectively
politicized, and common trademarks became the targets of political theatre”).
443. Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China,
21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 272 (1986); see also ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 197 (2005) (noting that “trademarks
existed throughout the PRC, even during the Cultural Revolution, although . . . the
constriction in the universe of ‘politically correct’ brand names . . . often obscured the
identify of the actual manufacturer—and in the process made trademarks largely
meaningless); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 21-22
(discussing the impact of Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution on intellectual
property protection in China).
444. See MERTHA, supra note 443, at 133-34 (noting that “[t]he copyright
bureaucracy . . . is embedded within a xitong [functional bureaucratic system] that
concerns itself with cultural, ideological, and value-laden media and is therefore
involved in a more politically sensitive environment, even if technical copyright issues
themselves are no more or less ‘political’ than those pertaining to patents or
trademarks”); id. at 140 (noting that the Press and Publications Administration, the
parent body of the National Copyright Administration, “is concerned mainly with
censorship and has no interest in promoting the rights of authors or creating a free
market in publishing” (quoting ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CHINA HAND: THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 51 (1999)); see also Yu, Piracy, Prejudice,
and Perspectives, supra note 259, at 28-32 (discussing the Chinese censorship and the
information control policy).
445. See Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New
Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 8 (1997) (attributing the delay of
implementing copyright law to China's concern about controlling ideology by
regulating publications).
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Second, although trademark protection requires local consumers to
pay a premium for the well-known foreign brand, it encourages local
companies to catch up and compete with the famous Western brands
by developing more attractive products and focusing on brand
positioning. The fact that the Chinese commercial market is still at an
early, immature stage will only serve to benefit Chinese companies. As
one commentator noted, “China’s market is . . . dynamic, with
consumer loyalty still developing: consumers are still experimenting,
446
and brands come and go with great speed.”
Under such rapidlychanging conditions, local companies have the opportunity to attain
market position and develop the next promising brands.
Indeed, the ability to develop local brands has been greatly
enhanced by the failure of foreign businesses to understand the local
447
Chinese market conditions.
Studies have “estimated that less than
10 percent of Chinese consumers have the level of disposable income
448
that can afford to buy Western products.”
Notwithstanding this
financial reality, many foreign businesses only focus on the high-end
market, ignoring the mid-to-low-end customers. A case in point is the
microwave market, which Galanz has overtaken recently. “[I]n 1993
only 1% of Chinese consumers had microwaves. Consumption grew—
but not in the pattern expected. By early 2000, nearly 90% of the

446. See CHEE, supra note 152, at 30; see also Rick Yan, Short-Term Results: The Litmus
Test for Success in China, in HARV. BUS. REV., supra note 208, at 79, 95 (noting that
“[t]he Chinese market is in such tumult that it is constantly challenging the positions
of incumbents and creating fresh opportunities for innovative competitors that know
how to change the rules of the game”). As one commentator noted:
In a developing immature market like China, many precious bullets in the war
for the customer are wasted just to educate the customer and the trade why
their products are better and how the trade needs to handle its products
and/or services. Often what happened was the “first mover” foreign
competitor did build up significant market share against local competitors
and enjoyed comfortable margins in the beginning. These high margins,
however, were not enjoyed for long, since the next major foreign competitor,
claiming no. 1 status in their home markets (be it Japan, Germany, Australia,
etc.), would come along with an aggressive market strategy. The incumbent,
having fired most of its bullets, would prefer to cut back on marketing
spending to reap back its original heavy investment in marketing and
distribution; instead, the new onslaught of competitors forced them to spend
heavily to defend their market positions again and again.
CHAN, supra note 169, at 54-55.
447. See CHEE, supra note 152, at 31 (observing that “foreign multinational
companies . . . are failing to understand the difference between buyer aspiration and
effective demand”); see also Rick Yan, To Reach China’s Consumers, Adapt to Guo Qing, in
HARV. BUS. REV., supra note 208, at 123, 125 (noting that “[f]oreign companies seeking
to win a piece of this growing market must adapt to guo qing . . . , which means
‘national characteristics’ or ‘a country’s special circumstances’”).
448. CHEE, supra note 152, at 31.
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market was in cheaper models, with the Chinese company Galanz
449
dominating.”
Unlike foreign companies, Chinese companies usually “produce
their own brands at low cost first, then gradually develop very strong
450
brand positioning.”
For example, instead of competing directly
against such famous Japanese household brands as Panasonic and
Fujitsu, Haier “aimed for the middle ground, positioning itself
between the leading overseas innovators and lower cost, lower quality
451
domestic rivals . . . .”
Once Chinese companies have built up their
market share, they will focus on developing their brand positioning.
Indeed, Chinese companies have been spending a substantial amount
of money on brand building. According to Nielsen Media Research,
“only two foreign brands were ranked among the top ten most
advertised products in China (Procter and Gamble’s ‘Crest’ and
452
‘Safeguard’).”
Some commentators have observed that Chinese companies are
actively purchasing Western companies and their brands for instant
453
name recognition, rather than spending time to build brand loyalty,
as Japanese companies have done. As a China specialist noted,
“Chinese companies don’t have that much choice but to acquire
overseas companies. ‘Very few companies can build organically any
454
more. If they wait 10 to 15 years, they could be dead.’”
This
observation might be true. Nevertheless, foreign companies are also
actively purchasing Chinese companies to obtain access to the local
market. As one commentator noted:
[F]oreign companies have . . . gradually overtaken Chinese famous
marks and brand names by way of forming joint ventures with

449. Id.
450. Id.
451. How China’s Most Valuable Brand Found Its Niche, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Apr.
1, 2005, at 38.
452. CHEE, supra note 152, at 31-32.
453. See SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 158 (noting that some Chinese companies
“have found a quicker and cheaper way [to build brand names], buying the
trademarks of companies in distress . . . , taking over customers with whom they have
done business as an OEM [original equipment manufacturer] . . . , or via an alliance
with a branded manufacturer”); David Barboza, Name Goods in China but Brand X
Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at C1 (discussing the strategy of Chinese
companies of acquiring well-known brand names, such as IBM, Maytag, RCA, to
obtain access to global distribution networks, sophisticated research and
development, and recognizable brand names). But see Steve Lohr, I.B.M. Sought a
China Partnership, Not Just a Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at C1 (reporting about how
IBM Chairman Samuel Palmisano “traveled to Beijing to explore the sale of the
company’s personal computer business” (emphasis added)).
454. Barboza, supra note 453 (quoting Joe Chang, China specialist at McKinsey &
Company).
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Chinese companies. For example, after Kodak bought a Xiamen
film company, the Chinese mark “Fuda” disappeared from the
market. Although another Xiamen company’s mark “Tong Si Da”
survived after forming a joint venture with General Electric (GE),
only 5% of its products were sold in the domestic market with the
Chinese trademark. The other 95% of its products were exported
455
to the US and other markets using GE’s trademark.

Third, trademark protection creates the least friction with the
Chinese culture, and the justification for trademark protection, in
particular its emphasis on goodwill, is easy for the Chinese to
understand. Indeed, the importance of “face” runs deep in the
Chinese culture and helps explain why it is important to protect
456
trademarks.
Just as “face” is about an individual’s self-respect,
prestige, and social standing, trademarks, especially well-known ones,
provide information about the quality, reputation, and commercial
standing of the products. In the wake of the WTO accession, China
strengthened its protection of well-known marks. Such protection is
particularly important, as licensed foreign products are increasingly
sold in different parts of the country.
Finally, “[t]he Chinese themselves are . . . very brand conscious, a
legacy of Confucian hierarchy and of their imperial past where rank
457
was prominently displayed on bureaucrats’ clothing.” The fact that
the Chinese language consists of pictorial characters and “is strongly
visual and semiotically promiscuous” also make trademarks and other
458
related symbols more important in the Chinese culture. Moreover,
the building of brands “fits with the government’s strategy of
consolidating strategic industries . . . to create national champions
that can hold their own in global markets and . . . to restore its
459
imperial glory.” As Oded Shenkar noted:
From building the world’s tallest building to hosting the Olympics,
which is a traditional coming-of-age for Asian nations, symbols are
important to the Chinese regime, whose legitimacy increasingly rests
on delivering economic performance and growth on the one hand
and on nationalist sentiments on the other. Showcase projects are
there to impress citizens and outsiders with the regime’s capabilities
and signal that the aspiration to be counted among the world’s
460
leading nations is attainable.
455. Li, The Wolf Has Come, supra note 28, at 96.
456. See supra Part III.B (discussing “face,” or mianzi, in the Chinese culture).
457. SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 157.
458. BOB HODGE & KAM LOUIE, THE POLITICS OF CHINESE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE:
THE ART OF READING DRAGONS 8 (1998).
459. SHENKAR, supra note 153, at 158.
460. Id. at 36.
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While the Beijing Olympics, no doubt, will provide an opportunity
for China to improve intellectual property protection, it is not the
only major opportunity. Two years after the event, China will hold the
World Expo in Shanghai. The importance of this event is not to be
understated. After all, it was the 1873 international exposition in
Vienna that led to the creation of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, which set the modern standard for
worldwide protection of patents, trademarks, and other industrial
461
property rights.
Nevertheless, as much as China wants to showcase its improvement
in intellectual property protection through these major international
events, its showcase might be limited to the major cities and the
coastal areas. As Part III pointed out, China is a “country of
countries,” and what happened in its major cities may not be extended
to other cities, townships, or the rural areas. This is particularly true
with respect to trademark protection. Due to the enormous disparity
in wealth and purchasing power, the goods that are in high demand
in the inland and rural areas may be quite different from those in the
major cities. The extent of counterfeiting and the protection of
trademarks, as a result, may vary significantly.
CONCLUSION
In the late 1980s, the United States pursued a very aggressive
foreign intellectual property policy toward China. It repeatedly
threatened the country with economic sanctions, trade wars, nonrenewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to entry into the
WTO. Although the policy had initial success, leading to the
promulgation of the 1990 Copyright Law, a complete overhaul of the
Chinese intellectual property system, and the creation of the current
enforcement infrastructure, the policy had become largely ineffective
by the mid-1990s. It cost the U.S. government not only credibility
before the Chinese leaders, but also the support of its business
constituency, which increasingly criticized the administration for
having a counterproductive U.S.-China foreign policy. Even worse,
the policy fostered resentment among the Chinese while jeopardizing
the United States’ longstanding interests in promoting free trade,
human rights, and rule of law.
In 2001, China became the 143rd member of the WTO, less than
two decades years after it (re)introduced a Western-style intellectual
461. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 105, at 343-48 (discussing the 1873
international exposition in Vienna and the origin of the Paris Convention).
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property regime.
China’s WTO accession presents both an
opportunity and a danger. While it is beneficial to have China playing
by the same rules like all other countries, a blunder by this emerging
trading power could ruin the entire international trading system.
Policymakers, therefore, are actively exploring options to induce
China to play by the WTO rules, in particular those concerning
protection of intellectual property rights under the TRIPs Agreement.
In exploring these options, countries need to be careful about how
they engage China in the process, especially at a time when the
country is still learning how to comply with the different demanding
requirements of the WTO. A misstep in the U.S.-China intellectual
property policy of the 1990s created “a cycle of futility” that backfired
on the United States’ longstanding interests. A misstep today would
have similar effects.
The piracy and counterfeiting stories about China have been told
often, but they remain important, and their plots continue to change.
A careful study of these plots not only reveal the country’s rapidlychanging local conditions, but also provide critical insights into the
difficulty countries face in complying with strong intellectual property
standards, the difference between the Chinese and Western legal
cultures, the unique nature of intellectual property protection, and
the different considerations and concerns less developed and
transition countries have over the one-size-fits-all intellectual property
system pushed by the European Communities and the United States.
At the ceremony of China’s WTO accession at the Fourth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Doha, former Chinese Minister of
Commerce Shi Guangsheng declared: “China’s accession to the WTO
is not only in the interest of China, but also in the interest of the
462
world.” While the piracy and counterfeiting stories discussed in this
Article feature China primarily, a better understanding of these stories
will benefit not just the Chinese, but every member of the
international trading community.

462. Guangsheng Shi, Introduction: Working Together for a Brighter Future Based on
Mutual Benefit, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 68, at 15, 17.

